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This study explores the intersection of religion and the economy by focusing on the 
case of socially responsible investing (SRI) mutual funds that are also religiously 
affiliated.  Mutual fund managers and investors understandably want competitive 
return performance from their investments.  Yet religious fund actors are also oriented 
toward avoiding ownership in “sin stocks” and/or trying to change the behavior of 
corporations that are held in investment portfolios.  Meeting both monetary and moral 
objectives can be a challenge.  In this study, I address two broad research questions.  
Firstly, how do social actors balance their moral commitments against their monetary 
interest?  Through 29 semi-formal phone interviews with fund producers (or the 
employees) of Catholic, Muslim and Protestant religious mutual funds, I analyze their 
embedding and differentiating cultural work as they make sense of their involvement 
in the economic and religious spheres (Chapter 1).  In a separate analysis, I conduct 
and analyze 41 phone interviews with investors of one religious fund family, 
Mennonite Mutual Aid (MMA) Praxis mutual funds.  In particular, I compare the 
moral meaning respondents articulate for their charitable giving and their SR investing 
(Chapter 4).  Secondly, I query whether the moral orientation of investors impacts 
their financial market behavior?  Using data from the Center for Research in Security 
 Prices (CRSP) from 1991 to 2007, I partition mutual funds into religious SRI, 
religious non-SRI and secular SRI and look for differences in levels of fund asset 
stability. This stability refers to fund flow volatility and the extent to which investors 
hold on to their fund shares with little regard to past return performance.  Religious 
SRI assets are found to be the most stable fund category and I adjudicate whether the 
structural characteristics of religious groups or the moral orientation of religious 
investors best explains this empirical finding (Chapter 2).  In a separate analysis, I 
analyze original phone survey data of MMA Praxis investors.  This article’s 
theoretical orientation focuses on moral and monetary “interest,” defined as an 
individual level driving force.  I find empirical evidence that moral interest induces 
fund commitment to SRI mutual funds, demonstrating that morality impacts behavior 
even in the financial market, a realm where monetary interest supposedly reigns. At 
the same time, I also find some evidence that monetary interest decreases fund 
commitment (Chapter 3).   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 You can’t serve both God and Money.  This biblical quote promises an 
intriguing spectacle wherever religious and economic spheres come in close contact 
with one another.  Max Weber recognized the salience of religious and economic 
spheres and argued their surprising collision in Northern Europe provided the spark 
that helped create a new version of rational capitalistic enterprise.  In studying 
religious mutual funds, I cast my analytical gaze to the sparks, so to speak, dancing 
forth from the friction of religion and a rather modern face of capitalism, the financial 
market.   
 Socially responsible investing (SRI) mutual funds afford individuals the 
opportunity to ethically invest in the financial market.  For instance, many SRIs avoid 
the so called “sin stocks,” that is, companies involved with gaming, alcohol and 
tobacco.  About a third of SRI funds are religiously affiliated.  The individuals that 
work for religious mutual funds (whom I will call fund producers) and the individuals 
who invest in them, intentionally marry their financial profit motives with their 
religious sensibilities of purity and how the world ought to be.  In the following pages, 
I direct my attention to this particular intersection of religion and the economy  
I think of the religious sphere as encompassing the beliefs, practices and 
experiences that are oriented toward a supreme being and mediated by institutional 
religious groups.  The face of religion that I will emphasize is morality.  In using the 
term morality, I am referring to individual perceptions of how the world ought to be.  
There are other ways, besides morality, that religion might impact SRI behavior.  For 
example, networks of co-religionists could help explain the heightened levels of fund 
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asset stability I will find among religious SRI funds.  However, I gain more traction in 
this analysis by emphasizing morality.  And since morality need not be religiously 
motivated, generalization beyond my religious fund context becomes possible. 
 The economic sphere refers to people interacting together to produce, 
redistribute and consume scarce resources and services.  I pursue an individual-level 
of analysis, zoning in on the individuals that produce religious fund investment 
vehicles and those that consume them.  I theorize material (or monetary) interest as an 
important factor in understanding this financial market activity.  By monetary interest, 
I simply mean individuals are driven to accumulate more dollars.  This is increasingly 
the case as individuals have become responsible for their own retirement investments, 
instead of relying on employer pension benefits as in decades past.  Mutual funds are a 
prime financial vehicle that many Americans have turned to in order to save for 
retirement.   
 Parting ways with the bulk of SRI research that addresses whether SRI return 
performance is comparable to conventional investments, I pursue a different line of 
inquiry.  My sociological predilection drives me to understand how individuals 
meaningfully engage in the social action that we study.  In particular, I aim to hear 
how the people involved with religious mutual funds pursue their monetary goals 
alongside their moral goals. In doing so, I draw upon and hopefully expand the 
sociological subfields of economic sociology and sociology of religion.   
 I am fortunate that Mennonite Mutual Aid (now called Everence) Praxis 
Mutual Funds granted me access to the contact information of their fund investors.  
This made it possible for me to conduct an unprecedented phone survey of SR 
investors.  I also personally conduct forty-one phone interviews with a subset of that 
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survey sample population.  These investor level data are analyzed in the final two 
chapters.  
All of the following chapters are crafted to stand alone, but with each touching 
upon the common case of religious mutual funds.  This means there will be times that 
I repeat myself, frequently in defining SRIs and setting a similar stage for each 
chapter’s distinct analytical task.  In sum, I draw upon five different sources of data 
and employ both qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis in answering these 
two broad research questions.  Firstly, how do social actors balance their moral 
commitments against their monetary interest?  Secondly, does the moral orientation of 
investors impact their financial market behavior?   
 Employees of religiously affiliated mutual funds seek to earn competitive 
returns for investors while abiding by moral principles stemming from their particular 
religious tradition. In the first chapter, I analyze 29 in-depth interviews with these fund 
producers, examining their cultural work as they negotiate the relationship between 
religious and economic spheres.  The secularization paradigm from sociology of 
religion highlights the differentiation of societal spheres, while the embeddedness 
paradigm from economic sociology underscores their entanglement.  I find that fund 
producers both embed and differentiate religion and finance, and suggest the 
organizational structure of the fund family best explains the patterns of cultural work 
that I find.   
In chapter 2, I garner empirical evidence to investigate whether the moral 
orientation of SR investors impacts their financial market behavior.  Using mutual 
fund data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), I partition mutual 
funds into religious SRI, religious non-SRI, secular SRI and conventional funds and 
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look for differences in levels of fund asset stability. This stability refers to the extent 
to which investors hold on to their fund shares with little regard to past return 
performance and over all fund flow volatility. Religious SRI assets are found to be the 
most stable fund category and I adjudicate whether the structural characteristics of 
religious groups or the moral orientation of religious investors best explains this 
empirical finding. 
 Analyzing original survey data, I expand my purview of morality in the 
financial market to include the behavior and attitudes of individual SR investors.  
Chapter 3’s theoretical orientation focuses on moral and monetary “interest,” defined 
as an individual level driving force.  This theoretical emphasis on individual interest 
expands both economic sociology’s structural approach and behavioral economics’ 
emphasis on cognitive biases.  I find empirical evidence that moral interest induces 
fund commitment to SRI mutual funds, demonstrating that morality impacts behavior 
even in the financial market, a realm where monetary interest supposedly reigns. At 
the same time, I also find some evidence that monetary interest decreases fund 
commitment.   
 Having carefully established that morality is, at least partially, driving SR 
investment behavior in chapters 2 and 3, I coin a category of social action I refer to as 
moral economic behavior (MEB).  This refers to economic behavior that includes an 
explicit shot of morality.  In Chapter 4, I unearth a puzzle by focusing on two 
examples of MEB, SR investing and charitable giving.  Despite the fact that SRIs have 
been available for decades, few American investors are putting their money where 
their heart is.  In contrast, Americans are notoriously generous when it comes to 
giving their money away.  Why are Americans so willing to give their money away, 
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yet hesitant to invest ethically?  To help solve this puzzle, I visit the theoretical 
concept of “mental accounting” taken from behavioral economics and “social meaning 
of money” from economic sociology.  I employ a mixed method analysis of Praxis 
investors and find both morality and social relations help solve the puzzle of low SRI 
involvement. 
 In each chapter, I address a unique spark that is fashioned by the friction of 
religion and the economy.  At times, those sparks might be viewed favorably, in the 
form of heightened levels of commitment to one’s religious SRI fund.  In other 
instances, I draw out the tension or difficulty that individuals experience at this unique 
intersection, as they attempt to serve God and money.   
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CHAPTER 1 
BETWEEN GOD AND THE MARKET: THE CULTURAL WORK OF RELIGIOUS 
MUTUAL FUND PRODUCERS 
 
Religious mutual funds represent a unique intersection of religion and 
the financial market.  Employees of these religious funds seek to earn 
competitive returns for investors while abiding by moral principles 
stemming from their particular religious tradition.  Through 29 in-
depth interviews with Catholic, Muslim and Protestant fund 
producers, I examine their cultural work as they negotiate the 
relationship between religious and economic spheres.  The 
secularization paradigm from sociology of religion highlights the 
differentiation of societal spheres, while the embeddedness paradigm 
from economic sociology underscores their entanglement.  I find that 
fund producers both embed and differentiate religion and finance and 
suggest the organizational structure of the fund family best explains 
the patterns of cultural work that I find.   
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Individuals combine the spheres of religion and the economy in varied ways.  
Examples of harmonious intersections include religious charities’ dutiful collection of 
donations to be distributed to disaster victims.  Providing clergy a monetary income in 
exchange for spiritual services is also an accepted blend of religion and money 
(Wuthnow 1997).  However, one can also point to more dissonant combinations.  For 
instance, the Catholic Church’s hawking of indulgences for exorbitant prices was 
objectionable to many and helped start the Protestant Reformation.  Prosperity 
gospel’s teaching that God is “in the business” of making true followers rich strikes 
many as inappropriate.  It is important to note, however, that these judgments are 
subjective.  The perception of harmonious or dissonant combinations varies across 
time and individuals and is the result of a cultural (or meaning-making) process.  
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Some denominations have historically resisted paying salaries to their spiritual leaders 
(Hess 1928).  Likewise, many have no problem believing God doles out financial 
rewards and adhere to the prosperity gospel (Harrison 2005).  This article analyzes 
qualitative interview data to examine the cultural work of individuals as they confront 
both religious and economic spheres.   
To analyze how individual actors relate religious and economic spheres, I 
consider the case of religious mutual funds in the United States (Mueller 1994, 
Boasson, Boasson, and Cheng 2006, Peifer 2011).  Most religious funds are socially 
responsible investing (SRI) mutual funds and refuse to invest in certain stocks that are 
considered immoral (this process is known as screening).  For instance, Muslim funds 
refuse to invest in the financial sector due to Muslim prohibitions on usury (or 
interest). Other Protestant and Catholic funds avoid pornography, companies involved 
in the abortion industry, and companies that provide same sex employment benefits.  
Other Catholic and denominational funds screen out environmental polluters, 
companies with excessive executive compensation packages or companies with poor 
labor relations.  These examples of refusing to invest in certain stocks or entire 
industries preclude certain diversification strategies and are frequently argued to harm 
the fund’s return performance (Goldreyer and Diltz 1999).  People who work at these 
funds (fund producers) face the task of joining together their religious beliefs with the 
economic goal of earning a competitive return for investors.   
Religious mutual funds dwell at the intersection of two sociological subfields, 
sociology of religion and economic sociology (Smelser and Swedberg 2005).  In effort 
to bring these rarely combined subfields into dialogue with one another, I borrow 
theoretical language from important paradigms of each subfield.  A macro-level 
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articulation of secularization theory, from sociology of religion, asserts that societal 
spheres (such as religion, science, education, the state and the economy) have become 
increasingly differentiated over time (Dobbelaere 1981, Tschannen 1991, Cassanova 
1994, Smith 2003).  “One of the consequences of differentiation is that the other 
institutions become autonomous from religion, which thus loses its power of social 
control and guidance over the rest of society” (Tschannen 1991).  Research in this vein 
has explored the combination of the religious and scientific spheres (Lemert 1979, 
Ecklund and Park 2009, Ecklund 2010).  This article also complements existing 
sociology of religion research that considers the economic sphere in relation to the 
religious sphere (Finke and Stark 1988, Wuthnow 1994, Iannaccone 1995, Wuthnow 
2005, Keister 2008, Peifer 2010).   
For the purpose of this research, the religious sphere is defined as beliefs and 
practices that are oriented toward a supreme being and mediated by institutional 
religious groups.  The economic sphere refers to the pursuit of one’s monetary interest 
in a capitalistic context.  This terminology of societal spheres is borrowed from Weber 
([1915]1946) who considers the intersection of the religious ethic of brotherliness and 
various societal spheres (including economic, political, esthetic, erotic and 
intellectual).   
 Karl Polanyi’s ([1944]2001) conceptualization of embeddedness expresses the 
idea that “the economy is not autonomous, as it must be in economic theory, but 
subordinated to politics, religion and social relations” (Block 2001, xxiv).1  Economic 
sociologists have extended Polanyi’s notion of embeddedness by looking at the state 
and the economy and highlighting Polanyi’s insight that these spheres are best viewed 
as comfortably intermeshed (Block and Evans 2005) or that the degree to which they 
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overlap varies across time and national contexts (Evans 1995, Hall and Soskice 2001).  
However, this intellectual project has largely ignored religion.   
  The paradigms of secularization and embeddedness lead in different 
directions.  A Polanyian embeddedness paradigm would highlight how religion and 
the economy are comfortably embedded or entangled, while a classical secularization 
approach would emphasize the differentiation of these spheres.2  While both 
paradigms most directly address temporal societal level processes, I borrow their 
conceptual language of differentiation and embeddedness to help motivate this 
article’s individual-level analysis.  Cultural sociology’s symbolic boundary theory 
(Lamont and Molnar 2002) and cultural repertoire theory (Swidler 1986) are utilized 
to analyze the cultural work of religious mutual fund producers.  The research 
question this article addresses is: how do the fund producers who find themselves 
between God and the market perceive the relationship between religious and 
economic spheres?  The forthcoming analysis of interview data is divided into 
examples of embedding cultural work and differentiating cultural work.  After 
providing examples of each, I look for patterned tendencies to practice embedding or 
differentiating cultural work by considering organizational structure and religious 
tradition. 
A Cultural Approach to the Financial Market 
 An empirical question that has occupied the bulk of scholarly research on SRI 
is whether it harms return performance relative to conventional investing.  Some find 
ethical investment criteria hamper returns (Mueller 1994), others find they induce high 
returns (Margolis and Walsh 2003, Shank, Manullang, and Hill  2005, Boasson, 
  10 
Boasson, and Cheng 2006) and still others find no difference (Hamilton, Jo, and 
Statman 1993, Naber 2001, Guerard and Stone 2002, Bauer, Koedijk and Otten 2005, 
Kurtz and DiBartolomeo 2005).  In sum, the scholarly evidence on the SRI impact on 
return performance is mixed.  This important research question highlights the 
monetary impulse at play in the financial market.  Namely, fund producers and 
investors alike want to accumulate more money and be socially responsible.  This 
strong drive for money (and the uncertainty of whether this goal is best met through 
SRI) produces a salient counterpart to the religious motivations at play.   
 Cultural sociologists provide helpful ways to understand just this type of 
cultural work individuals engage in.  Symbolic boundaries or “distinctions made by 
social actors to categorize objects, people, practices…” have become an important 
concept in cultural sociology (Lamont and Molnar 2002:168).  Zerubavel (1991:57) 
describes a rigid Durkhemian distinction between the sacred and the profane which are 
“mutually exclusive and are separated from each other by the widest mental gulf 
imaginable.”  I borrow the concept of symbolic boundaries to help conceptualize 
interactions between religious and financial spheres.  The permeability or rigidity of 
symbolic boundaries will be explored as a way to discuss the intersection of these 
spheres (Lamont 2001).  In addition to symbolic boundary work, individuals draw 
upon their available repertoire of cultural justifications (Swidler 1986, Vaisey 2009) to 
find meaning in their daily lives.  Both of these processes (symbolic boundary work 
and accessing one’s cultural repertoire) are more generally referred to as cultural 
work.   
In Purchase of Intimacy, Zelizer (2005) considers societal spheres of intimacy 
and the economy by analyzing legal cases that involve economic exchanges between 
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intimate parties.  In discussing how these spheres combine in the legal system, she 
defines the hostile worlds point of view as the notion that economic and intimate 
spheres ought not intermix.  Throughout the book, Zelizer dismisses the hostile worlds 
position and instead highlights the ability of actors to successfully embed these 
spheres through relational work.  Closer to the subject matter of this article, Lindsay 
(2007) interviews over one hundred evangelical corporate elites and finds, “the 
borders between the religious and the economic realms have become increasingly 
porous” (pg. 163).  These works point toward a harmonious embedding of religion and 
finance. 
In Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions, Weber 
([1915]1946) suggests religion’s “ethic of brotherliness” finds a particularly tense 
relationship with the economic sphere, mainly because of the rationalized economy’s 
impersonal nature.  In a similar vein, Wuthnow (1994) finds that Americans feel 
discomfort as they combine their religious faith with their economic lives.  “If a single 
word had to be used to describe the relationship between religion and money… it 
would be compartmentalization… Although many people claim to think about the 
connections between their faith and their money, something seems to encourage them 
to draw a fairly sharp distinction between these two realms” (pg. 150-51).  Friedland 
and Alford (1991) describe five central institutional orders (or societal spheres) of 
contemporary Western societies: capitalist market, bureaucratic state, democracy, 
nuclear family and Christian religion.  Each sphere has its own unique “institutional 
logic.” Friedland and Alford (1991) state, “Some of the most important struggles 
between groups, organizations, and classes are over the appropriate relationships 
between institutions, and by which institutional logic different activities should be 
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regulated and to which categories of persons they apply…. Are families, churches, or 
states to control education?  Should reproduction be regulated by state, family or 
church” (pg. 256)?  In sum, these scholars lead us to believe the religious and 
economic spheres will be differentiated.  This article explores whether (and if so, how) 
religious fund producers experience “institutional contradiction” of market capitalism 
and religion.   
Mutual Funds 
The number of mutual funds has grown precipitously (Davis 2009) in the past 
three decades from around 500 funds in 1980 to 8,022 in 2008.  The total number of 
religious funds rose more recently (in the early 90’s), revealing a growth trajectory 
that is similar to all mutual funds, but on a much smaller scale (see Figure 1.1).  A 
mutual fund is an investment vehicle where professional investment managers 
diversify a pool of money in stocks and/or bonds.  A small portion of investment 
dollars are used to pay for their investment expertise and overhead costs, while the 
returns or losses of the investment accrue to the contributing investors.  Forty-five 
percent of American households have owned some kind of mutual fund and more than 
three quarters of those households invest in mutual funds to save for retirement 
(Investment Company Institute 2009).  Mutual funds provide a common way for many 
Americans to diversify their retirement investments in the financial market. 
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Figure 1.1: Number of U.S. Mutual Funds from 1970 to 2008 
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A religious mutual fund is part of a fund family3 that claims an institutional 
religious identity.  I have identified 97 religious mutual funds nested within 18 fund 
families in the United States, which is the most comprehensive list that I am aware of 
(see Table 1.1 for list of religious fund families).  The fund families’ religious 
affiliations include Catholic, Muslim and Protestant (both denominationally affiliated 
and non-denominational).  One percent (97/8,022) of all mutual funds is religiously 
affiliated,4 which may strike many as a low percentage given the relatively high levels 
of American religiosity (Demerath 1998).   
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Table 1.1: List of Religious Mutual Fund Families in the United States  
(as of December 31, 2008) 
Fund Family Religious Affiliation 
Number of 
Funds 
Total Net 
Assets 
Thrivent Lutheran 29 11,314.7 
GuideStone Southern Baptist 20 10,355.8 
New Covenant Presbyterian U.S.A. 4 1,260.3 
Amana Muslim 2 1,146.0 
MMA Praxis Mennonite 6 557.2 
Steward Protestant (Non-Denominational) 5 422.0 
Ave Maria Catholic 6 380.6 
Timothy Plan Protestant (Non-Denominational) 11 328.8 
LKCM Aquinas Catholic 4 65.5 
Capstone Protestant (Non-Denominational) 1 53.3 
IMAN Muslim 1 24.6 
Allegiance  Christian Science 1 13.2 
Shepherd Protestant (Non-Denominational) 1 7.0 
CAMCO Protestant (Non-Denominational) 1 6.5 
Azzad Muslim 2 6.0 
Centurion Protestant (Non-Denominational) 1 3.0 
Epiphany Catholic 1 1.9 
Eventide Protestant (Non-Denominational) 1 1.0 
    97 25,947.5 
Note: Total net assets are in millions of dollars as of December 31, 2008.  Fund families are 
presented in order of total net assets. 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal 
 
There are three general contributing factors that have led to the formation of 
these religious mutual funds: Islamic economics, institutional experience in the 
financial market and the more recent advent of socially responsible investing.  Many 
Muslim countries have adopted Islamic economics in mid-20th century (Kuran 1997).  
One challenge of blending Islamic economics with a modern economy is Islam’s 
prohibition of riba (or usury).  To overcome this challenge, Islamic banks become co-
purchasers with the buyer instead of loaning money and collecting interest.  In this 
way, the bank shares in both the profits and the losses with the buyer.  US Muslim 
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immigrants have become increasingly interested in shariah compliant financial 
products, such as Islamic mortgages (Maurer 2006) and Islamic mutual funds.  Mutual 
fund investors do not accrue money through the collection of interest, rather mostly 
through capital gains.  In this way, mutual funds are quite amenable to Islam’s 
prohibition of riba, provided fund managers refuse to invest in corporations that earn 
income from the collection of interest.  Muslim mutual funds represent one particular 
instantiation of the international resurgence of Islamic economics.   
American denominational institutions have been connected to the financial 
market in various ways since at least the early 20th century.  For instance, religious 
denominations issued bonds to raise money for church related capital campaigns 
(Eckhart 1929) and issued gift annuities, where the principal that remained at the time 
of the holder’s death would automatically accrue to a particular religious cause (Evans 
1927, Merriam 1929).  Denominations also invested their own assets directly in the 
financial market (Financial 1931, An Interview 1931, Lindsay and Wuthnow 2010).  
These are just a few examples of the institutional experience religious denominations 
gained in the financial market, putting them in a natural position to adopt mutual funds 
as they became an increasingly popular investment vehicle in the latter half of the 20th 
century.  Most denominationally affiliated mutual funds (Baptist, Lutheran, Mennonite 
and Presbyterian) grew out of existing denominational institutions that had previous 
financial market experience.  
The SRI movement represents a third way religious mutual funds were formed.  
Kurtz (2008) asserts, “Religious belief was the first rationale for socially responsible 
investment, and remains an important force today, especially in the United States” (pg. 
253).  In the 1960’s, mainline denominations linked ethical concerns about the 
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Vietnam War and environmental pollution to investment decision making (Robinson 
2002).  In 1971, Methodist clergy established Pax World Fund, the first mutual fund 
family to screen for social issues (Shapiro 1992).5  That same year an Episcopalian 
Bishop attended a meeting of General Motors Corporation, asking the company to end 
its involvement in Apartheid South Africa.  Although the vote did not pass, the 
momentum for SRI grew and eventually many activists were insisting corporations 
sever relations with South Africa and that institutions (such as religious 
denominations) liquidate their South African affiliated assets (Robinson 2002).  
Catholic, Jewish and Unitarian organizations were also at the forefront of the SRI 
movement (Social Investment Forum Foundation 2009).  Since the mutual fund 
industry was growing during this time, SRI was naturally incorporated into these 
investment vehicles.  Most of the denominational funds adopted SRI criteria as they 
rolled out their mutual funds, indicating a denomination’s institutional experience with 
finance and SRI are not mutually exclusive pathways to these religious funds.  
Furthermore, while many of the original SRI actors were pursuing socially liberal 
issues, funds that are motivated by socially conservative issues have also been created. 
Perhaps the most recognizable consequence of the funds’ religious affiliation is 
what kind of corporations they refuse to own.  For instance, Catholic funds refuse to 
own stock involved in the production of abortion or contraceptives.  A Christian 
Science fund screens out the pharmaceutical industry due to a belief in spiritual 
healing.  Mennonite funds shun weapon manufacturers and Muslim funds refuse to 
invest in any corporation that collects interest or produces pork or alcohol.  Some 
funds are also involved in shareholder advocacy, which includes communication with 
portfolio corporations, attending shareholding meetings or using proxy votes in order 
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to pressure corporations to change their behavior.  
More fundamentally, actors that work at these religious funds simultaneously 
pursue religious and economic goals.  This can create an uneasy combination.  For 
instance, refusing to invest in certain stocks or entire industries precludes certain 
diversification strategies and is frequently argued to harm the fund’s return 
performance (Goldreyer and Diltz 1999).  Alternatively, applying a moral lens to 
corporate America is bound to reveal problematic stock holdings in nearly any 
portfolio, leaving a fund family vulnerable to questions about the chosen level of 
moral scrutiny.   
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In this article, I analyze the discourse of religious fund producers, or the people 
who work at religious mutual funds.  The term producer is meant to indicate both the 
production of mutual funds as a financial commodity and as a cultural object 
(Griswold 1987).  These producers are charged with upholding both the financial and 
the religious goals of the funds.  I conducted semi-formal interviews (mostly phone 
interviews) with at least one representative from 14 of the 18 fund families between 
April 2008 and May 2009, achieving a 78 percent response rate.6  I also visited the 
offices of three fund families (one Muslim fund, one Catholic and one denominational 
fund family) to conduct in-person interviews and observe the workplace environments.   
Interview respondents agreed to participate on the condition that I do my best 
to protect their identity.  I therefore give vague descriptions of interview respondents, 
usually by providing their job description and the religious tradition (Catholic, Muslim 
or Protestant) they represent.  The interviews analyzed in this article were with fund 
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managers, fund family presidents, marketing managers and various other actors in the 
fund families.  Since these fund producers spend their professional lives working at 
this explicit intersection of religion and the economy, this case study is well suited for 
the analytical task at hand.  Speaking with more than one representative from some 
fund families, I interviewed 29 fund producers, with a mean interview length of 47 
minutes.  All interviews were transcribed for content analysis.   
The interviews were semi-structured and all proceeded in the following format.  
After briefly describing my interest in learning more about religious funds, I asked 
how the fund family was founded, about the fund’s relationship with a larger religious 
group, how screening criteria were selected and operationalized, and how religion 
impacted the respondent’s daily work routine.  I also prompted respondents to talk 
about how they perceived the intersection of religion and finance.  I typically said 
something like, “Many people I talk to don’t think ‘religious’ and ‘mutual fund’ 
belong in the same sentence.  How would you respond to that?” Among some 
Christian respondents, I cited a Biblical passage which states that one can’t serve both 
God and Mammon (or money) (Mathew 6:24) and I then wondered out loud whether 
religious funds were attempting to do just that (see Appendix 1 for interview script).  I 
approach my data as “hermeneutic interviews” (Spickard 2007) and seek to represent 
my interviewees’ “conscious view of the world, of themselves, and of their place in it” 
(pg. 139).  Therefore, during my interviews, I often repeated what I heard them saying, 
and asked if I had understood them properly.  In contrast, a non-hermeneutic interview 
approach (not taken here) is aimed at uncovering a reality that is inaccessible to the 
interviewee (pg. 129).  
 In addition to interviews, I also analyzed each mutual fund’s legally mandated 
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prospectus and annual report from 2007 to 2008.  The prospectus outlines the 
investment strategy and potential risks of the mutual fund.  Annual reports (or semi-
annual reports) are made available to all investors, and include a letter from the fund 
manager to investors as well as a report on the fund’s recent performance and other 
relevant financial information. These documents serve the dual purpose of meeting 
legal transparency requirements and marketing the fund family to investors.  I also 
analyzed each fund family’s website material.  Most of the analysis below relies on the 
interview material, but these publicly visible documents are also important since they 
represent carefully scripted presentations of the fund family.   
 
FINDINGS 
Embedding Spheres: Sunday = Monday 
 At some point in most interviews, I introduced the notion that religion and the 
economy should not intermix.  Seventy-nine percent (11/14) of fund families were 
represented by an interviewee that disagreed with this prompt.8  For instance, one 
Catholic fund manager explained that Christ did not “separate religion and life and,” 
[did not] “say, ‘Here’s your religion over there, and go to the temple on those days, 
and on the other days do whatever you want…” Another non-denominational 
Protestant fund representative explained, 
…as a Christian, you are to live your life as Jesus lived his life.  That 
just doesn’t mean on Sunday mornings, that’s 7 days a week, 24 hours 
a day.  If that’s the case, then whether you’re cutting the grass or 
interacting with your family, or considering your investment portfolio, 
being a Christian is part of the decision, part of the process.  So you 
can’t exclude any aspect of your life when you consider yourself a 
Christian. 
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When asked what kind of people invest in his fund, this respondent replied, “I just 
know the vast majority are devout Christian people.  The vast majority are folks that 
want to live their entire lives for the Lord.  And they don’t distinguish between 
Sunday and Monday.”   
Georg Simmel is seldom cited for his work on religion, yet his depiction of 
religiosity is particularly helpful on this point.  For Simmel, religious fervor overflows 
into all realms of life.  “The truly religious person does not view religion as the 
celebration of certain specific moments in his life, like the garlands of roses that 
enhance the day’s festivities but wither in the evening.  The religious mood is present, 
at least potentially, at every moment of that person’s life, because to him it is the very 
foundation of life, the source of all his energies” (Simmel [1904]1997:38).  Similar to 
Simmel’s depiction, these respondents muddy the distinction between Sunday and 
Monday, dissolving the symbolic boundaries and thereby comfortably embedding 
religion and finance. 
I also mentioned the following biblical passage to some Christian respondents: 
“No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or 
else he will hold to the one, and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and mammon” 
(Mathew 6:24, King James Version).  I then queried whether religious funds were 
trying to do just that, serve God and Mammon.  A frequent retort was the citation of 
competing Bible verses.  An evangelical fund representative said, “I don’t think 
there’s any tension at all…  Remember also the parable of the talents.”  In this parable 
(Matthew 25:14-30, Luke 19:12-27) delivered by Jesus, servants were given money by 
their master.  Upon the master’s return, the servants were asked to account for what 
they did with the money.  The one that failed to invest and earn a return was chastised.  
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The fund representative continued, “You don’t take your money out and hide it, you 
put it to work for the Kingdom.  Well, if you’re going to put it to work for the 
Kingdom, you put it to work in the best manner that you can.  Our goal is to multiply 
the talents, but our goal is to also invest in those vehicles and those companies that 
Jesus would say, ‘Hey, that’s a pretty good deal.’”   
 The concept of stewardship was commonly mentioned by fund representatives 
and cited in the funds’ promotional material.  One Christian fund family adopted the 
name, calling its fund family Steward Funds.  Moody and Payton (2004) suggest that 
the concept of stewardship can be summed up as the belief that “everything… belongs 
to God, and while we are permitted to use it, we must take care to use it well.”  
Religious funds capitalized on this, explaining that all assets belong to God.  In a 
promotional flyer posted on their website, The Timothy Plan (a non-denominational 
Protestant mutual fund family) posts conjectural comments from investors followed by 
a pithy response from God.  With aptly placed quotations, the flyer reads… 
Man Says: But it’s “my money!”  
God Says: The Lord has entrusted it to your care and you are 
accountable for it (Man Says 2008). 
 
 A Muslim fund representative relayed the concept of stewardship (without 
using that specific term) from an account taken from the Hadith where a young boy 
was asked to watch over the animals of a stranger.  As the stranger returned to the 
animals and the boy, he thought to himself, I should pay this boy 10 dinars.  
Meanwhile, the boy considered stealing the stranger’s satchel and selling it in the 
market for 10 dinars.  The fund producer explains,   
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So our belief is that, one way or another the kid was going to get 10 
dinars.  It was written for him.  The question is whether he was going 
to get it by permissible means, in the case of watching over the 
animals, or whether it be by impermissible means, in the case of 
stealing the satchel and selling it in the market.  So that’s why the 
source of our wealth must come through permissible means… 
Ultimately, since we believe the money that we have is given to us by 
God, what we do with that wealth is the key determining factor…  Are 
you investing in activities that are impermissible?  In our belief, if 
you’re buying something that’s impermissible and making money on 
it, that’s basically like poison in the system.   
 Another way respondents spoke about religion and financial investments was 
to highlight an age-old economic and religious activity: charitable giving.  John 
Wesley’s ([1872] 1999) sermon entitled the Use of Money blends the counsel to gain 
all you can (without harming your neighbor) so that you can give all you can.  One 
denominational fund producer adopted this Wesleyan logic as he explained, “We try to 
help people reach their financial goals because so many of the people who work with 
[us] have admirable financial goals.  [Members of this denomination]…are extremely 
charitable.  So by helping our members reach their financial goals, take care of their 
children, take care of their parents in retirement, whatever that may be, we feel like, in 
a sense we contribute to the greater good.”  Another evangelical fund hopes to give 
away a portion of the fund family’s profits to religious organizations.  “One of the 
things we hope will prove both interesting and distinctive about [our fund] is we have 
committed to donate to Christian ministry and charities from our profits, once we’re 
profitable, basically, 25 percent of revenue on an ongoing basis.”  Turning profits into 
charitable contributions was another way actors brought religion and finance together 
in a comfortable fashion. 
 At least one representative from 11 of the 14 fund families sampled provided 
examples of embedding (or comfortably combining) religion and finance.  In some 
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cases, this was accomplished through drawing porous symbolic boundaries, 
exemplified by seeing no distinction between Sunday and Monday.  In addition to this 
boundary work, respondents also drew upon their cultural repertoire of stories and 
wisdom from sacred texts in order to provide support for the appropriateness of 
combining religion and finance.  Stewardship was one important concept.  Fund 
producers also associated their funds with charitable giving, a legitimate economic 
activity that has long been associated with the religious sphere.  
 
Differentiating Spheres: “Meditation and Munis” 
 Other fund producers readily articulated a meaningful differentiation of 
religion and finance.  Alluding to the impossibility of serving both God and Mammon, 
I asked a denominational fund manager if he saw any tension in operating a religious 
fund.    
I think there could be.  We don’t try to hold ourselves out as someone 
representing the religion or embodying the whole sense of the 
religion.  And I think that helps us steer clear of that dangerous area 
that you’re mentioning...  I’m very uncomfortable with somehow 
representing the… church in this mutual fund.  A church has nothing 
to do with money, really.  A church is about helping people find their 
true spiritual strength.  Helping them through their difficult times.  It’s 
not about making money for people.  That has nothing to do with 
church or religion. 
 
In a similar fashion, a Muslim fund manager was also wary of combining religion and 
finance too closely. 
The difference with us and other Islamic firms is that some of them 
will say, ‘we are sharia compliant,’ which means we are compliant 
with Islamic law, which is holding yourself to an amazing standard.  It 
means that you know for sure that your product is compliant with 
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Islamic law.  And what we say is our product is informed by Islamic 
law.  In other words, our intention is to invest in accordance to Islamic 
law.  But we can’t tell you that this is 100 percent in accordance with 
the law. 
 
Both of the above fund managers are careful not to make unwarranted religious claims 
in the financial realm by maintaining rigid symbolic boundaries, a process I call 
compartmentalization.  Perhaps related to this type of boundary work, both of the fund 
families these preceding respondents represent make no explicit mention of their 
religious affiliation in their promotional and legal material.  Out of the eighteen 
religious fund families, only three did not explicitly advertise their religious affiliation.  
A non-denominational Protestant fund family is the third.8 Since these three fund 
families span religious traditions (denominational, non-denominational Protestant and 
Muslim) it is difficult to argue that one particular religious tradition is more likely 
compartmentalize.   
  I also asked some fund managers whether they prayed over their stock picks.  
Just as a farmer might pray for rain it seems conceivable that religious fund managers 
would pray for positive returns or extraordinary stock picking abilities.  But the 
response I received was generally one of nervous laughter revealing that praying over 
a stock pick was not an acceptable way to mix religion and finance.  One 
denominational fund manager responded that he prayed for “calm.”  After an awkward 
pause, he noted the irony in a story of a bond manager who happened to be a devotee 
of yoga, and…  
was talking about how that gives him peace, the meditative aspect…  
One quote really caught my attention.  “Well, I came up with the idea 
of buying munis [municipal bonds] during a sun salutation.”  You can 
imagine him looking out over the Pacific Ocean while doing yoga, 
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coming up with some very capitalistic, very self-serving strategy.  It's 
kind of funny. 
 
In this example, praying for calm was ok, but being “enlightened” with profitable 
investment schemes was less legitimate.  This example of compartmentalization 
cordons off spiritual practices (such as praying or meditation) from financial 
investment decision making.   
  A representative from another denominational fund had difficulty reconciling 
faith and finance.  He reasoned,  
We live in a sinful world… we have to recognize that we’re a part of. 
And so, you just have to accept that as a basic premise of not only 
your investment portfolio, but the way that you live your life…  You 
would never go into that Exxon Mobil Station, because they sell 
cigarettes, lottery tickets and so forth.  So we have to recognize that 
there is no perfect solution in this world for the convergence of these 
factors.  Then you have to figure out, ok, how are you going to 
manage the competitive tension that exits between the social issues 
and all of the stakeholders that are involved in it.  That’s what we get 
paid to do. 
 
This fund manager reasons that he gets paid to confront the tension on behalf of the 
investors.  By pointing to the “sinful world” he excuses his fund family’s inability to 
bring the realms of religion and finance together in a more satisfactory fashion. 
 Five denominationally-affiliated fund families are but one branch of larger 
denominational organizations that are also involved in making various services 
available to members.  Some are financial services, such as health insurance, life 
insurance, annuities and mutual funds. Other services are less closely wed to the 
financial market, such as charitable giving or other congregational support systems.  
Some of the fund representatives I interviewed felt a certain sense of isolation within 
the larger denominational organization and attributed this to their proximity to the 
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financial market.  When asked how the larger denominational organization reacted to 
the financial crisis of 2008, a denominational fund representative explained,  
One of the themes that's been knocked around..., is ‘things are really 
bad, and God is still good.’  That's not a mutual fund tag line I'm 
giving you there.  But that's tough, when you’re a financial institution 
with fiduciary responsibilities and legal contractual obligations, 
maybe that's not quite enough.  Maybe that is enough for a church to 
say, but we straddle that chasm between being business and being 
church…  
 
Another producer explained the dual objectives housed in his denominational 
organization. 
Some of us are working more for a Fortune 500 financial services 
company, like me.  My world, I have to compete against the Fidelities 
and T. Rowe Prices and RiverSources and all these other firms.  Other 
parts of the organization are really all about working on the fraternal 
side, you know, how do congregations get stronger…working with 
Habitat for Humanity and overseas building trusts… Those folks feel 
like our mission is to… do good, and they are probably less engaged 
with the economic side. You can see how that might happen. 
 
 In another example, fund producers not only acknowledged, but also 
welcomed the discomfort that accompanies their combination of religion and finance.  
A marketing manager explained that their investors are very interested in having a 
“faith conversation” with their fund-sponsored financial advisor.   In fact, the financial 
advisors who offer the religious fund are trained to have that “faith conversation” and 
ask,  
‘What's your purpose in life?  What's God calling you to?’  And most 
people have a hard time doing that and it's sometimes an 
uncomfortable conversation….  You will not see this if you go to a 
Raymond James guy or an Edward Jones guy.  They will not talk 
about this.  In fact, they will avoid this at all costs.  We see, every 
time we do this, our customers love it.  We're trying to capitalize on 
this.  
  27 
 
The tension between religion and finance is exemplified by the “uncomfortable” faith 
conversation that financial advisors are encouraged to instigate.  Through its own 
marketing research, this fund family is convinced their clients value these 
conversations.  Some religious investors would rather experience the tension then 
ignore it. 
 At least one representative from 36 percent (5/14) of sampled fund families 
differentiated the societal spheres and articulated some degree of tension.  In one 
example, an Islamic fund producer was wary of adopting the “shariah compliant” 
label.  Others bristled at the prospect of praying for profitable stocks picks.  This type 
of symbolic boundary can be considered compartmentalization.  The physical 
proximity of financial market actors housed in larger denominational organizations 
also caused strain.  In yet another example, religious fund investors literally value the 
awkward conversation about faith and finance.  These examples show how fund 
producers meaningfully perceive dissonance stemming from these differentiated 
spheres.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Having presented examples of both embedding and differentiating cultural 
work, I now discuss whether patterns have emerged that help determine what kind of 
religious fund producer is more likely to engage in one or the other.  I do so by 
considering, first, the organizational structure and then secondly, the religious tradition 
of the fund family.   
The following fund families fall into the denominational organizational 
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structure; Allegiance (Christian Science), GuideStone (Southern Baptist), MMA 
Praxis (Mennonite Church USA), New Covenant (Presbyterian Church U.S.A) and 
Thrivent (Lutheran).  Representatives from four of these denominational fund families 
articulate differentiating cultural work. One interpretation of this pattern is the 
organizational proximity these fund producers have to other denominational 
employees that are not involved in the financial market.  By frequently rubbing 
shoulders with co-religionists who are primarily oriented to other denominational 
goals (such as religious education or denominational growth), denominational fund 
producers are more likely to perceive contradictions that arise from joining religion 
and finance.   
In contrast, Catholic and Muslim fund families tend to rely on spiritual leaders 
to dictate the religious implications of their work.  I refer to this as a hierarchical 
organizational structure.  For instance, a Catholic representative explains why his fund 
family does not screen out alcohol and tobacco stocks as follows, “We have a Catholic 
advisory board made up of lay Catholics and they have an advisor to them, a 
cardinal…, the archbishop of [the local] diocese.  And they’ve decided to focus on the 
few core issues that they’ve identified.”  Another Catholic fund family relies on the 
U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops investment guidelines for its screening criteria.  
In a similar way, each Muslim fund family relies on a carefully selected scholar or 
group of scholars to interpret the Koran in attempt to ensure shariah compliance 
(Maurer 2006).  One Muslim representative said,  
 Sometimes Muslims come to us and say, “You need to constantly look at your 
guidelines and adjust them; make them more strict if you can.”  Our thought is 
that that’s not our responsibility.  That’s the scholar’s responsibility.  If they 
feel that we’re not doing the right thing, they should tell us.  And they haven’t 
told us that. 
  29 
 
Fewer examples of differentiating cultural work stem from Catholic and Muslim fund 
producers, perhaps because their spiritual leaders provide clear directives which 
reduce uncertainty about the fund failing to measure up to religious standards.  This 
may free fund producers to more comfortably embed religion with the financial 
market. 
 A third organizational structure is nondenominational Protestant fund families, 
which are, by definition, devoid of denominational influence.  Most of these funds 
were started up and now autonomously operated by an entrepreneurial individual.  
One implication of this organizational structure is that, as nondenominational fund 
producers reference the Bible, they tend to rely on their own interpretation (as opposed 
to denominational interpretations).  For example, one fund president states “…we are 
using the scriptures as our basis.  We’re not using any tenants of any particular 
denomination to attempt to base our screens. Everything we do, as far as our screening 
approach, comes directly from the scriptures.”  This is not to suggest that 
nondenominational fund producers are unique among fund producers in their citation 
of scripture.  Instead, I find fund producers from all religious traditions cite their 
respective sacred texts.  When fund producers cite their sacred text, they typically 
engage in embedding as opposed to differentiating cultural work.  In this vein, I also 
find nondenominational fund producers rarely engage in differentiating cultural work, 
but freely interpret scripture in support of embedding religious and economic spheres. 
One strength of this study is that different religious traditions are represented, 
breaking the tendency of American sociologists of religion to only study Protestant 
Christians (Smilde and May 2010).  However, looking for patterns of cultural work 
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across Catholic, Muslim and Protestant traditions gains less traction than consideration 
of organizational structure.  Both Catholic and Muslim funds demonstrate similar 
hierarchical organizational structures by deferring to spiritual authorities, and I suggest 
the clear directives coming down from above lend itself to embedding work.  A 
nondenominational organizational structure also tends to encourage embedding, 
through careful selection of legitimating scriptural citations.  However, in this 
analysis, I find denominational fund producers are more likely to give examples of 
differentiating cultural work and I suggest this can be linked to their organizational 
proximity to non-financial denominational actors they work alongside.  This 
heterogeneous work environment helps explain a tendency to see dichotomies arising 
from the intersection of religion and finance and thus foster differentiating cultural 
work.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 The research question stated at the onset was, how do the fund producers who 
find themselves between God and the market perceive the relationship between 
religious and economic spheres?  I introduced two sociological paradigms that 
provide contrasting portraits of how religious and economic spheres might be 
combined by mutual fund producers.  A Polanyian conception of embeddedness would 
emphasize the entanglement of them.  The secularization thesis highlights the 
increasing differentiation, suggesting an awkward combination of these same spheres.  
This article provides examples of both embedding and differentiating cultural work,9 
and I find the heterogeneous organizational structure of denominational fund families 
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is especially amenable to differentiating cultural work.  This individual-level cultural 
work is an important aspect of social behavior in a modern society where institutional 
logics are changing and unclearly arranged (Friedland and Alford 1991).  This cultural 
work is also generalizable to other case studies that dwell at the potentially dissonant 
intersection of various societal spheres.   
 Zelizer (2005) and Lindsay (2007) provide two contemporary examples of 
embedding spheres.  Likewise, Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism ([1930]2009) might be seen as a case of religion and the economy 
harmoniously coming together.  Indeed, Weber argues that Calvinism helped to 
produce modern rational capitalism.  However, a closer look at Weber’s thesis reveals 
that his religious actors did not intend to produce impressive economic outcomes.  In 
fact, Weber shows that early Puritans believed there to be a “secularizing influence of 
wealth,” so as religious people grow wealthy they become less religious (Weber 
[1930]2009: 92).  Concluding from Weber’s thesis that certain religious values easily 
translate into the creation of wealth misses the point.  Weber’s interpretative sociology 
is attentive to the meaning actors bring to their social behavior and part of that 
meaning was a belief that religion and wealth are inversely related.  From this 
baseline, Weber goes on to describe how religious actors (who were oriented toward 
religious goals) provided a spark which helped create modern rational capitalism, an 
endpoint that is both a surprise (because religion and wealth were believed to be 
antithetical) and an unintended consequence.   
Perhaps surprisingly, the fund producers I interviewed did not parrot Weber’s 
Protestant ethic of abstemious consumption and patient investing.  However, some 
religious fund producers articulated an idea expressed by another classical sociologist.  
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Simmel ([1904]1997) portrays religion as freely overflowing into all realms of social 
action.  When fund producers believe their religious faith is calling them to resist the 
symbolic boundaries between religion and finance, their financial behavior becomes 
embedded with their religious behavior and they have difficulty separating the two.  
Indeed, this religious conviction to dissolve symbolic boundaries between Sunday and 
Monday (or religion and finance) is one specific way that fund producers think about 
the overlap of religion and the economy.  Lindsay (2007) describes modern American 
evangelicalism as possessing an “imperative to bring faith into every sphere of one’s 
life” (pg. 3).  This analysis demonstrates that embedding also transpires among 
Catholics, Muslims and denominational Protestants, in addition to nondenominational 
fund producers.   
At first glance, emphasizing the differentiation of religion and the economy 
through analysis of religious funds may seem counterintuitive in that the existence of 
these funds could be seen as evidence of embeddedness.  Nonetheless, this analysis 
demonstrates the differentiating cultural work that fund producers engage in.  Namely, 
some fund producers maintain stark boundaries between “God and mammon.”  
Respondents balked at the notion of praying for profitable stock picks and one Islamic 
fund producer was wary of dragging the sacred concept of “shariah compliance” into 
the economic sphere.  These examples of boundary work can be thought of as 
compartmentalization.  A denominational fund finds their clients actually value and 
welcome the uncomfortable faith conversation with their financial advisor.  This 
exemplifies that dissonance or tension is not always something to be avoided.  Like 
the bitter herbs of the Seder plate, social actors are able to savor tension.   
Considering the high levels of American religiosity (Demerath 1998), the 
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paucity of religious funds (1 percent of all mutual funds) may be surprising.  The vast 
majority of US mutual fund investors are not investing in religious mutual funds.  This 
analysis was not able to address the experience of individual investors.  However, this 
article has demonstrated the cultural work of fund producers and it seems reasonable 
to assert that investors that are considering religious funds are engaging in a similar 
process.  Investors’ experience in embedding or differentiating religious and financial 
spheres will likely prove instrumental in determining the future course of this rather 
nascent religious investment industry.  It would seem that religious investors 
performing embedding cultural work, as exemplified in this analysis, would own 
higher levels of religious fund assets.  However, one lesson learned from this analysis 
is that meaningful differentiating cultural work can also accompany activity that 
explicitly combines the two spheres. 
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ENDNOTES 
1In her critique of Granovetter’s (1985) use of the “embeddedness” term, Krippner 
(2001: 777) argues that Granovetter adopts a “vision of the social world as sharply 
demarcated into neatly bounded and essentially separate realms” and “remains trapped 
in the limitations… that sharply separate the economy from the social.”  She argues 
this contradicts Polanyi’s central insights, and has thus confused the conceptual clarity 
of economic sociology’s utilization embeddedness. 
 
2Demerath (2007) suggests the battle lines of the scholarly secularization debate are 
least contested at the societal level of analysis, from which the concept of 
differentiation stems.  Critiques of other levels of the secularization thesis have 
emphasized that religion in America has thrived (Chaves 1989, Finke and Stark 1992, 
Warner 1993). 
 
3
 A fund family can offer more than one mutual fund.  Funds within religious fund 
families differ from each other on financial investment criteria. 
 
4At year end of 2008, the total US mutual fund population tallied $9.6 trillion in assets 
(Investment Company Institute 2009).  Religious funds totaled $25.9 billion or .3 
percent (0.003) of all US mutual fund assets. 
 
5 Despite Pax World’s founding by religious individuals, it has never identified itself 
as religious and is therefore not considered a religious mutual fund for the purpose of 
this article. 
 
6
 I compiled, what I believe to be, a comprehensive list of 18 US religious fund 
families through Internet web searches, key word searches on mutual fund data bases 
and by asking religious fund producers if they were aware of other religious fund 
families.  Four religious fund families (three Protestant and one Muslim) are not 
represented in my convenience sample for the following reasons.  I was unable to 
speak with anyone after repeated attempts with two fund families, I was refused an 
interview from one fund family for the purported reason that the office was short 
staffed and busy and I was not aware of another fund family at the time of my 
interviewing. 
 
7
 This majority should help assure the reader that my interview questions did not bias 
responses in the direction of agreeing with my interview prompts.   
 
8
 Despite not publicly avowing a religious affiliation in promotional material, I 
consider these three fund families to be religiously affiliated for two reasons.  First, 
their screening criteria clearly signal their religious affiliation to insiders (Lindsay 
2008).  Secondly, their religious affiliation was confirmed through phone interviews 
with a representative from the fund of interest and other religious fund producers that I 
spoke with.    
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9
 While this article is not theoretically interested in the relative frequencies of 
embedding and differentiating cultural work, it may come as no surprise that more 
embedding work is observed.  One explanation for this is that actors that self select 
themselves to work for these funds (which represent an explicit intersection of religion 
and finance) are already less likely to perceive differentiating dissonance between the 
two spheres. 
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Appendix 1.1: Generic Interview Script for Religious Fund Producer 
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯  
Tell me a little bit about what you do?   What’s your general job description? 
 
Tell me a little about the history of Religious Fund.  How did it get started?  
 
Are there any requirements about the religious identity of the fund manager?   Must he or she 
be religious?   
 
(Asked of Christian fund representatives) Is Religious Fund affiliated with any denomination?  
If so, talk about that relationship. 
 
When I tell people I’m researching religious mutual funds, most say they didn’t know such a 
thing exists; as if “religious” and “mutual fund” don’t belong in the same sentence.  So tell me 
generally, what is your experience with combining religion and mutual funds. 
 
(Asked of Christian fund representatives) I’m thinking of the parable in Matthew 6, where 
Jesus says, “You can’t serve two masters…You can’t love both God and Mammon.”  In a 
sense, isn’t that what Religious Fund is trying to do, serve God and Mammon?   
 
Please tell me about the screening process at Religious Fund.  What are your screening 
criteria?  How did Religious Fund decide upon those criteria?   
 
Is Religious Fund involved in advocacy work through the mutual funds?  If so, tell me a little 
bit about that activity. 
 
Does Religious Fund feel more pressure to increase its socially responsible mission or to 
increase returns for investors?  Tell me about balancing these two goals?     
 
(Asked of fund managers) Do you pray that your stock picks would be profitable? 
 
If I were to spend a day at Religious Fund offices, would its religious identity be salient?  If 
so, how? 
 
How does Religious Fund differ from other religious mutual funds?   
 
Do you largely target religious investors?  What is your marketing approach?  How are 
churches/mosques or other religious organizations involved? 
 
I’m very interested in the experience of investors.  What is the average investor like?  Do they 
invest in other conventional funds?   
 
Are there any other things that came into your head as we were talking that you would like to 
tell me?  Are there questions you wished I would had asked? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Interview scripts were modified to take into account the religious identity of the fund, the 
employment position of the interviewee and various other pieces of relevant information I was able to 
obtain before conducting my interview.  This script is a generic baseline from which modifications were 
made. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MORALITY IN THE FINANCIAL MARKET: 
A LOOK AT RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED MUTUAL FUNDS IN THE USA 
 
Socially responsible investing (SRI) mutual funds are becoming a 
popular investment option for investors. Stemming from religious 
origins, these funds deliberately inject moral concerns into financial 
decision making. Focusing on religiously affiliated mutual funds, I 
garner empirical evidence to investigate whether the moral orientation 
of investors impacts their financial market behaviour. I partition 
mutual funds into religious SRI, religious non-SRI, secular SRI and 
conventional funds and look for differences in levels of fund asset 
stability using data from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) from 1991 to 2007. This stability refers to the extent to which 
investors hold on to their fund shares with little regard to past return 
performance and over all fund flow volatility. Religious SRI assets are 
found to be the most stable fund category and I adjudicate whether the 
structural characteristics of religious groups or the moral orientation 
of religious investors best explains this empirical finding. 
 
From Socio-Economic Review. 2011.  9(2):235-259. Reprinted with permission. 
 
 
The USA stands out as an exceptionally religious country (Demerath, 1998) 
and a country increasingly wed to the financial market (Davis, 2009). One 
manifestation of this combination is the availability of religiously affiliated mutual 
funds. Most of these fund families are a part of a growing field of socially responsible 
investing (SRI) which represents a corner of the financial market where morality 
might hold significant sway. SRI mutual funds avoid ownership in certain industries 
or companies (screening) and/or try to change the behaviour of companies they do 
own (advocacy). SRI fund managers take moral or ethical values into consideration as 
they decide which corporate stock they will purchase and how they will interact with 
corporations they decide to own. This article explores whether morality also impacts 
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economic behaviour of SRI investors who must decide which mutual fund to invest in 
and how long to continue holding those shares. 
Modern day economic sociologists have explored the role morality plays in the 
economy (Zelizer, 1978; Etzioni, 1988, 2003; Stehr et al., 2006; Fourcade and Healy, 
2007; Beckert et al., 2008; Quinn, 2008) but have paid little attention to the unique 
role religion might play. This article’s interest in religion taps Weber’s ([1930]2009) 
intuition in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism to analyse how religious 
forces impact economic phenomena. Religion scholars have looked at various ways 
religion intersects with the economy (Finke and Stark, 1988; Iannaccone, 1992; Hoge 
et al., 1996; Chaves and Miller, 1999; Wuthnow, 2005; Keister, 2007, 2008; Peifer, 
2010). While these accounts are instructive, little attention has been directed toward 
religion’s impact on the financial market. 
Etzioni (2003) asserts, ‘the more individuals act under the influence of moral 
commitments, the more they are expected to persevere’ (p. 115). One way this article 
operationalizes perseverance in the financial market is to measure investor behaviour 
in response to a fund’s previous return performance. I refer to this as fund asset 
stability. Previous research has compared the asset stability of SRI funds and non-SRI 
(or conventional) funds, producing mixed results. Some find SRI assets to be more 
stable than conventional funds (Bollen, 2007; Benson and Humphrey, 2008), whereas 
others find SRI assets to be less stable (Renneboog et al., 2006; Osthoff, 2008). I 
advance this line of research by zoning in on religiously affiliated mutual funds in the 
USA. I also consider four mechanisms that would lead one to expect religious SRI 
fund assets to be more stable than secular SRI fund assets. Stemming from these 
mechanisms are two plausible hypotheses. The first hypothesis suggests that the 
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structural characteristics of a religious group lead to more stable investing. The second 
emphasizes that religious actors are motivated by moral reasons to continue investing. 
In testing these two plausible hypotheses, I address this article’s main goal which is to 
empirically demonstrate a moral impact on social behaviour in the financial market 
and by doing so, bring empirical evidence to a largely theoretical branch of economic 
sociology. While both of these hypotheses (structural and moral) might be 
generalizable beyond a religious context, focusing on their religious instantiations 
yields a sharper analytical focus. 
 
Mutual Fund Categories 
About 44% of American households own some kind of mutual fund (Holden 
and Bogdan, 2007). Mutual funds are regulated investment vehicles where 
professional investment managers diversify a pool of money in stocks and/or bonds. A 
portion of investment dollars is used to pay for their investment expertise and 
overhead costs, whereas the returns or losses of the investment accrue to contributing 
investors. In the past three decades, SRI mutual funds have become increasingly 
available to investors. SRI is an important part of the larger corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) field, which has been researched at the firm level (Margolis and 
Walsh, 2003) and the national level (Gjølberg, 2009; Kinderman, 2009). This article’s 
emphasis on SRI considers the ability of corporate shareholders to exert pressure on 
corporations (King and Soule, 2009; Soule, 2009). 
SRI mutual funds are recognized by their involvement in at least one of two 
dominant activities; screening and shareholder advocacy (Domini and Kinder, 1986). 
Screening is exemplified by SRI funds refusal to invest in a well rehearsed list of 
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industries deemed unethical by many, including tobacco, alcohol, gaming and the 
military. These are commonly referred to as sin screens, pointing to the religious 
influences on the SRI industry. However, many SRI funds have gone beyond the 
standard sin screens to include a wider array of screening criteria.  To name just a few, 
SRI funds now avoid firms that are involved in animal torture, have poor records of 
workplace diversity, pollute the environment or have poor product safety records. A 
second SRI mutual fund activity is shareholder advocacy. This refers to 
communication with owned corporations through attending shareholding meetings and 
using proxy votes1 to pressure firms to change their behaviour.2 Interestingly, to be a 
shareholder advocate, SRI funds must first own a corporation whose behaviour they 
believe can be improved. 
Kurtz (2008) asserts, ‘Religious belief was the first rationale for socially 
responsible investment, and remains an important force today, especially in the United 
States’ (p. 253). In 1758, the Society of Friends (Quakers) refused to do business with 
anyone that bought or sold slaves (Domini, 2001). By the 1960’s mainline, American 
denominations began linking ethical concerns about the Vietnam War and 
environmental pollution to investment decision making (Robinson, 2002).  In 1971, 
Methodist clergy established the Pax World Fund, the first mutual fund family3 to 
screen for social issues (Shapiro, 1992).4 That same year an Episcopalian Bishop 
attended an annual meeting of General Motors Corporation, asking the company to 
end its involvement in Apartheid South Africa. Although the vote did not pass, the 
momentum behind SRI grew and eventually many activists were insisting corporations 
sever relations with South Africa (Robinson, 2002). Given the important role religion 
has played in the formation of the SRI industry in the USA, it is appropriate to isolate 
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religiously affiliated mutual funds for special attention. 
I define a religious mutual fund as a fund that self-avows an institutional 
religious identity. Religious groups in the USA that are represented by mutual funds 
include Catholic, non-denominational Christian, Muslim and other Christian 
denominations (see Table 2.1 for list of active US religious mutual fund families as of 
2008).5 Thrivent Financial for Lutherans mutual funds is the only religiously affiliated 
fund family that is not involved in screening or advocacy work and therefore not 
labelled socially responsible. Stemming from my discussion of SRI and my definition 
of religious funds, I derive a two by two table of mutual fund categories (see Table 
2.2). The resulting four categories of funds (religious SRI funds, religious non-SRI 
funds, secular SRI funds and conventional funds) will be utilized to determine whether 
religious SRI investments tend to be more stable than secular SRI investments. The 
religious non-SRI fund category will be used to help assess whether morality has an 
impact on financial market behaviour. Since previous research has compared 
conventional funds with SRI funds, the following theoretical discussion and 
hypotheses do not specifically address the conventional fund category. Instead, this 
article focuses on the intersection of a fund’s religious affiliation and SRI status. 
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Table 2.1: List of Active Religiously Affiliated Mutual Fund Families 
in the United States (all class shares) 
Mutual Fund Family Religious Affiliation Number 
of Funds
Ave Maria Funds Catholic 6
Epiphany Funds Catholic 3
LKCM Aquinas Funds Catholic 4
CAMCO Investors Fund Christian (non-denominational) 1
Centurion Christian Values Fund Christian (non-denominational) 1
Eventide Gilead Christian (non-denominational) 1
Shepherd Funds Christian (non-denominational) 1
Steward Funds Christian (non-denominational) 12
Timothy Plan Christian (non-denominational) 18
Allegiance Fund Christian Science 1
Amana Funds Islamic 2
Azzad Funds Islamic 2
Iman Fund Islamic 1
Thrivent Funds Lutheran 75
Praxis Funds Mennonite 18
New Covenant Funds Presbyterian U.S.A. 4
GuideStone Funds Southern Baptist 49
199
 
Note: Number of funds (all class shares) that existed as of 2008. 
 
 
Table 2.2: Mutual Fund Categories 
Religious Non-Religious
Religious SRI                                         Secular SRI                                                
39 funds (.5 percent of funds) 75 funds (1 percent of funds)
Religious Non-SRI  (Thrivent)                                      Conventional                                      
33 funds (.4 percent of funds)  7,488 funds (98 percent of funds)       
SRI   
Non- SRI   
 
Notes: The number of mutual funds represents all class shares of funds between  
1991-2007 in CRSP data set that are used in subsequent analysis reported in Table 2.4. 
Source: CRSP Mutual Fund Data (1991-2007) 
 
Religious SRI funds are often recognized for their unique screening criteria. 
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For instance, Islamic funds refuse to invest in any company that collects interest 
(effectively ruling out the entire financial sector) due to Muslim prohibitions on usury. 
The Christian Science fund screens out the pharmaceutical industry in line with its 
religiously motivated belief in spiritual healing. Many Christian funds screen out on 
abortion and pornography. More progressive religious funds avoid weapons 
manufacturers and environmental polluters. SRI screens (for both religious and secular 
funds) are an important example of a moral component that could potentially hinder a 
fund’s ability to maximize returns. Namely, placing strictures on what securities a 
fund manager is able to purchase is often believed to hamper the fund’s return 
performance (Goldreyer and Diltz, 1999).  
Indeed, an empirical question that has occupied the bulk of scholarly research 
is whether socially responsible investment practices impact return performance. Some 
find SRI hampers returns (Mueller, 1994), others find they induce high returns (Shank 
et al., 2005; Boasson et al., 2006) and still others find no difference (Hamilton et al., 
1993; Naber, 2001; Guerard and Stone, 2002; Bauer et al., 2005; Kurtz and 
diBartolomeo, 2005). This debate over whether SRI investments yield lower return 
performance elucidates a certain tension; SRI investing might be economically costly. 
This analysis steers clear of this important research question but does feature how fund 
assets respond to lagged return performance. 
 
Morality in the Financial Market 
The field of behavioural finance challenges common assumptions of rationality 
in the financial market by providing descriptive accounts of investor behavior 
(Barberis and Thaler, 2003). For instance, Barber and Odean (2000) find investor 
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overconfidence leads to excessive trading, which reduces returns on investments. 
Cooper et al. (2005) find investors irrationally react to cosmetic name changes of 
mutual funds. These empirical findings are generally explained through psychological 
accounts that emphasize sporadic emotional risk assessments or overconfidence. In 
contrast, the approach taken here paints a different picture, where entrenched moral 
imperatives impact investor behaviour.  
Economic sociologists have considered the role of morality in the market in 
various ways. Zelizer (1978) shows how religion played an important role in the 
legitimation of life insurance in the nineteenth century America. Etzioni (1988) posits 
a project for socio-economics which centres around the assertion that moral 
motivation must be acknowledged alongside the more familiar pleasure-seeking 
motivation of neoclassical economics. Beckert (2006) points out the ambiguous 
economic consequence of moral behaviour, while cataloguing different kinds of moral 
behaviour in the market. Switching the causal arrow, Fourcade and Healy (2007) 
provide a review of three different ways in which the market may impact society’s 
moral order. This article extends this largely theoretical body of research by looking 
for empirical evidence that morality is impacting the economic behaviour of average 
investors.6 
Before embarking on the specific hypotheses this article will address, I define 
the term moral and point out two ideal types of morality that are at play in the SRI 
realm. Etzioni suggests a moral act must meet four criteria; ‘moral acts reflect an 
imperative, a generalization, a symmetry when applied to others, and are motivated 
intrinsically’ (Etzioni, 1988, pp. 41–42). Accentuating Etzioni’s first criterion will be 
sufficient for this article’s treatment of morality. Admittedly general, I define moral 
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action as taking on an imperative quality where one believes they ought to behave in a 
certain way.  
In outlining different types of social action, Weber distinguishes between the 
means and ends of the action. Value rational action is ‘determined by a conscious 
belief of the value for its own sake . . . independently of its prospects of success’ 
(Weber’s [1922]1978, pp. 24–25). The idea that moral means are practiced despite ‘its 
prospects of success’ is especially appropriate to the financial market because return 
performance is an important measure of investment success (or an important end). One 
implication of Weber’s value rationality is that the means by which monetary gain is 
pursued is what matters most in the SRI realm. Screening out certain types of stocks is 
a good example of paying heed to the means of investing and this might cause average 
investors to pay less attention to return performance. This deontological flavour of 
ethics resembles Etzioni’s (1988) treatment of subject. 
However, monetary gain is not the only end pursued by socially responsible 
investors. The goal of shareholder advocacy is to create societal change. Many point to 
the abolishment of Apartheid as a fitting example of a successful SRI drive for societal 
change. In the SRI realm, ethical ends are considered alongside monetary ends, 
introducing a multiplicity of ends. When creating societal change is a moral 
imperative, a moral actor may consider various means to accomplish that end. This is 
manifest in the willingness of SRI investors to deliberately own ‘unethical’ companies 
in order to take part in shareholder advocacy, an action a value rational actor would 
not consider. This weighing of both means and ends matches Weber’s definition of 
instrumental social action where ‘the end, the means, and the secondary results are all 
rationally taken into account’ (Weber’s [1922]1978, p. 26) and resembles a 
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consequentialist version of ethics. Matched with the screening and advocacy functions 
of SRI, moral imperatives can be value rationally or instrumentally pursued. Of 
course, these ideal types need not be mutually exclusive in practice as evidenced by 
many SRI funds that are heavily involved in both screening and advocacy.  
This generalizable discussion about morality is not limited to a religious 
context. However, since modern day economic sociologists have scarcely considered 
the role religion might play in economic behaviour and since religious actors have 
played an important role in SRI’s formation, this article particularly investigates 
whether morality is at play among religious fund investors. Additionally, the structural 
characteristics of religious groups will be shown to prove advantageous in empirically 
demonstrating the impact of morality in the financial market. 
 
Religious Structure or Religious Morality? 
 
The following discussion of plausible religious mechanisms that lead to high 
levels of asset stability will anachronistically provide theoretical justification to 
motivate the following hypothesis.  
 
   HYPOTHESIS 1 - Religious SRI assets are more stable than secular SRI assets. 
 
In route to motivating this hypothesis, this discussion will generate two 
additional hypotheses regarding why religious SRI assets are more stable than secular 
SRI assets. These two additional hypotheses address a primary goal of this article, 
which is to investigate whether the moral orientation of investors impacts their 
investment behaviour. 
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Structural Characteristics of Religious Groups 
The solidarity in religious communities is an important component of religious 
life (Kanter, 1972; Becker, 1999; Durkheim, [1912]2001). Previous research suggests 
that solidarity and cohesion within social groups can induce sacrificial monetary 
behaviour (Lawler, 2001; Collins, 2004; Beckert, 2006). Peifer (2010) demonstrates 
that religious followers that perceive higher levels of cohesion with their congregation 
give more money to their congregation. This suggests that religious members might 
extend high levels of trust to a mutual fund that shares their religious identity leading 
them to be committed investors and less likely to redeem fund shares. 
Many religious Americans attend religious services on a regular basis and the 
physical gathering and the social networks they foster are amenable to spreading the 
word about a variety of religious and secular opportunities. Religious publications that 
are dispersed among religious followers and word of mouth chains might serve as 
effective conduits through which mutual fund information can easily flow. These 
religious networks could be especially effective in advertising these religious funds 
and in turn induce investment stability.  
These mechanisms depend on the structural characteristics that are common to 
most religious groups and do not depend on the funds’ socially responsible 
characteristics. Since the religious groups featured in this article have a common 
congregational and sometimes denominational structure, focusing specifically on 
religious funds is an effective way to test the forthcoming structural hypothesis 
(whereas secular SRI funds have less obvious organizational structures in which 
investors are already involved). Therefore, if religious structural characteristics are a 
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main driver of religious fund asset stability, then religious non-SRI funds should be 
similar to religious SRI funds in terms of fund asset stability. More formally, 
   HYPOTHESIS 2a - Religious non-SRI funds are similar to religious SRI funds in 
terms of asset stability, lending support to the theory that the structural characteristics 
of religious groups explains why religious SRI assets are more stable than secular SRI 
assets. 
 
Moral Orientation 
All SRI funds screen out certain companies that they deem to be immoral and 
Beckert (2006) refers to this morally driven economic behaviour as ‘blocked 
exchange’. Durkheim ([1912]2001) suggests religious activity revolves around the 
perception of the sacred (or things set apart) and profane realms of life. This highlights 
the prohibition of all things considered to be impure. To the extent that religious 
groups are especially concerned with avoiding impurity, the screening function of 
religious SRI funds would secure particular allegiance among religious fund investors. 
Purchasing religious SRI funds is a way to maintain a purer investment portfolio. This 
screening function aligns with Weber’s value-rational social action where the means 
of investment (or the ethical status of the corporations owned) are especially 
important.  
Some religious SRI funds are also involved in shareholder advocacy where 
owned corporations are pressured to change their behaviour. Noting the importance of 
a religious moral orientation, Nepstad and Williams (2007, p. 423) write, ‘Religious 
beliefs, moral worldviews, and religious identities are not the only resources for those 
engaging in . . . collective action, but they can be among the most potent.’ This 
advocacy mechanism features religious followers attempting to change society 
through pressuring owned corporations to behave more responsibly. For religious SRI 
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mutual funds, this action for social change is typically done through direct use of 
proxy votes, but funds also join activist coalitions such as the Interfaith Center on 
Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), a faith-based organization that specializes in 
shareholder advocacy. Religious investors that are interested in pressuring companies 
to change their behaviour to align with their religious values could be especially loyal 
to their fund, resulting in more stable fund assets. Here the moral imperative to change 
society is religiously driven and of utmost importance. The advocacy function of SRI 
matches Weber’s instrumental rational orientation as activists see owning unethical 
companies (enabling subsequent shareholder advocacy) as an acceptable means to 
attain a moral end.  
Since these moral mechanisms (value rational and instrumental) are closely 
linked to the socially responsible activity of screening and advocacy, they would not 
be operating in religious non-SRI funds. 
 
   HYPOTHESIS 2b: Religious SRI fund assets are more stable than religious non-SRI 
fund assets, lending support to the theory that the moral orientation of religious 
investors explains why religious SRI assets are more stable than secular SRI assets. 
 
These preceding structural and moral mechanisms combine to justify the 
hitherto uninformed hypothesis. To test Hypothesis 1, which states that religious SRI 
fund assets are more stable than secular SRI funds, I compare two financial measures 
of fund asset stability across those categories of mutual funds. Through observing 
religious non-SRI asset stability, I adjudicate whether religious structural 
characteristics or a religious moral orientation is likely to be driving the difference. It 
is acknowledged that the data at hand are not sufficient to entirely rule out either the 
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structural or moral hypothesis. Instead, I allow the empirical data to provide positive 
evidence in favour of one or the other. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
The mutual fund data used in this analysis are taken from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Mutual Fund Data collected at the University of 
Chicago’s Graduate School of Business.7 The CRSP data are survivor bias free, 
meaning funds that were started and subsequently ‘died’ remain in this longitudinal 
data set. This data set is widely seen as the most complete collection of USA mutual 
fund records and has been used in numerous financial publications. It is not a random 
sample of mutual funds, but more aptly represents the full population of mutual funds. 
For instance, the CRSP data set contains about 80% of the active religious funds that I 
have been able to identify. Since I am fundamentally interested in explaining the 
investor behaviour that occurred in actual mutual funds, I am not inclined to view this 
data as a random sample of a super population (or a hypothetical universe of possible 
outcomes.) Instead, I will treat this as the apparent population of mutual funds (Berk et 
al., 1995). However, I report robust standard errors since this is customary practice in 
the presentation of sociological results. But I will refrain from referring to statistical 
significance in my interpretations and instead discuss the magnitude of relevant 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients (Ziliak and McCloskey, 2008). 
To my knowledge, this article presents the first comprehensive list of religious 
mutual funds in the USA. The list was collected from Internet research, 
correspondence with mutual fund industry insiders and key religious word searches on 
the Bloomberg terminal and the CRSP data base. I also read through website material, 
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the fund prospectuses and annual reports in search of religious affiliation. Thrivent 
Financial for Lutherans is the only religious fund family that is non-SRI. The list of 
secular SRI funds was generated by the historical compilation from Social Investment 
Forum (SIF) from 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2007. This list was also supplemented by 
Internet search and key word searches (such as ‘social’, ‘ethical’ and ‘environmental’) 
on Bloomberg and CRSP data. Funds that SIF indicated were socially responsible in 
the past, but whose current prospectus contains no indication of social responsibility, 
were excluded from this list in order to avoid having funds whose SRI status changed 
at unidentified times. Funds that do not fall into either of the preceding categories are 
labelled conventional funds.  
To help operationalize the stability of mutual fund assets, I use fund flow. This 
measures the ballooning and shrinking of the total net assets (TNA) of a fund that 
result from buying and redeeming fund shares (Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Del Guercio 
and Tkac, 2002; Bollen, 2007). More specifically, a mutual fund’s price per share 
changes each day, based mostly on the performance of the fund’s underlying portfolio. 
TNA is the product of the price per share and the number of shares that are held by 
investors. Fund flow measures the change in TNA that is due to the change in the 
number of outstanding shares, not due to the underlying performance of the fund’s 
portfolio. More formally, 
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FFi,t is the fund flow for mutual fund i from time t-1 to t measured as a percentage of 
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the TNA at time t-1. Ri,t is the return for the time period t-1 to t.8 A positive fund flow 
of 0.05 means that, over the specified time period, the TNA of a mutual fund has 
increased by 5% due to aggregate shareholder purchases. To be clear, a more direct 
measure of mutual fund purchases and redemptions is not publicly available, leading 
to this fund flow measure, which is calculated from data that is publicly available. 
Financial analysts have found that the fund’s previous (or lagged) annual 
return is a strong predictor of fund flow (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). Funds with 
higher annual returns at time t-1 tend to see an increase in share purchases. Funds that 
have poor performance tend to be punished with share redemptions. This relationship 
between lagged (or past) return performance and fund flow is the first way this article 
measures fund asset stability. The second way is to measure each fund’s standard 
deviation of monthly fund flows from 1991 to 2007. Bollen (2007) suggests fund flow 
volatility represents the relative stability of fund investors. A fund with high fund flow 
volatility would indicate that on average investors are redeeming many shares one 
month and buying many shares the next. A fund with low volatility would see fewer 
and lower vacillations of this type. 
In an analysis of portfolios of financial market securities, an important factor to 
control for is the portfolio’s exposure to market risk. Formula 2 summarizes the 
relationship between a fund’s excess return and exposure to market risk. This model 
assumes that four macro market indicators move the entire stock market (Fama and 
French, 1993; Carhart, 1997). The standard macro market event is operationalized by 
the S&P 500, which represents the aggregate performance of 500 large cap companies 
in the USA. In addition to this single measure of the entire market’s excess return, 
Carhart (1997) includes measures of returns on three additional factors that nicely 
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match common investment strategies. This includes large cap versus small cap stocks, 
growth versus value and 1 year return momentum versus contrarian stocks. 
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Ri represents the return of fund i and Rf is the risk free rate of return (or the treasury 
rate) at month m. iα is the expected return of mutual fund i if the market is neutral, or 
all other market measures equal zero. This alpha is a common measure of fund 
performance since it controls for relevant risk factors. 1β  represents the extent to 
which the fund’s excess return ( mmi RfR −, ) follows the overall market’s excess return 
(MKTRF). The small minus big (SMB) factor stands for the monthly difference in 
returns between a portfolio of small cap stocks (small capitalization, or funds with 
small TNA values) and large cap stocks. During months that have large SMB values, 
funds that target small cap stocks should have higher returns than funds that target 
large cap funds. It can therefore be assumed that funds with similar SMB betas are 
similar to one another in terms of their exposure to large (or small) cap stocks. In a 
similar fashion, the high minus low (HML) factor represents the difference between a 
portfolio of high book-to-market stocks versus a portfolio of low book-to-market 
stocks, which controls for the value versus growth investment strategy. The 
momentum (MOM) factor shows the difference in return between a portfolio of the 
past 1 month winners and a portfolio of the past 12 month losers. The preceding OLS 
model (Formula 2) is estimated for each mutual fund over its historic monthly return 
data and loaded into the data to control for each specific fund’s sensitivity to the 
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overall market climate or risk exposure. These betas also provide a way to control for 
the investment style of the fund. 
I constrict the data to only include funds that have 75% of its portfolio in 
common stocks (Bollen, 2007) since these equity funds tend to be the most volatile 
and therefore provide a better case study to observe the flow–performance relation. 
Only funds whose mean monthly TNA from 1991 to 2007 exceed $10 million are 
included in order to eliminate small funds that are likely to see explosive growth and 
distort fund flow measures (Bollen, 2007; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). Funds that 
were merged together are also dropped from the analysis, since these mergers 
artificially impact fund flow. The majority of religious mutual funds were founded 
after 1991, providing a natural beginning point. Since 2007 was the last complete year 
of data in the CRSP data set at the time of this research, it is the cut-off date. The data 
from the unusual market climate of 2008 and 2009 was unavailable at the time of this 
research. 
 
Models and Results 
Since mutual funds have become an increasingly popular investment vehicle in 
past decades, it is not surprising that the central tendency of fund flow is positive. 
When considering annual fund observations that meet the previously mentioned 
criteria on size, exposure to equity, mergers and that contain full data for the following 
flow–performance analysis, the median annual fund flow is 0.01 and the mean is 0.99. 
Visual inspection of data indicates cases of extreme observations of TNA, likely the 
result of misplaced decimal or other abnormal events. Therefore, I follow Bollen’s 
(2007) solution by omitting outlying fund flow measures that are less than -0.9 (-90%) 
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and greater than 10 (1000%). This procedure drops 714 annual observations, leaving 
50 611 annual observations from which to observe flow–performance relation. This 
same procedure drops less than three-one thousandths of all monthly fund flow 
measures which are used to calculate fund flow volatility below.9 Dropping these 
observations reduces the annual fund flow mean to 0.29, while maintaining the median 
fund flow to 0.01. To put the median fund flow of 1% into perspective, consider a 
fund with a TNA of $200 million at year y-1 and an annual return performance of zero 
at year y. The median fund flow of 1% indicates that the TNA at year y is $202 million 
[(200/(1 + 0)) + (200*0.01)], representing an annual inflow of $2 million in assets. 
 
Flow–Performance Relation 
First, this article considers how fund flow responds to lagged return 
performance while controlling for appropriate covariates. Accordingly, the following 
model will be estimated for each fund category. 
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FFi,y is the percentage fund flow for mutual fund i at year y. In order to test for the 
impact of the previous year’s return, binary variable POSi,y-1 = 1 when the previous 
year’s absolute return10 was positive and zero if otherwise. Following Bollen’s (2007) 
methodology, I also control for the SIZE of the fund (mean monthly TNA from 1991 
to 2007) and the AGE of the fund in years at year y. Year dummy variables (excluding 
1991) are also included to control for the overall market climate of each year. Control 
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variables ALPHAi, MKTRFi, SMBi, HMLi and MOMi are loaded from Formula 2 and 
measure the sensitivity of each fund to the market. To address this article’s 
hypotheses, I am primarily interested in comparing the magnitudes of the lagged 
performance coefficients )( 1β .11  
Of the four featured fund categories, religious SRI funds are noticeably least 
responsive to lagged positive performance. Following years with positive return 
performance, the fund flow of religious SRI funds is 5.6% higher than a year 
following negative performance, controlling for all other covariates in the model (see 
Table 2.3). The magnitude of this religious SRI coefficient is about 24 percentage 
points lower than the magnitude for religious non-SRI funds (with a coefficient of 
29.7), about 16 percentage points lower than secular SRI funds (22.0) and about 30 
percentage points lower than conventional funds (35.9). To help put the size (Ziliak 
and McCloskey, 2008) of these percentage point differentials into perspective, 
previous literature (Bollen, 2007; Benson and Humphrey, 2008) has found substantial 
and meaningful differences between conventional and SRI funds (ignoring religious 
affiliation). The comparable point differential for this conventional-SRI comparison 
(not shown in Table 2.3) is 18. This indicates that the main differentials of interest (24 
for religious SRI and religious non-SRI; 16 for religious SRI and secular SRI) are on 
par with differentials described in previous research and therefore substantially large 
and meaningful.12 
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Table 2.3: OLS Regression of Annual Fund Flow 
Religious 
SRI
Religious             
Non-SRI Secular SRI Conventional
Positive lagged return performance      5.6 (10.7)       29.7 (22.2)     22.0** (7.6)      35.9*** (1.6)
Age     -0.6 (0.6)      -13.3** (4.6)      -2.5*** (0.6)       -2.0*** (0.0)
Size (mean monthly TNA)     -0.0 (0.0)         0.0 (0.0)       0.0 (0.0)        0.0*** (0.0)
Alpha (lifetime) 4,844 (2498) -7,799 (11242) 5,560*** (1636)  4,686*** (181)
Market-risk free return beta (MKTRF)    32.0 (16.2)       52.9 (44.2)     48.8** (15.8)        6.4** (2.0)
Small minus big beta (SMB)   -13.5 (14.8)      -67.4 (41.4)     22.2 (12.8)       -2.9 (1.7)
High-low book to market beta (HML)    29.6 (18.3)       64.3 (45.0)    -21.2 (16.7)       13.5*** (1.5)
Momentum beta (MOM)    50.5 (65.6)      -66.8 (147.2)    228.0*** (55.6)       30.7*** (4.1)
1991     (referent)     (referent)       (referent)
1992     -3.6 (16.0)      -5.5 (17.6)      -24.8*** (5.6)
1993      2.2 (12.6)      -5.5 (18.0)         2.3 (6.4)
1994   -14.4 (14.9)    -20.6 (15.4)       -39.1*** (5.0)
1995      0.2 (14.6)      (referent)     20.7 (18.7)       -11.7 (5.2)
1996    37.1 (20.0)       -0.2 (22.3)       3.6 (19.8)       -21.6*** (5.2)
1997    14.1 (23.6)      -17.9 (23.3)       9.1 (22.8)       -31.0*** (5.0)
1998     -9.1 (13.4)        4.4 (29.8)      -0.9 (15.8)      -37.4*** (4.8)
1999     -7.2 (14.8)       33.8 (29.8)       1.2 (16.2)      -29.9*** (4.8)
2000     -4.0 (14.4)       34.8 (38.4)      -5.3 (16.6)      -40.0*** (4.8)
2001      9.1 (11.9)       32.6 (37.4)      -0.0 (14.3)      -28.2*** (4.5)
2002     -6.7 (8.7)       35.9 (34.4)      -3.5 (15.1)      -24.6*** (4.5)
2003     -2.8 (7.6)       33.2 (41.5)      28.1 (16.3)       -1.7 (4.6)
2004    12.8 (22.2)     122.9 (86.9)       7.3 (19.1)     -39.8*** (4.7)
2005     -7.8 (14.8)     104.9 (60.7)      -7.3 (16.5)     -41.1*** (4.7)
2006   -17.8 (14.9)       95.3 (60.0)    -14.5 (16.4)     -51.6*** (4.6)
2007   -12.8 (14.5)       56.5 (54.7)      -5.6 (17.6)     -58.0*** (4.6)
Intercept     -1.9 (14.5)      -28.4 (48.2)      -9.6 (19.6)      46.5*** (4.6)
N   224     168 570 49,649
Adjusted R Square      0.01        0.03       0.16        0.07
 
Notes: White's standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 1 percent;  *** significant at 
0.1 percent; (two-tailed test).  A fund is included if the fraction of assets invested in equity 
reaches 75% while the fund is in the data base and the mean monthly TNA exceeds $10 
million.  Funds that were merged into were dropped from analysis. 
Source: CRSP Mutual Fund Data (1991-2007) 
 
 
The control variable coefficients for the conventional fund category show that 
an additional year of age decreases fund flow by about 2%, while the impact of size 
(in millions of dollars) is negligible. The alpha measures (or the predicted slope-
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intercept from Model 2) have large positive impact on fund flow. The large point 
estimate reflects the relatively narrow range of alpha values in the data, ranging from -
0.02 to 0.04. A difference of 0.01 in lifetime alpha is associated with 47% higher fund 
flow. Funds with higher market risk free return betas tend to see higher fund flow. The 
negative SMB coefficient indicates that, on average, funds that target small cap stocks 
tend to have lower fund flow than funds that target large cap stocks. The positive 
coefficient for HML indicates that value funds (tending to invest in high book-to-
market ratio) tend to have a higher fund flow than growth funds. The positive MOM 
coefficient indicates that funds which tend to hold ‘past one month winners’ have a 
higher fund flow that funds that tend to hold ‘past 12 month winners’. Compared with 
1991, 2006 and 2007 saw much smaller fund flows. 
 
Fund Flow Volatility 
Fund flow volatility is measured by the standard deviation of monthly fund 
flows of a mutual fund from 1991 to 2007. Funds with lower fund flow volatility are 
made up of investors that tend to be more stable. It is possible that a large portion of 
assets could be leaving a fund, whereas other investors are buying new assets. Fund 
flow volatility may not capture this movement, depending on the time period in which 
this occurs. To minimize this possibility, I 
measure the volatility of monthly fund flows instead of annual fund flows. Including 
important covariates, I predict the following model in order to determine the relative 
levels of fund flow volatility among the four fund categories of interest. 
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Table 2.4: OLS regression of mutual fund monthly fund flow volatility  
from 1991-2007 
(1) (2)
Religious SRI (referent) (referent)
Religious non-SRI       0.18** (0.06)       0.16** (0.06)
Secular SRI       0.03 (0.03)       0.06 (0.04)
Conventional       0.12*** (0.03)       0.14*** (0.03)
Alpha        1.41 (0.98)
Market-risk free return beta (MKTRF)       -0.01 (0.02)
Small minus big beta (SMB)       -0.02 (0.01)
High-low book to market beta (HML)       -0.00 (0.01)
Momentum beta (MOM)        0.03 (0.03)
Size (mean monthly TNA)       -0.00 (0.00)
First year fund is in data        0.01*** (0.00)
Count of months       -0.00*** (0.00)
Intercept       0.14*** (0.03)    -18.94*** (0.97)
N 7,635 7,635
R square       0.002       0.10
 
Notes: White's standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 1 percent;  
*** significant at 0.1 percent; (two-tailed test). A fund is included if the fraction of  
assets invested in equity reaches 75% while the fund is in the data  base and the mean  
monthly TNA exceeds $10 million.  Funds that were merged into were dropped from  
analysis. 
Source: CRSP Mutual Fund Data (1991-2007) 
 
FF.VOLi represents the fund flow volatility of mutual fund i. Religious non-SRI funds 
are denoted as relNonSRI =1 (zero if otherwise), secular SRI funds as SecSRI = 1 and 
conventional funds are coded as Conv = 1. The religious SRI fund category is the 
referent category for the OLS model so that each of the other three categories can be 
compared with it. Control variables ALPHAi, MKTRFi, SMBi , HMLi and MOMi 
represent the coefficients calculated in Formula 2. The variable SIZEi represents the 
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mean monthly TNA of each fund, 1stYEARi represents the first year the fund was in 
the data set and MONTHSi measures the number of months used to calculate the fund 
flow volatility and helps control for the age of the fund.  
Model 1 in Table 2.4 presents the base OLS model with indicator variables for 
three of the four fund categories. Each fund category has a higher fund flow volatility 
than the religious SRI category, which averages 0.14 (intercept) fund flow volatility 
across 39 funds (the number of funds is not shown in Table 2.4). This statistic means a 
mutual fund with a TNA of $100 million experiences monthly fund flows with a 
standard deviation of $14 million. Religious non-SRI funds average 0.32 (0.14 + 0.18) 
in fund flow volatility across 33 funds, secular SRI averages 0.17 across 75 funds and 
conventional funds average 0.26 across 7488 funds. These descriptive statistics show 
religious SRI funds to be least volatile. Model 2 in Table 2.4 controls for appropriate 
covariates and confirms that religious SRI fund assets are more stable than both 
religious non-SRI and secular SRI.13 
 
Discussion 
I define moral action as taking on an imperative quality. However, I do not 
casually assume that religious fund investors are more stable due to a moral 
orientation. Instead, I consider the strong alternative hypothesis that structural 
characteristics (solidarity or advertising networks) are associated with stable fund 
assets. Since the preceding results have shown that religious non-SRI funds have 
lower levels of fund asset stability than religious SRI funds, the structural hypothesis 
is not supported with the data at hand. It should be noted that failing to observe high 
asset stability among religious non-SRI funds does not rule out the possibility that 
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religious structural characteristics are operating among religious funds. Future 
research should find better ways to directly measure various structural characteristics 
of religious groups and test for its impact on asset stability. With that said, these same 
results do lend positive empirical support for the morality hypothesis which I will 
more thoroughly address in the concluding section of this article.  
From a methodological standpoint, it is unfortunate that there is only one fund 
family that is religious and non-SRI. Ideally, one would want to observe more than 
one fund family in order to neutralize any effect of immeasurable attributes that are 
unique to the Thrivent family of funds. Additionally, existing mutual fund analyses of 
this sort have not raised concern about dependency among fund observations within 
the same mutual fund family. I therefore treat all funds within the Lutheran fund 
family as independent observations. Fortunately, the large number of funds offered by 
Thrivent allows the sample size of religious SRI and religious non-SRI funds to be 
comparable.  
The large number of Thrivent funds also raises a plausible alternative 
hypothesis that has yet to be addressed. Using international data on SRI funds and 
comparing to UK equity funds, Renneboog et al. (2006) finds that the number of funds 
in a fund family is associated with lower fund asset stability. This suggests that 
Thrivent assets could appear less stable because investors are rolling over shares from 
one Thrivent fund to another. Since other religious fund families 
have fewer investment alternatives within their respective families, fund asset stability 
could be a result of the relatively fewer investment options available to religious SRI 
fund investors. The fund data at hand is unable to detect where assets are being moved 
to and from. In order to properly test this hypothesis, further research is needed to 
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determine the viable investment options SRI investors actually face and in turn, 
whether this is associated with fund asset stability. It is important to note that this 
alternative hypothesis would assume and depend 
upon religious investors excluding other funds from their universe of possible 
investment options. This article helps frame this discussion of fund exclusion by 
exploring both structural and morally based explanations for this type of blocked 
exchange. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Previous research on SRI fund investment stability (Bollen, 2007; Benson and 
Humphrey, 2008) has ignored the religious affiliation of SRI mutual funds. After 
isolating the population of religiously affiliated funds, I find stark differences in asset 
stability. Religious SRI funds are less responsive to lagged performance and 
experience less fund flow volatility than secular SRI funds, confirming hypothesis 1. 
This finding supports Weber’s argument that religion can have an important impact on 
economic phenomena, an insight that has been mostly 
ignored among present day economic sociologists. 
Addressing this article’s main contention, the empirical results lend support to 
the morality hypothesis. Namely, since religious non-SRI assets are less stable than 
religious SRI assets, I conclude that the moral attributes of socially responsible fund 
activity (screening and advocacy) represent a strong force in producing high levels of 
asset stability in religious SRI funds. In contrast to behavioural finance sensibilities, 
this asset stability does not appear to be the result of irrational mistakes or cognitive 
lapses, but the consequence of thoughtful moral action. To revisit Etzioni’s (2003) 
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posited association between morality and perseverance, these results confirm that 
morality leads to investment perseverance among religious SRI investors. Beckert 
(2006) aptly notes that this display of morality could be viewed as good or bad. A 
financial advisor that is concerned about a client’s retirement savings may view this 
perseverance to be financially foolish (depending on the fund’s return performance). 
However, that same perseverance may be admirably viewed as holding to ones moral 
beliefs, especially in the face of significant monetary sacrifice.  
The moral orientation of fund investors can be divided into two ideal types. By 
screening out unethical companies, SRI investors find a moral means of investing in 
the stock market. On the other hand, the advocacy prong of SRI aligns with the moral 
imperative to produce societal change. The former aligns with Weber’s notion of value 
rationality, where actors are concerned with abiding by moral means with little 
concern for the outcome. The latter highlights an instrumental orientation that 
emphasizes a moral imperative to change society via the most suitable means to meet 
that end. Further research is needed to explore how these moral orientations impact 
investor behaviour. Visiting the bigger picture, however, it is possible that value 
rational SRI investors will continue investing despite impressive returns and despite 
promising signs of societal change. On the other hand, morally instrumental SRI 
investors would be more attentive to the prospects of effecting societal change through 
their mutual fund involvement.  
In conclusion, this research makes a contribution to the largely theoretical 
body of literature on morality in the market by empirically demonstrating a moral 
impact among religious SRI fund investors. I have shown that religious SRI fund 
assets are more stable than secular SRI assets. Through comparisons with religious 
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non-SRI funds, I have demonstrated that a moral orientation is a likely explanation for 
this finding. These combined findings suggest that religious morality can have an 
especially potent impact on financial behaviour. This in turn warrants further attention 
to the role of religious influences and moral influences in the economic realm. 
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ENDNOTES 
1I am referring to proxy voting above and beyond the legally mandated requirement. 
All funds are required to make their proxy voting activity available to the public. 
Funds typically vote in accordance with company management (Davis and Kim, 
2007), whereas SRI funds are ostensibly more likely to vote against management. 
 
2Both screening and advocacy are forms of socially responsible behaviour. The 
content (or the issues that funds are concerned about) is deemed ethical or unethical 
from the particular perspective of the SRI fund, meaning the term ‘ethical’ is relative. 
For instance, one SRI fund might ethically avoid companies that offer benefits to same 
sex partners of employees, whereas another SRI fund might ethically seek to own 
those same companies. 
 
3A fund family can offer multiple mutual funds that differ on financial criteria. 
 
4Despite Pax World’s founding by religious individuals, it has never identified itself as 
religious and is therefore not considered a religiously affiliated mutual fund for the 
purpose of this paper. 
 
5It is acknowledged that there are notable doctrinal and cultural differences between 
these religious groups that could affect economic behaviour. For instance, Tropman 
(2002) elaborates a particular Catholic ethic, which emphasizes community over 
individualistic capitalistic pursuits. Islamic finance has its own distinct character 
(Maurer, 2006). In this analysis, however, these various religious traditions are joined 
together under one ‘religious’ category. Teasing out differences between these 
religious traditions is an important direction that future research should take. 
 
6Since average Americans are increasingly investing in mutual funds for their 
retirement (Lusardi, 2008), this analysis features the behaviour of non-financial 
experts. This emphasis expands the growing sociological literature on finance (Knorr 
Cetina and Bruegger, 2002; Beunza and Stark, 2004; MacKenzie, 2006), which tends 
to focus on the behaviour of financial experts. 
 
7These data were collected from the following printed sources; Fund Scope Monthly 
Investment Company Magazine, the Investment Dealers Digest Mutual Fund Guide, 
Investor’s Mutual Fund Guide, the United and Babson Mutual Fund Selector and the 
Wiesenberger Investment Companies Annual Volumes. Funds that were not listed in 
these sources were added, although instances of this were rare. CRSP continues to 
update this list and uses various methods to ensure the data are accurate. 
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8
 A fund’s monthly return represents the change in price per share or Net Asset Value 
(NAV) as follows,
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9To exemplify the kind of anomalies this procedure omits one fund’s monthly TNA 
hovers around $3 billion for years, yet dips to $100 000 for one month before 
returning to its previous level. This procedure omits an observation with a fund flow 
of 3 286 008. Fund flows that are this large are unhelpful in detecting the kind of 
investor behaviour this paper is theoretically interested in. 
 
10Since I am theoretically interested in the aggregate response of average mutual fund 
investors, I use lagged absolute return performance instead of relative return 
performance. In doing so, I assume average investors are more likely to react to their 
fund’s absolute return, as opposed to investors taking the extra step to observe and 
process relative returns. Bollen (2007) similarly measures lagged performance in 
absolute terms. 
 
11For those who would rather view this data as a random sample of a super population 
and are therefore concerned about statistical significance of the hypothesized 
differences, I control for potential dependency of residuals of annual observations 
within the same fund by calculating White’s standard errors (presented in Table 2.3), 
clustered robust standard errors (clustered within mutual fund) and a hiearchical linear 
model (HLM) at the mutual fund level. The latter two analyses produce results that are 
similar to those presented in Table 2.3 and are available upon request. 
 
12It is acknowledged that both the religious SRI and religious non-SRI coefficients 
could be viewed as no different than zero, because the effects are not statistically 
significant. This could be due to the relatively small sample sizes for religious SRI and 
religious non-SRI categories. To make inferences to a super population, I predict a 
pooled analysis (n = 50 611). In this analysis, I include a binary lagged positive 
performance variable, binary variables for three fund categories (religious non-SRI, 
secular SRI and conventional) and interaction variables for each fund category and 
lagged positive performance variable. The summation of the fund category and the 
appropriate interaction variable coefficients is each found to be greater than zero (P , 
0.05) in all three comparisons, using the t test and Wald test. These results (available 
upon request) show that the aggregate reaction to lagged positive performance of 
religious SRI is lower than that of the other three categories of funds and the 
difference is statistically significant for each. 
 
13In order to determine if the difference between religious SRI and secular SRI is 
statistically significant and can therefore be inferred to a super population, I perform 
the following analysis. The positively skewed nature of the fund flow volatility 
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distribution (partially because fund flow volatility is bounded at zero) is inherited in 
residual plots, leading to heteroscedasticity of residuals. The logarithmic 
transformation of the dependent variable ameliorates this diagnostic concern, 
providing more accurate standard error estimates. OLS prediction of the logged 
monthly fund flow volatility on the full model (with featured covariates and robust 
White standard errors) produces results that confirm those presented in Table 2.4. One 
important difference is that the positive coefficient for the secular SRI fund category is 
statistically significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test). These results are available 
upon request. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MORAL AND MONETARY INTEREST IN SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE 
INVESTING 
 
Analyzing original survey data of socially responsible investors (SRI), 
this article seeks to demonstrate that morality induces commitment to 
SRI mutual funds.  In order for the SRI industry to effectively impact 
the behavior of corporations, more and more investors will have to 
shift and keep their investment dollars in SRI vehicles (investment 
behavior I refer to as fund commitment).  This article’s theoretical 
orientation focuses on moral and monetary “interest,” defined as an 
individual level driving force.  This theoretical emphasis on individual 
interest expands both economic sociology’s structural approach and 
behavioral economics’ emphasis on cognitive biases.  I find empirical 
evidence that moral interest induces fund commitment to SRI mutual 
funds, demonstrating that morality impacts behavior even in the 
financial market, a realm where monetary interest supposedly reigns. 
At the same time, I also find some evidence that monetary interest 
decreases fund commitment.   
 
Socially responsible investing (SRI) has the potential to change corporate 
behavior by allowing investors to vote with their dollars.  SRI mutual funds add a 
moral component to the financial priority of generating investment returns by refusing 
to invest in certain corporations (screening) and communicating with management in 
attempt to change behavior of corporations that are owned (advocacy).  Existing 
research suggests these moral priorities lead to higher levels of fund commitment (or 
more stable asset levels) in SRI funds in comparison to conventional mutual funds 
(Bollen 2007, Peifer 2011).  This implies that individuals who choose to invest in SRI 
funds will hold those shares longer because of their moral motivations.  However, 
existing evidence derives from changes in mutual fund asset levels over time, 
necessarily ignoring investor level behavior and attitudes.  This article helps fill this 
void in SRI research by describing and analyzing unprecedented survey data from 
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investors of one denominational SRI mutual fund.  
Analyzing survey data of SR investors provides a valuable opportunity to 
entertain alternative explanations for heightened levels of SRI fund commitment.  In 
other words, it might not be morality that is inducing SRI fund commitment.  For 
instance, SR investors may tend to be buy-and-hold investors which would mean they 
are committed to their SRI funds as well as their conventional funds.  The religious 
context of this case study isolates especially convincing alternative explanations for 
heightened levels of fund commitment.  For instance, it might be religious identity that 
cements the loyalty of investors, not the SRI activity.  Or the structural networks 
fostered in local congregations may induce commitment to religiously affiliated 
mutual funds. 
It is also possible that SR investors are just as oriented toward generating a 
high return as non-SR investors.  Perhaps the SRI label is casually adopted, yet 
quickly abandoned when return performance is perceived to be harmed.  In this article, 
I emphasize both monetary and moral interest, and a concept that is relatively absent 
from most sociological analyses and can be defined as an individual level driving 
force (Swedberg 2005).  Alongside testing whether moral interest is inducing fund 
commitment, I test whether monetary interest reduces SRI fund commitment.   
Much of the scholarly debate on SRI revolves around SRI return performance 
(Kurtz 2005).  Indeed, one can easily imagine that investors want SRIs to be a win-win 
scenario, where both moral and monetary goals are optimized.  Industry pundits refer 
to this as the coveted ability to “do well and be good.”  But what to SR investors really 
think, and how does their perception of SRI return performance impact their 
behavior? 
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The issue of fund commitment is important because in order for the SRI 
movement to have a stronger voice among corporate decision makers, SRI assets must 
reach a critical mass.  Once corporations become more responsive, this should in turn 
attract even more SRI assets as potential investors begin to realize they can effectively 
change corporate practice (Landier and Nair 2009).  Fund commitment is measured as 
the decision to continue investing even in the face of low return performance.  I 
analyze original survey data from a random sample of Mennonite Mutual Aid 
(MMA)1 Praxis mutual fund investors.  This is the first academic survey of individual 
SR investors that I am aware of.2  After considering plausible alternative hypotheses, I 
find that moral interest does induce fund commitment and monetary interest tends to 
reduce it.   
 
Moral and Monetary Interest 
The discipline of sociology has largely ignored the concept of interest, which 
can be defined as an individual-level driving force (Swedberg 2005).  But this is not 
due to a lack of attention by one of sociology’s classical thinkers.  The second part of 
Max Weber’s well known “switchman metaphor” is often recounted among 
sociologists.  It reads, “‘world images’ … like switchmen, determined the tracks along 
which action has been pushed.”  However, Weber first asserts that “material and ideal 
interest directly govern men’s conduct” (italics mine) (Weber [1915] 1946: 280).  This 
article borrows Weber’s dual concepts of material and ideal interest and instead uses 
more specific terminology; moral and monetary interest.  This emphasis on interest 
builds upon Weber’s definition of sociology as the “interpretive understanding of 
social action” where social action is recognized when the actor “attaches a subjective 
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meaning” to his or her behavior (Weber [1922]1979: 4).  In particular, I argue that 
moral interest is a particularly potent type of subjective meaning that drives social 
action (or investment behavior) even in the financial market, a realm of the economy 
supposedly driven by narrow monetary self-interest.   
In The Moral Dimension, Etzioni (1988) explains that pleasure seeking and 
moral interest drive economic behavior.  Although published during the formative 
years of new economic sociology, Etzioni’s emphasis on individual-level motivation 
(or interest) has been scarcely advanced by the subfield (Beckert et al. 2008).  Instead 
new economic sociology has staked its identity in downplaying the importance of 
monetary self-interest (or desire for pleasure) partially because of the concept’s 
perceived resonance with neoclassical economics.  And instead of emphasizing moral 
interest, new economic sociology founders showcase how embeddedness in structural 
networks help shape economic outcomes (White 1981, Grannovettor 1985, Burt 
2004).  This article expands economic sociology by empirically testing whether 
morality impacts financial market behavior and acknowledging monetary interest 
deserves more attention.   
This theoretical orientation to interest also runs against the grain of behavioral 
economics, which tends to assume financial behavior is driven by unconscious biases 
and cognitive errors (Statman 2011, Thaler and Sunstein 2009).  For instance, Akerlof 
and Shiller (2009) describe economic activity as driven by animal spirits.  By this, 
they mean behavior that is frequently “irrational or misguided” and “restless and 
inconsistent” (pgs. 3-4).  In contrast, this article pursues a model of behavior where 
actors are generally aware of and driven by their own interests, in particular their 
  83 
moral interest. 
The broader concept of morality has recently received a boost of energy among 
sociologists, exemplified by Hitlin and Vaisey’s Handbook of the Sociology of 
Morality (2010).  This article follows social scientific approaches that view morality 
as “a domain where concepts like good and bad, right and wrong are relevant,” as 
opposed to evaluating whether a certain action is right or wrong (Hitlin and Vaisey 
2010:5).  Macro-level sociological accounts emphasize society’s moral order as a 
central factor in explaining human behavior (Zelizer 1978, Wuthnow 1987, Smith 
2003, Fourcade and Healy 2007).  In contrast, this article garners individual level data 
to build upon existing research that suggests morality is driving SRI fund 
commitment. 
Peifer (2011) compares aggregate measures of asset stability across three 
mutual fund categories: religious SRI, secular SRI and religious non-SRI.  Religious 
SRI fund assets are found to be more stable (or less impacted by the previous year’s 
return performance) than secular SRI assets and two theoretical explanations are 
elaborated. One explanation points to religiously motivated morality.  Since this 
mechanism requires the fund to be socially responsible, religious non-SRI funds 
would not experience asset stability for this reason.  The other explanation points 
toward the structural attributes of religious groups, such as high degrees of trust 
directed toward co-religionists.  The religious non-SRI funds should experience 
heightened levels of asset stability if this mechanism is dominant.  Religious SRI 
funds have higher levels of asset stability than religious non-SRI funds, providing 
evidence in favor of the morality mechanism.  This article will determine if the impact 
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of morality on investor commitment to SRI funds can be verified at an individual level 
of analysis and alternative hypotheses will be more rigorously accounted for.  
Monetary interest is defined as the desire to accumulate more money.  Most 
neoclassical economic models assume monetary interest is the only one at play and 
drives all cost-benefit analyses.  In contrast, I emphasize that monetary interest is one 
of many different interests (Swedberg 2005).  In this case, I assess both moral and 
monetary interest side by side.  Neoclassical models of economic behavior also tend to 
assume the universal importance of monetary interest.  In contrast, I emphasize the 
contingent nature of monetary interest, which varies across individuals, time, place 
and culture.   
 
Socially Responsible Mutual Funds 
Planning for retirement is now an important concern for many Americans.  
Many workers that retired before the 1980’s could rely on social security benefits and 
employer’s defined benefit pensions.  However, the changing pension landscape in 
America means future retirees will have to rely on a more complex mix of assets 
(Poterba, Venti and Wise 2008).  As a result, the number of mutual funds available has 
grown precipitously (Davis 2009) in the past three decades from around 500 funds in 
1980 to 8,624 in 2009.  Having just stated that monetary interest is contingent upon a 
larger context, this marked shift in the American pension landscape creates a context 
where individuals are likely to be increasingly in tune with their own monetary interest 
in the financial market.  This helps provide theoretical motivation to analyze the role 
of monetary interest in mutual fund investment behavior. 
Mutual funds are now the most common way many Americans interface with 
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the financial market.  A mutual fund is an investment vehicle where professional 
investment managers diversify a pool of money in stocks and/or bonds.  A small 
portion of investment dollars are used to pay for their investment expertise and 
overhead costs, while the returns or losses of the investment accrue to the contributing 
investors.  Forty-four percent of American households own mutual fund in 2010 with 
about seventy-five percent using the investment vehicle for retirement (Bogdan et al. 
2010).   
SRI mutual funds represent an explicit combination of morality and the 
financial market.  SRI funds are involved in at least one of three activities; screening, 
shareholder advocacy and community investment (Domini and Kinder 1986).  
Screening refers to the refusal to invest in companies a fund deems to be unethical.  
The most commonly screened industries are tobacco, alcohol and gaming (or casinos).  
Some SRI funds also engage in positive screening, where particular companies are 
targeted for ownership.  A second SRI mutual fund activity is shareholder advocacy.  
This refers to communication with owned corporations through attending shareholding 
meetings and using proxy votes to pressure firms to change their behavior.  While 
nearly all SRI funds are engaged in screening, fewer practice shareholder advocacy.  
The least frequently practiced prong is community investment, wherein fund assets are 
directly invested in community development efforts. 
 Despite substantial growth of SRI assets since the 1980’s, their proportion of 
all mutual fund assets has hovered around 2 to 3 percent.  Mennonite Mutual Aid 
(MMA) Praxis is one SRI fund family that is associated with the Mennonites and is 
heavily engaged in screening, advocacy and community investment.  Praxis screens 
out companies involved in the military industry and tries to avoid companies with 
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questionable environmental practices, among many other screening criteria.3  I was 
given unprecedented access to conduct a phone survey with a simple random sample 
of Praxis investor households, which I analyze here.  Since the population of SR 
investors is largely hidden, this feasible research design provides a rare opportunity to 
focus on one particular SRI fund family and test hypotheses regarding fund 
commitment.  In this article, I will not be arguing that morality has the strongest 
impact among religious SRI fund investors.  Instead, I suggest this article’s findings 
generalize to all SRI fund investors, an issue I take up in the conclusion of this article.  
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Fund commitment is the dependent variable to be predicted through 
multivariate regression analysis.  Assuming return performance is an important reason 
people invest in the financial market (driven by their monetary interest), this article 
conceptualizes fund commitment as continuing to invest in a mutual fund even when 
one believes they may be getting lower return performance by doing so.  This article’s 
conceptualization of commitment represents behavior above and beyond that which is 
performed out of habit.  Inertia may be a good general explanation for why investors 
continue with their current investment portfolio.  But I intentionally measure fund 
commitment as persistence in spite of a convincing reason to change, such as a belief 
that one is earning lower return performance.  This conceptualization of fund 
commitment closely matches existing research on the topic (Bollen 2007, Peifer 
2011). 
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Buy-and-Hold SR Investor 
 In thinking about SRI commitment, it is important to consider the plausible 
alternative hypothesis that fund commitment is not driven by individual level interest, 
but that SR investors are unique in some other way.  In other words, perhaps high 
levels of asset stability result from SR investors being more committed to all of their 
mutual funds.  Perhaps they are more likely to be buy-and-hold type of investors that 
many financial advisors condone.  To address this alternative hypothesis, Praxis 
investors who also invest in conventional funds (who I call dual investors) are asked a 
question that measures their commitment to their Praxis fund.  Later in the survey, 
respondents are asked the same question that measures his or her commitment to a 
conventional fund.  Investors’ moral impulse regarding how one ought to be involved 
in the financial market should, on average, induce more commitment to Praxis than to 
conventional funds.   
 
   HYPOTHESIS 1 - Dual investors are more committed to their Praxis fund than to 
their conventional fund.  
 
Moral Interest 
Etzioni (2003) asserts, “The more individuals act under the influence of moral 
commitments, the more they are expected to persevere (when circumstances change).”  
Instead of perseverance, I use the term commitment.  A significant impediment to 
testing the simple proposition that morality drives economic behavior is the difficulty 
in operationalizing morality.  Analyzing SRI fund outcomes (as opposed to mutual 
fund behavior in general) helps overcome this difficulty because of the explicitness of 
the moral component associated with SRIs.  Praxis investors are likely to be aware that 
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their investment managers are screening out certain kinds of companies that are 
morally problematic and/or doing advocacy work.  It is also reasonable to expect those 
knowledgeable SR investors to gauge how important these activities are to themselves.  
This makes possible the following hypothesis.  
 
   HYPOTHESIS 2- Praxis investors who more highly value Praxis screening and 
advocacy functions are more likely to be committed to their Praxis fund.    
 
Monetary Interest 
 It is possible that SRI moral interest overshadows the mundane concerns about 
money.  After all, Americans routinely give their money away to charity, a moral and 
economic act that earns no monetary rewards in return.  Yet, the financial market is a 
venue where we would expect monetary interest to be a strong force.  In general, 
people invest their money in the financial market because they want to accumulate 
more of it.  This is especially the case now since investors are repeatedly told that the 
comfort level of their retirement years depends upon their saving discipline and 
financial acumen in the financial market.  In this case study, the degree to which 
investors value their Praxis return performance nicely operationalizes their monetary 
interest in their SRI fund.  Based upon the assumption that financial actors are driven 
by monetary concerns, I hypothesize,  
 
   HYPOTHESIS 3- Praxis investors who more highly value the importance of their 
Praxis fund’s return performance are less committed.  
 
One criticism of the broader concept of SRI derives from a strict reading of 
modern portfolio theory (MPT), which asserts that restricting the universe of potential 
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investments, for any reason, leads to suboptimal return performance (Kurtz 2005).  
Since SRI fund managers screen out certain stocks on moral grounds, SRI return 
performance should suffer according to MPT. On the other hand, some have argued 
that SRI can lead to higher return performance, by avoiding companies with high 
litigation costs (such as environmental polluters) and actively owning companies with 
higher productivity stemming from well treated employees (Landier and Nair 2009).  
However, Kurtz (2005) surveys the literature on SRI return performance and 
concludes, “There is very little disagreement about SRI performance.  It has not been 
dramatically different from unscreened performance over long time periods.”  
However, devoid from this important scholarly debate is the perception of SR 
investors.  How do they view their SRI fund’s return performance?  Forthcoming 
descriptive results provide a clearer picture of SR investor perception.   
SR investors can be divided into three camps.  Some think they are sacrificing 
on return performance.  Others think their SRI funds yield returns that are comparable 
to conventional funds.  Still others think they are earning higher returns.  The tenor of 
the academic debate on SRI return performance would seem to suggest the success of 
the SRI movement depends upon the growth of this latter group that believes they are 
“doing well and being good.”  It would follow that… 
 
   HYPOTHESIS 4a- Investors who believe they are earning higher returns from 
Praxis (as compared to conventional funds) are more committed than those that 
believe they are getting comparable returns.  
 
Those that believe they are making a monetary sacrifice by investing in Praxis, and yet 
continue to hold shares, could be argued to be the most committed.  Perhaps the 
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cognizance of that monetary sacrifice is compensated with the satisfaction of meeting 
one’s moral obligation. However, following the theoretical orientation that monetary 
interest drives financial market behavior, I hypothesize…  
   
   HYPOTHESIS 4b- Praxis investors who believe they are getting lower returns from 
Praxis (as compared to conventional funds) are less committed than those that believe 
they are getting comparable returns.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
There are few existing data sets that focus on individual investors and collect 
measures relevant to the study of SRI (Godshalk 2001, Greenberg Quinlin Rosner 
2006).  Kurtz (2005) reports that a major shortcoming of these studies is that they 
“report beliefs, not behavior.”  As far as I am aware, the data utilized in this article 
provide the first academic analysis of SRI fund investors and makes use of both 
investor attitudes and behavior.   
Since an estimated 3 percent of all mutual fund investors invest in SRI, 
collecting nationally representative data with satisfactory sample size of this small 
group is a challenge.  By focusing on one SRI fund family, gathering data about a 
substantial number of SRI fund investors becomes possible.  With the gracious 
cooperation of MMA Praxis mutual funds, a simple random sample of retail investor 
households was selected for inclusion in the study.  A pilot test of 25 respondents was 
conducted and minor changes were made to the survey questionnaire.  The phone 
survey was conducted by Cornell Survey Research Institute in January and February 
of 2010 (see Appendix 3.1 for survey questionnaire).  A respondent that felt 
knowledgeable enough to answer questions about the household's MMA Praxis 
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investment decisions was instructed to complete the phone survey. A total of 499 
Praxis investors completed the phone survey, creating a response rate of 62 percent.4 
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Portrait of Praxis Investors 
SRI mutual funds have existed for about three decades, yet relatively little is 
known about the people who invest in them.  Before testing hypotheses, I present 
some descriptive statistics of interest.  For instance, it turns out that 38 percent of 
Praxis investors also invest in a conventional mutual fund (see Figure 3.1 and sum 
23+15).  In other words, more than a third of Praxis investors could be considered 
“morally diversified” because they also invest in funds that could possibly own 
military defense companies, tobacco producers and environmental polluters.  While 
casual conceptions of morality frequently connote “all or nothing” scenarios, reality 
reveals a murkier picture.  These dual investors represent a pool of investors who are 
likely to be aware of the potentially immoral aspects of conventional mutual funds, yet 
continue to invest in such funds.   When asked to reconcile this contradiction in 
subsequent phone interviews,5 respondents often indicated they are forced to invest in 
conventional funds through their employer’s 401k or 403b plan.6   
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Figure 3.1: Proportion of Respondents that  
Invest in Featured Type of Mutual Fund  
(N = 499) 
Don't know
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Source: 2010 Praxis Phone Survey 
 
To get an idea of why respondents decided to invest in Praxis, they were 
simply asked, “Why did you begin investing in Praxis?”  This methodological 
approach is effective in gathering the first thing(s) that cross a respondent’s mind.  
Because interviewers were not instructed to probe for more comprehensive answers, 
many of these open ended responses tended to be terse.  “I do it because my employer 
offers it,” is one example.  However, another respondent gives a lengthier answer.  
Because I do have a concern about where my investments are made and I 
have a very strong peace stance. I only get one vote in an election and 
this way I have several votes in how my money is spent. If it means that I 
would not get as high a return then that's fine. It's important that I speak 
with my dollars. 
 
 All open-ended answers are coded according to the emergent categories.  One 
respondent’s answer was frequently coded into more than one of the following 
categories.   
More than a third (and the largest portion) of responses mention the ethical or 
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“socially responsible” aspect of the fund (see Figure 3.2), verifying the SRI 
component is an important reason people begin investing in Praxis.  For instance, one 
respondent invests with Praxis because the fund family is mindful of “investing in 
certain kinds of businesses and not others.”  However, there are other reasons given 
for investing in Praxis that are less morally relevant.  For example, a quarter of the 
sample mention that they are Mennonite or attend a Mennonite church as a reason.  
Twelve (12) percent mention that Praxis was offered by their employer.  Ten percent 
say something like “to save for retirement,” a type of response that I label “invest 
money” because it sounds as if they were answering the question, “Why did you begin 
investing in a mutual fund.”  These categories of responses provide evidence that both 
a moral orientation toward Praxis’ SRI involvement and more mundane reasons are 
drawing fund investors in.  I now address hypotheses that deal with the impact of 
moral and monetary interest on fund commitment to better understand what is driving 
Praxis investment behavior. 
 
Figure 3.2: Proportion of Responses to Open Ended Question, 
“Why did you begin investing in Praxis?” 
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40
Religion/Faith
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Trustworthy co.
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SRI
 
Note: Since respondents can be coded into more than one category, the  
proportions sum to more than one.  
Source: 2010 Praxis Phone Survey  
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Buy-and-Hold SR Investor  
I now entertain the possibility that SR investors are more likely to be a buy-
and-hold investor which would provide an explanation for higher levels of SRI fund 
commitment.  To do this, I isolate the thirty-eight (38) percent of Praxis investors that 
also invest in at least one conventional mutual fund, which is defined as a mutual fund 
that is neither engaged with screening nor advocacy work.  
These dual investors, as I am calling them, were asked a couple identical 
questions about their highest net worth Praxis fund and their highest net worth 
conventional fund.  This provides the comparison necessary to test Hypothesis 1, 
which asserts that dual investors are more committed to their Praxis fund than their 
conventional fund.  To operationalize fund commitment, dual investors were asked, 
“In the past, have you (or your financial adviser) 7 ever sold shares from [any Praxis 
fund/your highest net worth conventional fund] because of low return performance.”  I 
consider investors who have sold shares because of low return performance as less 
committed.  Thirty-two (32) percent of dual investors (that answered both questions) 
sold shares of their conventional fund in the past because of low return performance, 
whereas only 16 percent of the same dual investors sold Praxis shares for the same 
reason (see Table 3.1).  This difference between the two proportions is statistically 
significant and therefore generalizes to the universe of dual Praxis investors.  
Multivariate analysis is presented below to more rigorously test Hypothesis 1. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Dual Investor by Type of Fund Owned 
Variable Praxis Mean
Conventional 
Mean
Sell fund shares because of low returns       0.16       0.32*
Importance of Praxis return performance       5.01       5.43*
Owns 5/6 or more  funds       0.17       0.25*
Household income (in $1,000s)     74.65     74.65
Age     59.72     59.72
N   177   177
 
Note: Proportions and means are calculated from original and imputed data. 
Income and age are identical across columns because these individual  
characteristics do not vary by type of fund owned. The asterisk (*) denotes that the  
difference between the Praxis and Conventional mean is greater than zero or  
statistically significant (p < 0.05). 
Source: 2010 Praxis Phone Survey 
 
Dual investors also provide two different values that measure how important 
earning “high return performance” is from their Praxis and conventional fund(s) (on a 
seven point scale where seven means very important).  The mean score in response for 
Praxis funds is 5.01 and 5.43 for conventional funds (see Table 3.1).  Although the 
difference between these two means is small, it is statistically significant.  High return 
performance from Praxis is less important to dual investors than high return 
performance from conventional funds.  One interpretation is that dual investors 
tolerate lower return performance from their Praxis fund because it is socially 
responsible. 
The number of Praxis and conventional mutual funds owned is measured as a 
categorical variable, with the largest category representing more than five Praxis funds 
and more than six  conventional funds.  Due to the larger population of conventional 
funds, these nearly parallel categories likely represent different underlying quantities 
of mutual funds.  I therefore control for the variable, owns more than 5/6 funds.  Since 
the number of each fund type owned is likely an important determinant for whether an 
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individual has sold one in the past, this is an important variable to control for. 
 To conduct a multivariate analysis on whether dual investors are more 
committed to their Praxis fund, observations of the 177 dual investors are duplicated 
and stacked, forming a data set with 354 observations.  One observation (or row of 
data) for each respondent contains relevant data that are unique to their Praxis fund 
and the other contains data that are unique to their conventional fund.  Standard errors 
are calculated with robust cluster estimators, clustered within individual.8  If Praxis 
observations (denoted by the Praxis fund indicator variable) are less likely to indicate 
shares were sold because of low return performance, dual investors are more 
committed to their Praxis fund.  Model 1 in Table 3.2 demonstrates that Praxis 
observations are associated with a decreased odds of selling by a factor of 0.4.  In 
other words, dual investors are more committed to (or less likely to sell) their Praxis 
fund shares.  Valuing high return performance of respective fund types, higher income 
and higher age are associated with increased odds of selling.   
Table 3.2: Estimated Logistic Odds Ratio of Dual Investors  
Selling Fund Shares Because of Low Return Performance 
M1 M2
Praxis fund     0.42***     0.58*
Importance of fund return performance     1.19*     1.19*
Owns more than 4/5 funds     1.44     2.29*
Praxis fund by Owns more than 4/5 funds     0.21*
Household income (in $1,000s)     1.01**     1.01*
Age     1.03***     1.03**
Wald chi square   32.71   42.64
Probability > chi square     0.00     0.00
N 354 354
 
* < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001 for one tailed test    
Note: Standard errors are clustered by individual with VCE variance-covariance  
matrix. 
Source: 2010 Praxis Phone Survey 
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Model 2 (Table 3.2) tests whether the impact of owning multiple funds (owns 
more than 5/6 funds) varies by type of fund.  The interaction effect is significant, 
suggesting the likely differing population of underlying funds the categorical variable 
is unable to measure is an important predictor of having sold shares in the past.  To 
interpret this significant interaction, I calculate predicted probabilities.  Among dual 
individuals that own six or fewer conventional funds, the predicted probability of 
selling conventional funds is 26 percent.  For dual investors that own five or fewer 
Praxis funds, the predicted probability of selling Praxis funds is 17 percent.  Most 
importantly, after including this significant interaction, the Praxis fund factor is 
statistically significant with a factor that is less than one, indicating a decreased odds 
of selling.9  This verifies Hypothesis 1 which asserts that dual investors are more 
committed to their Praxis fund and thus fails to confirm the notion that there is 
something about Praxis investors that make them more committed to all of their 
mutual funds.   
   I just used a behavioral measure of commitment, with investors who had sold 
Praxis shares in the past due to poor return performance being viewed as less 
committed.  The forthcoming analysis which tests Hypotheses 2-4 will measure 
commitment slightly differently.  Instead of asking respondents whether they actually 
sold shares in the past, they are instructed to indicate their likelihood of selling shares 
if they “were to learn that the return performance of that MMA Praxis fund was 
usually lower than conventional funds.”  This conjectural question allows investors to 
gauge for themselves how committed they are to their fund.  Sixty (60) percent of 
valid Praxis investors indicate they are “not at all likely” to sell, with the remaining 
categories covering somewhat likely, very likely and extremely likely (see Table 3.3 
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for descriptive statistics).  This binary outcome of “not at all likely” operationalizes 
investor commitment, which the following Logistic regression analysis will predict.10   
 
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of Praxis Investors (N=491) 
Proportion            
or Mean
Not at all likely to sell Praxis shares if returns were low 0.60
Female 0.44
Married 0.89
Age 59.13
Age squared 3683.89
Household income (in $1,000s) 68.16
Household income (in $1,000s) squared 6095.19
Education: Less than high school degreed 0.05
Education: High school graduate 0.18
Education: Some college 0.15
Education: College graduate 0.29
Education: Graduate degree 0.33
SRI (screening and advocacy) very important 0.24
Praxis returns very important 0.33
Perception: Believes Praxis returns is about the same 0.49
Perception: Believes Praxis returns are higher 0.07
Perception: Believes Praxis returns are lower 0.36
Perception: Don't know if Praxis is higher or lower 0.08
Feels sense of belonging to denomination 0.53
High trust that Praxis deals honestly with investor 0.89
Spoke to friends/family about Praxis in past 2 years 0.54
Praxis mentioned at church 0.39
 
Note: Proportions and means are calculated from original and imputed data. 
Source: 2010 Praxis Phone Survey 
 
 
 
Moral Interest 
Before testing Hypothesis 2 (or the morality hypothesis), I first focus on a 
descriptive portrait of SRI screening and advocacy.  Praxis is heavily engaged in both 
screening and advocacy work, but how educated are individual investors about this 
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involvement?  Respondents were asked, “To your knowledge, does MMA Praxis 
refuse to own companies that it finds to be involved in unethical behavior?”   Ninety 
(90) percent responded in the affirmative (with about 7 percent answering no, and 3 
percent indicating they “did not know”).  Respondents were also asked, “To your 
knowledge, does MMA Praxis communicate with some of the companies that it owns 
and encourage them to change their unethical behavior?”  Far fewer (54 percent) could 
answer yes, 14 percent answered no and 31 percent “did not know.”  Praxis is an SRI 
leader in the field of advocacy work and communicates this to investors through fund 
material.  This 54 percent point estimate is therefore especially telling and suggests 
that a substantial portion of SR investors (of funds that practice advocacy) are not 
knowledgeable of that work.  Awareness of screening, on the other hand, is much 
higher.   
 Turning now to multivariate analysis, in the forthcoming models I control for 
sex, marital status, age, income, and education; none of which are significantly 
associated with fund commitment (see Table 3.4).  Respondents that know Praxis is 
engaged in screening and advocacy and also rank both as extremely important are 
coded as investors who highly value the SRI function of their Praxis fund.  This 
measures how important the fund’s moral behavior is to the investor and 
operationalizes individual moral interest in SRI.  Hypothesis 2 states that Praxis 
investors who more highly value the screening and advocacy function are more likely 
to be committed to their Praxis fund.  This is confirmed with the variable increasing 
the odds of commitment by a factor of about 1.8 (see Model 2 and 5 in Table 3.4).  
Interpreting this coefficient from Model 5, individuals that highly value SRI have a 71 
percent predicted probability of being committed (holding all other values at the 
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respective variable’s mean) while individuals that value SRI less have a 58 percent 
predicted probability.   
 
Table 3.4: Estimated Logistic Odds Ratio of Being Committed to Praxis Fund 
M 1 M 2 M 3 M 4 M 5
Female    1.22    1.18    1.23    1.19    1.15
Married    1.00    1.00    1.2    1.03    1.22
Age    0.98    0.98    0.98    0.97    0.97
Age squared    1.00    1.00    1.00    1.00    1.00
Household income (in $1,000s)    1.01    1.01    1.01    1.01    1.01
Household income (in $1,000s) squared    1.00    1.00    1.00    1.00    1.00
Education: High School (Referent)
Education: Some college    1.23    1.15    1.27    1.21    1.17
Education: College graduate    1.52    1.47    1.54    1.46    1.4
Education: Graduate degree    1.47    1.38    1.51    1.46    1.39
SRI (screening and advocacy) very important    1.68*    1.79*
Praxis returns very important    0.50***    0.51**
Believes Praxis returns are comparable (Referent)
Believes Praxis returns are higher    1.14    1.11
Believes Praxis returns are lower    0.64*    0.68*
Don't know if Praxis is better or worse    1.7    1.66
Feels sense of belonging to denomination    1.07    1.01
High trust that Praxis deals honestly with investor    2.33**    2.08*
Spoke to friends/family about Praxis in past 2 years    0.69*    0.68*
Praxis mentioned at church    1.20    1.11
Wald chi square  10.57  14.69  26.60  23.02  38.35
prob > chi2 square    0.31    0.14    0.01    0.04    0.00
N 491 491 491 491 491
 
 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 for one tailed test 
Source: 2010 Survey of Praxis Investors 
 
Monetary Interest 
In contrast to morality inducing commitment, I also hypothesize that monetary 
interest reduces commitment (Hypotheses 3, 4a and 4b).  One way to measure 
monetary interest is to measure the importance of fund return performance to the 
respondent.  Thirty-three (33) percent rank Praxis return performance as very 
important (see Table 3.3), and as predicted, these investors are substantially less 
committed, reducing the odds of commitment by a factor of 0.5.  An individual that 
ranks return performance as very important has a 50 percent predicted probability of 
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being committed compared to a 66 percent predicted probability for investors who 
rank return performance as less important.  This confirms Hypothesis 3 and shows 
monetary interest is associated with lower levels of fund commitment to Praxis. 
One hitherto obscured fact about SR investors is their perceptions of SRI 
return performance.  Empirical evidence of investor perception is noticeably absent 
from SRI research, which tends to focus on the objective risk adjusted return 
performance relative to relevant benchmarks.  However, individual investors are 
probably not exposed to these esoteric studies and are likely driven by more proximate 
forces.  Leaving aside how investor perception is formulated, the survey questionnaire 
simply asks what investors think about their Praxis return performance.  The majority 
of respondents, 49 percent, believe they are getting “about the same” return 
performance from their Praxis fund.  Seven (7) percent of Praxis investors believe 
their Praxis fund tends to get higher return performance than most conventional funds 
and 36 percent believe Praxis tends to underperform conventional funds.  Eight 
percent didn’t know (see Table 3.3).11  
Failing to confirm Hypothesis 4a, investors who believe they are getting higher 
return performance with Praxis are no more or less committed than the reference 
group (those that believe they are getting comparable return performance).  However, 
investors who believe they are getting lower return performance are less committed 
than the reference group, supporting Hypothesis 4b (see Model 3 and 5).  To help 
interpret the coefficient of 0.68 (Model 5) for the impact of believes Praxis returns are 
lower, respondents that believe Praxis returns are comparable to conventional funds 
have a predicted probability of 63 percent of being committed, whereas those that 
believe Praxis earns lower returns have a 54 percent predicted probability.  In other 
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words, believing that Praxis earns lower returns is associated with less fund 
commitment.  In sum, I find some evidence that monetary interest reduces fund 
commitment with confirmation of Hypothesis 3 (those that highly value Praxis return 
performance are less committed) and 4b (those that believe they are getting lower 
returns from Praxis are less committed). 
 
Controlling for the Religious Context  
The social structure of American denominations and congregations highlight a 
unique characteristic of this religious case study.  This raises additional alternative 
explanations of SRI fund commitment that I control for in order to demonstrate the 
above findings are robust and potentially generalizable to all SR investors.  For 
instance, secular SRI funds endorse specific moral issues but lack an especially 
coherent pool of likely investors.  In contrast, a sense of Mennonite identity is one 
potential explanation for Praxis fund commitment.  Social psychologists have 
fruitfully extended Tajfel and Turner’s (1986) seminal insight that even minimal 
perceptions of group identity can impact prosocial behavior directed toward that 
group.  Previous research has confirmed that identity and solidarity impacts economic 
outcomes (Lawler 2001, Peifer 2010, Akerlof and Kranton 2010).  This would suggest 
that Praxis investors who have a strong sense of Mennonite identity are more 
committed to their Praxis fund than investors who have a weaker sense of Mennonite 
identity.  Put another way, Mennonites may invest in Praxis because of the funds’ 
Mennonite affiliation, not because it is socially responsible.  Survey results show that 
90 percent of Praxis respondents self identify as Mennonites.  Among these 
Mennonites, feeling a strong “sense of belonging” to the denomination operationalizes 
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a stronger sense of identity.  However, this variable is not associated with fund 
commitment (see Model 4 and 5 in Table 3.4). 
Trust is another important component of group identity that is often conceived 
of in interpersonal terms.  However, trust can also be directed toward a larger group.  
In this case, trusting that the people that work at Praxis will deal honestly with 
investors is one aspect of group identity.  Almost 90 percent of Praxis investors have a 
high degree of trust (see Table 3.3) and this variable increases the odds of commitment 
by a factor of 2.1 (see Model 5 in Table 3.4).  To more easily interpret this coefficient, 
individuals that have high trust in Praxis have a 63 percent probability of being 
committed while individuals that do not trust Praxis as much have a 45 percent 
probability of being committed.  In sum, feeling a sense of belonging to the 
denomination has no statistically significant impact on commitment, but trust in Praxis 
employees (likely stemming from their Mennonite affiliation) has a substantial impact.   
Members of Mennonite congregations are also likely to be situated in networks 
of social relations through which Praxis information might freely flow.  
Congregational life, infused with small group discussions on financial issues or the 
availability of mutual fund literature in church foyers, may encourage congregational 
members to continue investing in Praxis.  This structural explanation resonates most 
closely with conventional new economic sociology wisdom (White 1981, Granovettor 
1985, Burt 2004).  Short of collecting the actual network structure of these 
congregations, I measure 1) whether respondents had spoken with friends or extended 
family about their Praxis fund in the past 2 years and 2) whether people at the 
respondent’s congregation “openly talk about and encourage investing with MMA 
Praxis.”  Having Praxis mentioned at church is not associated with fund commitment 
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(see Model 4 and 5).  Surprisingly, talking about the fund with friends and family 
decrease the odds of commitment by a factor of 0.7.  This suggests negative 
information about Praxis is possibly flowing through conversational networks.  
However, follow-up phone interviews were unable to verify this interpretation.  In 
sum, the relational conduits afforded by the congregational structure are not shown to 
induce fund commitment.  More broadly, the above moral and monetary interest 
findings obtain after controlling for these identity and structural factors that are 
specific to Praxis’ religious context. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Through investor level data of one particular SRI mutual fund family, this 
article provides empirical evidence that moral interest is driving SR investment 
behavior and attitudes.  Dual investors are more committed to their Praxis fund than to 
their conventional funds, suggesting Praxis investors are not somehow more 
committed to all their mutual funds.  Likewise, Praxis investors who highly value 
screening and advocacy work of their fund are more committed.  Even in the financial 
market, where self-interest or greed is frequently legitimated and encouraged, morality 
holds sway.  This stands in contrast to behavioral economics assumptions that 
cognitive biases and mistakes are driving investment behavior.  Instead, this article 
theorizes and empirically demonstrates that a subjectively conceived moral force (or 
moral interest) is driving investment behavior in the financial market. 
In addition to moral interest inducing SRI commitment, there is also some 
evidence to suggest monetary interest works against it.  Those that highly value the 
return performance of their Praxis fund are less committed to the fund.  In other 
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words, investors who want high return performance from their Praxis fund find it hard 
to remain committed to it.  However, investor perception that Praxis fund return 
performance is higher than conventional funds has no statistically significant impact 
on fund commitment.  This suggests that trying to convince SRI investors that they are 
“doing well and being good” is unlikely to induce their commitment.  However, 
results do suggest that convincing SRI investors that SRIs are no worse the 
conventional funds (in terms of return performance) may induce SRI fund 
commitment.  
Economic sociologists have traditionally taken a structural approach to the 
study of economic phenomena, thus downplaying the possibility of moral interest 
driving behavior.  The findings here fail to demonstrate that fund information flowing 
through congregational structural networks induces fund commitment.  However, the 
moral pull toward and monetary push away from SRI are robust after controlling for 
the structural and identity variables that are unique to this case study’ religious 
context.  This suggests the moral and monetary interest findings generalize beyond the 
religious context.   
The theoretical position taken here follows a Weberian approach which posits 
that material and ideal (or monetary and moral) interests drive economic action.  
While there are more interests one could emphasize, these two in particular are 
especially important to the study economic phenomena that include explicit moral 
components.  Other examples might include buying organic products, living more 
simply or giving one’s money away.  In cases such as these, moral and monetary 
interests are both in play.  While some actors perceive both interests to coexist 
harmoniously, exemplified by the notion that one can “do well and be good,” many do 
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not.  More precisely, among SR investors, moral interest tends to work against the 
thrust of monetary interest.  This tug and pull of moral and monetary interest is an 
important reality for individuals that attempt to meld morality with their economic 
activity.   
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ENDNOTES 
1
 MMA has since changed its name to Everence.   
 
2
 Consulting firm Green Quinlin Rosner Research (2006) conducted a survey on 
TIAA-CREF investors (N = 1,002).  Half of the sample invested in the fund family’s 
SRI fund and the other half is non-SR investors.  Beyond a report of the survey’s 
descriptive statistics and crosstabulations of variables of interest, I am not aware of 
additional research on this data. 
 
3
 Praxis focuses on six core values in its screening process.  It aims to own companies 
that respect the dignity and value of all people, build a world at peace and free from 
violence, demonstrate a concern for justice in a global society, exhibit responsible 
management practices support and involve communities, and practice environmental 
stewardship. 
 
4  Additional information about the respondents that did not complete the phone survey 
is not available in order to protect the confidential information of Praxis investors.  
Therefore, information regarding the possibility of a non-response bias is unavailable.   
 
5 A random sample of 41 willing survey respondents were contacted for a follow-up 
phone interviews.  
      
6 Interestingly, in contrast to this interview data that suggests SR investors feel 
“forced” to invest in conventional funds offered by their employers, Praxis investors 
were explicitly asked (in the phone survey) if they had a choice to invest in Praxis.  
This addresses the possibility that Praxis investors are effectively forced to accept 
their employer’s Praxis benefit package.  However, this does not appear to be the case 
with 92 percent of the sample indicating they had a choice.  Incidentally, this variable 
has no impact (analysis not shown here) on the investor commitment outcome to be 
analyzed in Table 3.4.    
 
7 It could be the case that individuals largely defer to their financial advisors and 
therefore practice limited decision making, thus eroding the possibility that individual 
interest is driving any financial behavior.  The phone survey measures whether 
respondents have a financial advisor (and 69 percent of all survey respondents do) and 
how heavily these respondents rely on their financial adviser when making mutual 
fund buy-and-sell decisions.  A binary variable that measures heavy reliance on 
financial adviser has no impact on fund commitment (not shown here).   
 
8 Clustered results were modeled with Stata using the vce(cluster clustvar) option.  In 
this case, a unique individual identifier is the clustvar.  Featured results are very 
similar to results generated from robust standard errors and normal logistic regression 
standard errors.  
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9
 In Model 2, the Praxis fund variable tests the difference between the odds of selling a 
Praxis fund among those that own five or fewer Praxis funds and the odds of selling a 
conventional fund among those that own six of fewer conventional funds.  This 
difference is statistically significant with a one tailed test (p< .05).   
 
10
 Ordinal logistic regression of the original four point scale dependent variable 
confirms forthcoming logistic results.  All missing values of covariates were manually 
imputed through fitting regression models.   Lastly, the behavioral measure of having 
sold Praxis in the past because of low return performance used to test Hypothesis 1 is 
correlated in the expected direction with the attitudinal dependent variable used here 
to test Hypotheses 2 - 4. 
 
11
 This raises the issue of actual Praxis return performance.  Relevant data on which 
Praxis mutual funds each respondent held over which time period was not collected.  
This makes it impossible to determine each respondent portfolio’s relative return 
performance.  However, among the 3 Praxis mutual funds that existed for 10 years (as 
of December 31, 2010), none of the no-load return performance figures beat their 
relevant 10 year benchmark.  Among the 4 Praxis funds that existed for 5 years, one 
beat its relevant benchmark.  Among the 6 funds that existed for 3 years, 1 beat its 
relevant 3 year benchmark (Praxis Fund Family Overview 2010).  
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Appendix 3.1: 2010 Praxis Survey Questionnaire        
findec: Financial decision maker in household 
 
I'm calling from Cornell University and we're working with MMA Praxis mutual funds.  I'd 
like to ask you a few questions about your investments.  
 
Are you knowledgeable enough to answer some questions about your household's MMA 
Praxis investment decisions, or would someone else be better to speak to? 
 
 <1> YES 
 <0> NO  
 
mar: Marital status 
 
Ok.  All of your answers will be kept completely confidential and the survey should take about 
20 minutes to complete. 
 
As you may know MMA Praxis Mutual Funds is a fund family created and managed by 
Mennonite Mutual Aid.  It offers six different mutual funds, each with a different investment 
strategy or style.  A mutual fund is a pool of money that is invested in stocks or bonds.  A 
mutual fund investor, such as yourself, owns shares of the mutual fund and the value of those 
shares rises or falls depending on performance of the stocks and/or bonds. 
 
Now, before asking about mutual fund ownership, I need to know, are you currently married?  
 
 <1> YES-MARRIED 
 <0> NO-NOT MARRIED            [goto nummma] 
 <d> Do not know                [goto nummma] 
 <r> Refused                    [goto nummma] 
 
 
whoowns: Who owns MMA Praxis shares 
 
So, which of the following best describes your household?  Do you alone own shares of an 
MMA Praxis fund, does only your spouse own an MMA Praxis fund, or do both you and 
your spouse own MMA Praxis? 
 
 <1> I ALONE OWN SHARES OF MMA PRAXIS FUND 
 <2> ONLY MY SPOUSE OWNS SHARES OF MMA PRAXIS 
 <3> BOTH SPOUSE AND I OWN MMA PRAXIS (EITHER INDIVIDUALLY OR 
JOINTLY) 
 <d> Do not know  
 <r> Refused 
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nummma: How many MMA Praxis funds owned 
 
About how many MMA Praxis mutual funds do you currently own shares in? Is it zero, one, 
2 to 4 or more than 4? 
 
 <0> ZERO [goto done] 
 <1> ONE 
 <2> 2 TO 4 
 <3> MORE THAN 4  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
 
 
whymma: Why invest in MMA 
 
Please tell me, in just a few words, why did you begin investing in MMA Praxis? 
 
 <1> Answered [specify] 
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
   
numcf: How many non-MMA mutual funds owned 
 
About how many non-MMA Praxis mutual funds, if any, do you currently own shares in?  Is 
it zero, one, 2 to 5, or more than 5? 
 
 <0> ZERO 
 <1> ONE 
 <2> 2 TO 5 
 <3> MORE THAN 5  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
 
hvfnad: Have financial advisor 
 
Do you currently have a financial adviser?  
 
 <1> YES 
 <0> NO [goto finknw] 
 <d> Do not know [goto finknw] 
 <r> Refused [goto finknw] 
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imp_fa: Importance of financial advisor 
On a scale from 1 to 7, how much do you rely on the advice of your financial advisor when it 
comes to making mutual fund buy-and-sell decisions, where 1 means not at all and 7 means 
you rely on your financial advisor's advice a lot.  
 
 <1> NOT AT ALL 
 <2> 
 <3> 
 <4> 
 <5> 
 <6> 
 <7> A LOT 
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
 
finknw: Financial knowledge 
 
On a scale from 1 to 7, how would you assess your overall financial knowledge, where 1 
means very low and 7 means very high? 
 
 <1> VERY LOW 
 <2> 
 <3> 
 <4> 
 <5> 
 <6> 
 <7> VERY HIGH 
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
risk: how willing to take risks 
 
When thinking of your financial investments, how willing are you to take risks?  Please use a 
10 point scale, where 1 means not at all willing and 10 means very willing. 
 
 <1> NOT AT ALL WILLING 
 <2> 
 <3> 
 <4> 
 <5> 
 <6> 
 <7> 
 <8> 
 <9> 
 <10> VERY WILLING 
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
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cmpint: Financial literacy about compounding interest 
 
Now I'm going to ask you a multiple choice question. If you don't know the answer, just say 
so. 
 
Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2 percent per year.  After 
5 years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to grow?  
Would you have more than 102 dollars, exactly 102 dollars, less than 102 dollars, or do 
you not know.  
 
 <1> MORE THAN $102 
 <2> EXACTLY $102 
 <3> LESS THAN $102 
 <d> Do not know  
 <r> Refused 
 
chcprc: How often check share price 
 
Now, I'm going to ask you a few questions about the MMA Praxis mutual fund you have the 
most money invested in. 
 
Please be thinking about that particular mutual fund as you answer the following questions. 
 
About how often do you typically check the share price of that MMA Praxis fund?  Do you 
rarely check the share price, do you check it 1 to 5 times a year, 6 to 12 times a year, or more 
than 12 times a year? 
 
 <1> RARELY 
 <2> 1 TO 5 TIMES 
 <3> 6 TO 12 TIMES 
 <4> MORE THAN 12 TIMES  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
 
choice: Do you have a choice to invest in MMA 
 
Are you required to invest in that MMA Praxis mutual fund, perhaps because of an 
employer's benefit package, or is there a choice to invest in it?   
 
 <0> REQUIRED TO INVEST IN MMA PRAXIS 
 <1> THERE IS A CHOICE  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
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redpst: MMA_Ever redeemed shares in past due to return performance 
 
In the past, have you (or your financial advisor) ever sold shares from any MMA Praxis 
mutual fund because of low return performance?  
 
 <1> YES 
 <0> NO 
 <d> Do not know  
 <r> Refused 
 
trust: How much do you trust MMA 
 
How much trust do you have that the people who manage MMA Praxis mutual funds are 
going to deal honestly with you as an investor?  Do you have no trust at all, very little trust, 
some trust, or do you have a lot of trust? 
 
 <1> NO TRUST AT ALL 
 <2> VERY LITTLE TRUST 
 <3> SOME TRUST 
 <4> A LOT OF TRUST 
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
 
telfrnds: Did you talk about MMA with friends or family 
 
Within the past 2 years or so, can you recall a time when you spoke with your friends or 
extended family about your MMA Praxis investments? 
 
 <1> YES 
 <0> NO  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
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impperf: How important is return performance 
 
How important is it to you that the MMA Praxis mutual fund produces high return 
performance, on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 meaning not at all important and 7 meaning 
very important. 
 
 <1> NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT 
 <2> 
 <3> 
 <4> 
 <5> 
 <6> 
 <7> VERY IMPORTANT 
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
knscrn: Did you know MMA screens out unethical companies 
 
To your knowledge, does MMA Praxis refuse to own companies that it finds to be involved 
in unethical behavior? 
 
 <1> YES 
 <0> NO  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
 
impscrn: How important is screening to you 
 
(Just so you know, MMA Praxis does refuse to own unethical companies. Now that you are 
aware of this...) 
 
How important is it to you that MMA Praxis refuses to own unethical companies, on a scale 
from 1 to 7, with 1 meaning not at all important and 7 meaning very important. 
 
 <1> NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT 
 <2> 
 <3> 
 <4> 
 <5> 
 <6> 
 <7> VERY IMPORTANT  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
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knadv: Did you know MMA is advocate 
 
To your knowledge, does MMA Praxis communicate with some of the companies that it owns 
and encourage them to change their unethical behavior?  
 
 <1> YES 
 <0> NO   
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
 
impadv: How important is advocacy to you 
 
(Just so you know, MMA Praxis does encourage unethical companies to change their 
behavior.  Now that you are aware of this...) 
 
How important is it to you that MMA Praxis communicates with some of the companies that it 
owns and tries to change their unethical behavior, on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 being not at 
all important and 7 meaning very important.   
 
 <1> NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT 
 <2> 
 <3> 
 <4> 
 <5> 
 <6> 
 <7> VERY IMPORTANT  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
 
scrnadv: Which is more important, screening or advocacy 
 
(if impscrn =  impadv, read) Ok, your previous answers indicate that refusing to own and 
trying to change the behavior of unethical companies are of equal importance to you, but I'm 
wondering if you can tell me which is more important to you.  Pretend that MMA Praxis 
would continue to do both activities but could devote extra energy to only one activity.  Would 
you want MMA Praxis to more rigorously refuse to own unethical companies or more 
rigorously try to change the behavior of unethical companies?  
 
 <1> SCREEN OUT 
 <2> CHANGE BEHAVIOR  
 <3> BOTH ARE EQUALLY IMPORTANT 
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
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mmaret: How does mma returns compare to conventional funds 
 
The term conventional fund refers to mutual funds that are not involved in refusing to own 
unethical companies nor do they try to change the behavior of companies involved in 
unethical behavior.  Most mutual funds available today are conventional funds. 
 
With that said, do you think that your MMA Praxis fund tends to earn lower returns than most 
conventional funds, about the same level of returns, or higher returns than most conventional 
funds?   
 
 <1> LOWER RETURNS 
 <2> ABOUT THE SAME 
 <3> HIGHER RETURNS  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
perfbuy: If returns were high, how likely is it that you would buy 
 
If you were to learn that the return performance of that MMA Praxis fund was usually higher 
than conventional funds, how likely is it that you would begin contributing more money to it 
for that reason?  Is it not at all likely, somewhat likely, very likely or extremely likely?   
 
 <1> NOT AT ALL LIKELY 
 <2> SOMEWHAT LIKELY 
 <3> VERY LIKELY 
 <4> EXTREMELY LIKELY  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
 
 
Note to Interviewer: If respondent indicates he/she might not have enough money to 
contribute more, say, "I understand.  Given that monetary constraint, would the high return 
performance make you not at all likely somewhat likely, very likely or extremely likely to 
contribute more money?" 
 
perfsell: If returns were low, how likely is it that you would sell 
 
If you were to learn that the return performance of that MMA Praxis fund was usually lower 
than conventional funds, how likely is it that you would sell some shares for that reason?  Is it 
not at all likely, somewhat likely, very likely or extremely likely?  
 
 <1> NOT AT ALL LIKELY 
 <2> SOMEWHAT LIKELY 
 <3> VERY LIKELY 
 <4> EXTREMELY LIKELY  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
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sriown: Own other sri funds 
 
Earlier, you mentioned that you invest in (a) non-MMA Praxis mutual fund(s). Does this (Do 
all of these) non-MMA Praxis mutual fund(s) also refuse to own or try to change the behavior 
of unethical companies or is it a (are they all) conventional fund(s)?  
 
 <1> ALL REFUSE TO OWN OR TRY CHANGING UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR 
 <2> CONVENTIONAL 
 <3> BOTH TYPES (ONLY USE IF R OWNS MORE THAN ONE NON-MMA FUND) 
 <d> Do not know         
 <r> Refused             
 
impperfcf: conventional fund_How important is return performance for conventional 
fund 
 
Thinking about that conventional fund (the conventional fund that you have the most money 
invested in), how important is it to you that this fund produces high return performance, on 
a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 being not at all important and 7 meaning very important. 
 
 <1> NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT 
 <2> 
 <3> 
 <4> 
 <5> 
 <6> 
 <7> VERY IMPORTANT  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
  
 
redpstcf: conventional fund_Ever redeemed shares in past due to return 
performance 
 
In the past, have you (or your financial advisor) ever sold shares from that conventional fund 
because of low return performance? 
 
 <1> YES 
 <0> NO 
 <d> Do not know   
 <r> Refused 
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relimp: How important is religion to you 
 
Thanks for that information.  We're coming to the end of the survey.  Now I'm going to ask 
you some more general questions about your religious involvement. 
 
First question; how important is religion or religious faith to you personally? Is it not at all 
important, somewhat important, very important, extremely important, or by far the 
most important part of your life?  
 
 <1> NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT 
 <2> SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT 
 <3> VERY IMPORTANT 
 <4> EXTREMELY IMPORTANT 
 <5> BY FAR THE MOST IMPORTANT PART OF YOUR LIFE  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
 
relatt: How often do you attend religious services 
 
How often do you attend religious services?  Do you attend every week or more, nearly 
every week, one or two times a month, several times a year, about once or twice a year, 
or do you very rarely attend?  
 
 <1> EVERY WEEK OR MORE 
 <2> NEARLY EVERY WEEK 
 <3> ONE OR TWO TIMES A MONTH 
 <4> SEVERAL TIMES A YEAR 
 <5> ABOUT ONCE OR TWICE A YEAR 
 <6> VERY RARELY  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
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denom: Denomination or religious group most currently involved in 
 
What specific denomination or religious group are you currently most involved in, if any? 
 
INTERVIEWER: DO NOT READ ANSWER OPTIONS.  Select the option 
that most closely 
matches open ended answer of respondent. 
 
 
 <1> MENNONITE OR ANABAPTIST 
 <2> NON-DENOMINATIONAL OR NO PARTICULAR DENOMINATION 
 <3> JUST SAYS "CHRISTIAN" 
 <4> CATHOLIC 
 <5> OTHER (specify) 
 <6> I'M NOT PART OF A DENOMINATION OR RELIGIOUS GROUP  
 <7> I'M NOT RELIGIOUS                                  
 <d> Do not know                                        
 <r> Refused                                            
 
snbl: How much of a sense of belonging to you feel 
 
Please indicate how much of a sense of belonging or sense of closeness you feel to that 
denomination or religious group you just mentioned, using a scale of 1 to 7, with one meaning 
you don't feel a sense of belonging or closeness at all and seven meaning you feel a very 
strong sense of belonging and closeness. 
 
 <1> DON'T FEEL SENSE OF BELONGING OR CLOSENESS AT ALL  
 <2> 
 <3> 
 <4> 
 <5> 
 <6> 
 <7> FEEL A VERY STRONG SENSE OF BELONGING OR CLOSENESS 
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
 
wrkmenn: Have you ever worked for Mennonite  organization 
 
Have you ever worked or volunteered for a Mennonite associated organization as part of your 
daily work routine?  
 
 <1> YES 
 <0> NO  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
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tlkmma: Is MMA talked about at congregation 
 
How often, if ever, do people at your congregation openly talk about and encourage investing 
with MMA Praxis?  Is it never, rarely, every once in a while, or often? 
 
 <1> NEVER 
 <2> RARELY 
 <3> EVERY ONCE IN A WHILE 
 <4> OFTEN      
 <5> DON'T HAVE CONGREGATION 
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
 
edu: Education level 
 
Thanks for that information; and there are just a few more questions.  Some people find these 
next few questions to be sensitive in nature, but it's really important that we try to collect this 
information so that we have a better understanding of what kind of people decide to invest 
according to their religious or ethical values.  Remember, all your answers will be kept 
completely confidential. 
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed?  Is it some high school, a high 
school diploma, some college, a college degree, or a graduate degree? 
 
 <1> SOME HIGH SCHOOL 
 <2> HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA 
 <3> SOME COLLEGE 
 <4> COLLEGE GRADUATE 
 <5> GRADUATE DEGREE  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
 
   
female: Female 
 
Interviewer: Record the respondent's gender but don't read this statement or the options. 
 
 <1> FEMALE 
 <0> MALE 
 <d> Do not know 
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yob: Year born 
 
What year were you born? 
 
 <1900-1991> year of birth       
 <d> Do not know [goto oyage50] 
 <r> Refused     [goto oyage50] 
 
oyage50: Older or younger than 50 
 
Ok, if you're not comfortable giving me your exact age, that's fine.  Please tell me if you are 
younger than or older than 50 years of age? 
 
 <1> YOUNGER THAN 50      [goto yage50] 
 <2> OLDER THAN 50        [goto oage50] 
 <d> Do not know                 
 <r> Refused         
 
yage50: Range under 50 
 
Ok, are you 20 or younger, 21 to 30, 31 to 40, or 41 to 50? 
 
 <1> 20 OR YOUNGER 
 <2> 21 TO 30 
 <3> 31 TO 40 
 <4> 41 TO 50 
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
 
oage50: Range over 50 
 
Ok, are you 50 to 60, 61 to 70, 71 to 80 or 81 or older? 
 
 <5> 50 TO 60 
 <6> 61 TO 70 
 <7> 71 TO 80 
 <8> 81 OR OLDER  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
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gv_cg: Dollars contributed to congregation 
 
Next, I’m going to ask you about your household’s charitable contributions in the past year. 
I’m going to ask you for three different charitable giving amounts; the first is how much you 
may have contributed to your congregation, the second is how much you may have 
contributed to other religious causes outside of your congregation and the third is how much 
you may have contributed to non-religious or secular causes. 
 
 So first, in the past year, about how many dollars did you contribute to your congregation?   
 
 <0-100000> dollars  
 <d> Do not know    [goto cg_ml3k] 
 <r> Refused    [goto cg_ml3k] 
 
  
cg_ml3k: congregation_less or more than $3,000 
 
Ok, if you're not able to give me an exact dollar amount, please tell me if that amount is less or 
more than 3,000 dollars? 
 
 <1> LESS THAN $3,000       [goto cg_l3k]        
 <2> MORE THAN $3,000   [goto cg_m3k]         
 <d> Do not know                 
 <r> Refused                     
 
   
cg_l3k: congregation_range less than $3,000 
 
Ok, is the amount you gave to your congregation zero, 1 to 500 dollars, 501 to 1,000, 1,001 
to 2,000, or 2,001 to 3,000 dollars? 
 
 <0> ZERO 
 <1> $1 TO $500 
 <2> $501 TO $1,000 
 <3> $1,001 TO $2,000 
 <4> $2,001 TO $3,000    
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
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cg_m3k: congregation_range more than $3,000 
 
Ok, is the amount you gave to your congregation 3,000 to 4,000 dollars, 4,001 to 5,000, 5,001 
to 7,500, or more than 7,500 dollars? 
 
 <5> $3,000 TO $4,000 
 <6> $4,001 TO $5,000 
 <7> $5,001 TO $7,500 
 <8> MORE THAN $7,500    
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
 
gv_rl: Dollars contributed to religious cause 
 
In the past year, about how many dollars did you give to other religious causes or religious 
organizations, not including your congregation? 
 
 <0-100000> dollars  
 <d> Do not know    [goto rl_ml3k] 
 <r> Refused    [goto rl_ml3k] 
 
 
rl_ml3k: other religious causes_less or more than $3,000 
 
Ok, if you're not able to give me an exact dollar amount, please tell me if that amount is less or 
more than 3,000 dollars? 
 
 <1> LESS THAN $3,000           [goto rl_l3k] 
 <2> MORE THAN $3,000           [goto rl_m3k] 
 <d> Do not know                 
 <r> Refused                     
 
rl_l3k: other religious causes_range less than $3,000 
 
Ok, is the amount you gave to other religious causes zero, 1 to 500 dollars, 501 to 1,000, 
1,001 to 2,000, or 2,001 to 3,000 dollars? 
 
 <0> ZERO 
 <1> $1 TO $500 
 <2> $501 TO $1,000 
 <3> $1,001 TO $2,000 
 <4> $2,001 TO $3,000  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
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rl_m3k: other religious cause_range more than $3,000 
 
Ok, is the amount you gave to other religious causes 3,000 to 4,000, 4,001 to 5,000, 5,001 to 
7,500, or more than 7,500 dollars?  
 
 <5> $3,000 TO $4,000 
 <6> $4,001 TO $5,000 
 <7> $5,001 TO $7,500 
 <8> MORE THAN $7,500  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
 
gv_sc: Dollars contributed to secular causes 
 
In the past year, about how many dollars did you give to non-religious or secular causes?] 
 
 <0-100000> dollars 
 <d> Do not know    [goto sc_ml3k] 
 <r> Refused    [goto sc_ml3k] 
 
sc_ml3k: secular causes_more or less than $3,000 
 
Ok, if you're not able to give me an exact dollar amount, please tell me if that amount is less or 
more than 3,000 dollars? 
 
 <1> LESS THAN $3,000           [goto sc_l3k] 
 <2> MORE THAN $3,000           [goto sc_m3k] 
 <d> Do not know                 
 <r> Refused                     
 
sc_l3k: secular causes_range less than $3,000 
 
Ok, is the amount you gave to secular causes zero, 1 to 500 dollars, 501 to 1,000, 1,001 to 
2,000, or 2,001 to 3,000 dollars? 
 
 <0> ZERO 
 <1> $1 TO $500 
 <2> $501 TO $1,000 
 <3> $1,001 TO $2,000 
 <4> $2,001 TO $3,000  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
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sc_m3k: secular causes_range more than $3,000 
 
Ok, is the amount you gave to secular causes 3,000 to 4,000 dollars, 4,001 to 5,000, 5,001 to 
7,500, or more than 7,500 dollars? 
 
 <5> $3,000 TO $4,000 
 <6> $4,001 TO $5,000 
 <7> $5,001 TO $7,500 
 <8> MORE THAN $7,500  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
pol: Political preference 
 
Please indicate your political preference.  Are you very politically conservative, mostly 
conservative, neither conservative nor liberal, mostly liberal, or very politically liberal? 
 
 <1> VERY CONSERVATIVE 
 <2> MOSTLY CONSERVATIVE 
 <3> NEITHER CONSERVATIVE NOR LIBERAL 
 <4> MOSTLY LIBERAL 
 <5> VERY LIBERAL  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
totasst: Total mutual fund assets, higher or lower than $50,000 
 
Earlier, I had asked you some specific questions about your MMA Praxis fund investment(s).  
I would like to have a rough estimate of how much that investment is currently worth (those 
mutual funds are currently worth, all together)?  
Or 
Earlier, you indicated that you own MMA Praxis and non-MMA Praxis mutual funds.  I 
would like to have a rough estimate of how much all of those mutual fund investments are 
currently worth, all together.  
 
Is that total dollar amount currently worth less than or more than 50 thousand dollars? Your 
best estimate is fine.  
 
 <1> LESS THAN $50,000    [goto tal50] 
 <2> MORE THAN $50,000    [goto tam50] 
 <d> Do not know                 
 <r> Refused                     
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tal50: Range under $50k - Total assets 
 
Ok. Your best estimate: is that total dollar amount less than 10 thousand dollars, between 10 
and 25 or between 25 and 50 thousand dollars?  
 
 <1> LESS THAN $10,000 
 <2> BETWEEN $10,000 AND $25,000 
 <3> BETWEEN $25,000 AND $50,000  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
 
tam50: Range over $50k - Total assets 
 
Ok. Your best estimate: is that total dollar amount between 50 and 100 thousand dollars, 
between 100 and 200, or more than 200 thousand dollars? 
 
 <4> BETWEEN $50,000 AND $100,000 
 <5> BETWEEN $100,000 AND $200,000 
 <6> MORE THAN $200,000 
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
 
percmma: What percentage of mutual fund assets are in MMA Praxis 
 
Ok, roughly what percentage of that total dollar amount is invested in your MMA Praxis 
mutual fund(s)?  Is it less than or more than 50 percent? 
 
 <1> LESS THAN 50 PERCENT       [goto l50prc] 
 <2> MORE THAN 50 PERCENT       [goto m50prc]     
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
 
l50prc: Range under 50_ percent assets invested in MMA Praxis 
 
Ok, is it less than or more than 25 percent? 
 
 <1> LESS THAN 25 PERCENT 
 <2> MORE THAN 25 PERCENT  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
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m50prc: Range above 50_ percent assets invested in MMA Praxis 
 
Ok, is it less than or more than 75 percent? 
 
 <3> LESS THAN 75 PERCENT 
 <4> MORE THAN 75 PERCENT   
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
 
   
hhince: Exact household income 
 
Finally, for statistical purposes, last year (that is in 2009) what was your total household 
income from all sources, before taxes? 
 
Interviewer: The maximum is $1,000,000.  If the R's income is greater, just enter it as 
$1,000,000. 
 
 <0-1000000> dollars 
 <d> Do not know        [goto hhinc50k] 
 <r> Refused            [goto hhinc50k] 
 
 
 
hhinc50k: Over/Under $50k - Household income 
 
Instead of a specific number, please tell me if your total household income in 2009 was under 
or over $50,000. 
 
 <1> Under $50,000              [goto hhincu] 
 <2> $50,000 or over            [goto hhinco] 
 <d> Do not know                 
 <r> Refused                     
hhincu: Range under $50k - Household income 
 
And was it: 
 
 <1> Less than $10,000 
 <2> 10 to under $20,000 
 <3> 20 to under $30,000 
 <4> 30 to under $40,000 
 <5> 40 to under $50,000  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
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hhinco: Range over $50k - Household income 
 
And was it:  
 
 <6> 50 to under $75,000 
 <7> 75 to under $100,000 
 <8> 100 to under $150,000 
 <9> $150,000 or more  
 <d> Do not know 
 <r> Refused 
 
intervw: Permission for follow up phone interview 
 
In closing, I've asked a lot of questions about your religious and investment behavior. The 
researcher conducting this study would like to conduct follow-up phone interviews with some 
of the people we're talking to.  In this interview, you would be asked more in-depth questions 
that would allow you to more thoroughly explain yourself, without limiting you to certain 
answer categories.  This interview could last up to 30 minutes.  In a couple months from now, 
would you be willing to take part in a phone interview about this same topic at a time that is 
convenient for you? 
 
 <0>  NO 
 <1>  YES 
 <d>  Do not know 
 <r>  Refused 
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CHAPTER 4 
ACCOUNTING FOR MORALITY IN ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR: 
WHY AMERICANS GIVE THEIR MONEY AWAY  
BUT ARE HESITANT TO INVEST ETHICALLY 
 
Socially responsible investment (SRI) options have been available for 
decades, yet few American investors are putting their money where 
their heart is.  In contrast, Americans are notoriously generous when it 
comes to giving their money away.  I consider both to be moral 
economic behavior (MEB), that is, economic behavior that includes an 
explicit moral component. When it comes to combining morality with 
economic behavior, why are Americans so willing to give their money 
away, yet hesitant to invest ethically?  To help solve this puzzle, this 
article visits the theoretical concept of “mental accounting” taken 
from behavioral economics and “social meaning of money” from 
economic sociology.  I employ a mixed method analysis of socially 
responsible investors from one Protestant denomination and find both 
morality and social relations help solve the puzzle of low SRI 
involvement.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Americans are notoriously generous givers (Brooks 1996).  Nearly 90 percent 
of American households make charitable donations on an annual basis, averaging 
$1,479 per year or 2.7 percent of one’s income (Havens, O’Herlihy, and Schervish 
2006).  In contrast, far fewer American investors invest in mutual funds that screen out 
or try to change companies deemed to be unethical, otherwise known as socially 
responsible investing (SRI).  Since mutual funds are investments, investors hope their 
dollars will multiply (market downturns withstanding).  Yet despite this possible win-
win moral economic scenario, where one can do the “right” thing and make money, 
only three percent of all mutual funds (and all mutual fund assets) are socially 
responsible.1  For lack of better individual level data, this three percent proportion 
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serves as an estimate of the number of American mutual fund investors that invest in 
SRI funds.  This raises a puzzle.  Why are so many Americans giving their money 
away, yet so few investing ethically?2 
 
Moral Economic Behavior (MEB) 
 
Socially responsible investing (SRI) and charitable giving are two examples of 
a more general concept I refer to as moral economic behavior (MEB).  This ideal type 
of social behavior refers to economic behavior that explicitly includes a subjectively 
perceived moral component along with a concern about the monetary outcome. While 
one can rightly argue that all economic behavior is embedded in a moral order (Etzioni 
1988, Wuthnow 1987, Smith 2003, Fourcade and Healy 2007), some economic 
behavior has an explicit shot of morality.  For instance, buying a cup of coffee is 
rather morally neutral compared with purchasing fair trade coffee out of concern for 
the producers’ just wage, an action I consider moral economic behavior.  There are 
other examples of MEB that are gaining in popularity.  Purchasing locally grown and 
organic food (Jonston 2008) and voluntary decisions to live more simply (Etzioni 
1998, Shaw and Newholm 2002) in order to reduce one’s carbon footprint are 
examples.  Giving money away out of a sense of obligation also qualifies.  SRI 
emphasizes the moral obligations of corporations to society (Crane et al. 2008).   
These examples of MEB are important because they represent tangible moral 
acts individuals can take in their economic lives (Zald 2000).  Additionally, to better 
understand a broader range of motivations for economic action, we need to get a better 
handle on whether and how morality matters.  In route to helping solve the 
aforementioned puzzle (of high giving and low ethical investment levels), this article 
  134 
explores the experience of individual actors engaging in various forms of MEB, 
especially charitable giving and SR investing.  Visiting the theoretical concepts of 
“mental accounting” taken from behavioral economics (Kahnaman and Tversky 1984, 
Thaler 1999) and “social meanings of money” from economic sociology (Zelizer 
2011), I analyze quantitative survey data from American Mennonites and interview 
data collected from investors in that denomination’s SRI mutual fund.     
The concept of moral economic behavior (or MEB) houses both moral and 
monetary concerns.  I define morality as behavior that is subjectively perceived to 
have 1) an imperative quality that pertains to the “the right thing to do” and 2) is 
outward oriented.3  One important task in researching MEB is to empirically 
demonstrate that the behavior under examination is, on average, the product of moral 
motivation and not driven by other factors, such as a desire to impress one’s peers 
(Willer et al. 2010) or the byproduct of structural circumstances.  In other work, I 
verify that investing in SRI mutual funds is, at least partially, morally motivated 
(Peifer 2011, Peifer unpublished manuscript).  In this article, I move beyond asking 
whether morality impacts economic behavior and instead consider how morality 
impacts economic behavior.  I do this by comparing different MEBs and by 
considering different forms of morality at play.  
I use of a rather expansive definition of the term “economic” by including the 
household.  Weber usefully bifurcates economic ideal types of “profit-making” and 
“householding” (Weber [1922]1979, Swedberg 2009).  Householding is oriented to 
consumption and satisfaction of the family members’ bodily and emotional needs.  
Profit-making activity is “oriented to opportunities for seeking new powers of control 
over goods” (Weber [1922]1979: 90).  Current economic approaches tend to 
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emphasize profit-making in the formal market economy and often ignore the 
householding realm.  However, a substantial portion of our economic lives are 
concerned with monetary expenditures to meet household needs.  Additionally, goods 
and services that are consumed on a daily basis generally do not yield monetary profit.  
Charitable giving is an extreme example of an absence of the profit-making 
orientation, where money is given away.  There are also many non-monetary 
householding activities, such as preparing meals, washing clothes and routine 
maintenance of one’s physical property, to name just a few examples.  To more 
closely match the economic realities of average Americans, I consider the moral 
components that accompany householding economic behavior as well as their 
behavior in the profit-making realm. 
Americans also engage in the profit-making realm of the economy.  Many 
spend over 40 hours a week in a workplace that is oriented toward making a profit.  
Americans are also increasingly becoming engaged with the financial market, mostly 
through mutual fund investments (Davis 2009) that are often intended to provide for 
one’s householding needs during retirement.  Americans are repeatedly told they must 
earn a profit in the financial market if they want to retire comfortably.  Investing in an 
SRI mutual is one kind of MEB.  SRI fund management is involved in at least one of 
three moral activities; screening, shareholder advocacy and community investment 
(Domini and Kinder 1986).  Screening refers to the refusal to invest in companies a 
fund deems to be unethical.  The most commonly screened industries are tobacco, 
alcohol and gaming.  A second SRI mutual fund activity is shareholder advocacy.  
This refers to communication with owned corporations through using proxy votes and 
dialogue to pressure firms to change their behavior.  While nearly all SRI funds are 
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engaged in screening, fewer take on advocacy measures.  The least frequently 
practiced prong is community investment, wherein fund assets are directly invested in 
community development efforts.   
In this article, I examine three types of MEB; SR investing, charitable giving 
and householding.  SRI provides a fitting example of MEB that resides in the profit-
making realm of the economy.  People put their money in the financial market because 
they want to accumulate more of it.  Giving money away is the antithesis of profit-
making and therefore more closely aligns with householding, albeit imperfectly.  To 
glean more natural examples of householding activity, I encourage interview 
respondents to talk about the moral aspects of their daily household lives.  In the final 
section of this article, I compare householding with charitable giving and SR investing 
in effort to better account for a broader range of MEB.   
 
THEORY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Mental Accounting  
Behavioral economists have shown that the way monetary outcomes are 
framed influences monetary decisions (Kahnaman and Tversky 1984, Thaler 1999).  
Consider this classic example from that literature. 
Neel and Samantha planned to spend $100 on a theater ticket. Neel purchased a 
ticket but then lost it carelessly. In a separate instance of carelessness, Samantha 
lost $100 in cash. Neel was hesitant to spend a further $100 on a replacement 
ticket, while Samantha’s loss did not interrupt her theater plans (Soman and Ahn 
2011).  
 
Neel’s lost ticket represents a $100 debit to his theater “mental account” and Neel is 
unwilling to sink another $100 from the same account.  However, Samantha’s $100 
loss was debited to another (or broader) mental account (because it was cash and not a 
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theater ticket) freeing her to buy a ticket and deduct only $100 (not $200) from her 
theater account.  The subtle difference of losing $100 in cash versus losing a $100 
ticket meaningfully impacts the economic outcome.   
 The mental accounting theoretical orientation can be summed up as follows: 
“People do not treat money as fungible but rather tend to label it” (Soman and Ahn 
2011).  Put more precisely, expenditures within a mental account are more fungible 
than expenditures across different mental accounts.  Assuming separate mental 
accounts are driving behavior, behavioral economists provide a demonstration of and 
an explanation for seemingly irrational monetary behavior, which mounts a significant 
critique of neoclassical economics.   
However, this important research on mental accounting has failed to elucidate 
how these mental accounts are constructed and maintained.  One particular 
unexamined aspect of mental accounts is morality.  For instance, followers of the three 
Abrahamic religious traditions are encouraged to set aside a specific portion of their 
money (income or wealth) for charitable giving (Smith 2010).  Christians and Jews 
emphasize the tithe and Tzedakah (respectively), which encourages the giving away of 
10 percent of one’s income.  Islam teaches the giving of zakat (or alms giving), which 
amounts to 2.5 percent of one’s wealth.  These are religious examples of money being 
labeled for moral causes; a moral mental account of sorts.   
Coming back to the puzzle this article raises, this conception of a moral mental 
account raises the possibility that money given away to charity may crowd out SRI 
contributions.  This tradeoff (or fungibility) may help explain why so many give their 
money away, yet so few invest ethically.  In other words, giving money away may 
debit one’s moral mental account and thereby generate an unwillingness to invest in an 
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ethical manner.  An alternative explanation is that charitable giving and SRIs stem 
from different mental accounts which would mean expenditures in one does not 
necessarily crowd out expenditures in the other.  In fact, giving and SR investing may 
be positively correlated with an underlying moral impulse driving both MEBs.  This 
raises this article’s first research question, are individuals that give more to charity 
more or less likely to invest in an SRI mutual fund (and vice versa)?  To answer this, I 
analyze quantitative survey data of Mennonites, an American denomination that has 
its own SRI mutual fund. 
 Behavioral economic research tends to assert the existence of mental accounts 
and quickly move on to showing how subtle framing techniques (such as $100 ticket 
versus $100 in cash) influence economic outcomes.  But surely there is a richer story 
to be told about how actors meaningfully maintain and segregate mental accounts 
(Henderson and Peterson 1992).  To better understand how actors manage their mental 
accounts, I prompt interview respondents to think about the similarities of SRI and 
charitable giving.  This abandons behavioral economics’ emphasis on unconscious 
processes and privileges the analysis of meaningful explanations that are accessible to 
actors, a familiar methodological approach among cultural sociologists. This enables 
me to answer my second research question.  Do SR investors tend to view their giving 
and their SR investments as similar or different? 
 
Social Meaning of Money 
In direct response to behavioral economists, Zelizer (2011) explains that 
mental accounts are “deeply grounded in our social relations and shared meaning 
system.  In fact, cognitively established categories remain mysterious unless we 
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understand that they usually both emerge from and construct our distinctive relations 
to others” (pg 90).  Zelizer (1989) nicely exemplifies this with her historical example 
of “pin money,” which was the 19th Century American wife’s supplementary income 
derived from caring for boarders, selling eggs or sewing projects.  As a result of the 
unequal legal and cultural status of wives, pin money was segregated from the 
husbands “real” earnings.  In this example, viewing pin money as merely a cognitive 
category ignores the important social relations within a larger cultural context.  This 
article explores the moral meaning that buttresses the mental accounts of social actors.  
The third research question I raise is, how do actors perceive their moral involvement 
in charitable giving, householding and SRI?   
In order to answer the second and third research questions about MEB, I 
narrow my scope of analysis to SR investors.  Due to the very paucity of SR investors 
this article reveals, a nationally representative sample would not generate a large 
enough sample size of SR investors to efficiently proceed.  I therefore select a target 
population of SR investors and trust they are also involved in charitable giving and 
householding.  In particular, I focus on one religiously affiliated mutual fund that is 
associated with Mennonites.  The Praxis mutual fund family is well regarded in the 
SRI industry and is engaged in screening, advocacy and community investment.  
Before describing the data used in this article, I provide a brief description of 
Mennonites and their SRI mutual fund family. 
 
CASE STUDY 
Mennonite Simplicity and Community 
 The Mennonite movement traces back to 1525 in Zurich, Switzerland, where 
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Huldrich Zwingli and a group of like minded adults decided to baptize one another.  
This act of adult baptism defied the established Protestant church’s practice of infant 
baptism, leading to the group’s derogatory label, Anabaptists, which means to baptize 
again.  Menno Simons left the Roman Catholic priesthood to join the Anabaptists in 
1536 and his subsequent writings on faith and doctrine helped solidify the movement, 
leading to the Menist and eventual Mennonite label.  In face of persecution from state 
and church leaders, Anabaptists sought out regions of refuge, spreading the movement 
to German and Dutch speaking areas of Europe.  The group’s refusal to participate in 
the military led to a cold reception in many European locations.  Throughout the 17th 
and 18th Century, certain branches of Anabaptists Mennonites from modern day 
Germany immigrated to the United States in search of freedom from religious 
persecution.  Mennonites have retained their conscientious objections to participation 
in war, and today represent one of the few historic “peace churches” (along with 
Amish, Brethren and Quakers).  As of 2000, there were 291,200 American 
Mennonites.4  
 Simplicity and community are two Mennonite values that are especially 
relevant to this article’s emphasis on MEB.  Mennonite teachings emphasize a plain or 
simple lifestyle.  Grounded in nonconformity to surrounding society and Biblical 
injunctions against materialism, Mennonite simplicity has historically manifested itself 
in plain dress and unadorned congregational worship (Bender et al. 1958).  However, 
as Mennonite communities prospered economically, simplicity has been difficult to 
maintain (Redekop 1989).  Nevertheless, simplicity remains an important cultural and 
spiritual value for many contemporary Mennonites.   
 American Mennonites also tend to exude a “communal ethic” where “the 
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motivation of the individual” is “subordinated to the collective” (Fretz and Redekop 
1989).  One manifestation of this communal ethic that touches upon economic life is 
mutual aid, the practice of helping those in the community in a time of need (Fretz et 
al. 1989).  This communal ethic of mutual aid grew out the experience of early 
Anabaptists who endured “persecution, famine, and political upheavals” which in turn 
“motivated the believers to gather into communities where they depended on each 
other for physical and spiritual survival. Sharing material goods and caring for each 
other's needs were major elements of the Anabaptist movement. When persecution 
subsided and when community life became stable, mutual caring was often formalized 
and was built into ongoing community life” (Fretz et al. 1989). 
 Mennonite Mutual Aid (MMA)5 is one such formal financial organization that 
continues some of the benevolent activity its name connotes.  MMA “grew out of a 
long tradition of church communities putting faith into action by sharing resources 
with each other. .. [It] started by offering loans to church service volunteers. Over the 
years… [it] added many more mutual aid and stewardship programs” (History of 
MMA 2010).  MMA Praxis mutual funds rolled out in 1994.  The name Praxis stems 
from the Greek word orthopraxy, which means “correct action or activity.”  The fund 
family currently offers 10 mutual funds and totals $775 million in assets (as of January 
31, 2011).  Praxis practices all three prongs of the traditional SRI approach; screening, 
shareholder advocacy and community development.  In line with the church’s peace 
position, Praxis is perhaps best known for its avoidance of military stocks and 
government bonds. 
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Since an estimated 3 percent of mutual fund investors invest in SRI, contacting 
a substantial number of SR investors through a nationally representative survey design 
is prohibitively difficult.  However, by focusing on one denomination that is 
associated with a well established SRI mutual fund, gathering data about a substantial 
number of SRI fund investors becomes possible.  A mail survey of Mennonite Church 
USA members was conducted by a team of sociologists in 2006.6  Stratified by size 
and geographic location, 120 congregations were randomly selected.   Each selected 
congregation then supplied researchers with a list of their members, from which about 
30 was randomly selected as a mail survey respondent.  The final total sample size is 
2,216, collected with a 76 percent response rate.  Survey respondents were asked if 
they invest in any mutual fund and whether they invest with Praxis.  These 
quantitative data are analyzed to determine if higher levels of charitable giving are 
associated with the decision to invest in an SRI fund, the first research question I 
raised. 
 In a separate study, I collected phone survey data from a random sample of 499 
Praxis investors in January and February of 2010.  The last phone survey question 
asked if the respondent would be willing to take part in a follow-up phone interview.  
Fifty-nine (59) percent said yes, from which a simple random sample was selected for 
phone interviews.7  I conducted all phone interviews, which averaged 36 minutes in 
length, in April through June of 2010.  Of 47 contacted respondents, 6 refused to take 
part.  A total of 41 interviews were recorded, transcribed and analyzed with Atlas-TI.  
In this article, all interview respondents are referred to with pseudonyms to protect 
their identity.  There was no monetary compensation for the interviewee’s time. 
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After conducting a more close-ended phone survey with a larger sample of 
Praxis investors, the phone interviews analyzed here give Praxis investors an 
opportunity to provide more in depth information about their investing attitudes and 
experiences.  Interviews were semi-formal, in that I aimed to ask the questions on the 
interview script (see Appendix 1), but took the freedom to deviate from the script as I 
saw fit.  For instance, one interviewee mentioned that he was involved in an 
investment club and I took a few minutes to learn more about his experience with that.  
Throughout my phone interviews, I did my best to understand my interviewee’s 
“conscious view of the world, of themselves, and of their place in it” (Spickard 2007: 
139).  This means I often repeated what I heard them saying and asked if I had 
understood them properly.  In practice, these clarification questions frequently 
encouraged interviewees to elaborate upon their original answer and resulted in the 
more open ended and thoughtful responses that I was looking for.   
These qualitative data stem from SR investors who are also involved in 
charitable giving and householding, providing a sufficient comparative framework to 
help unravel the aforementioned puzzle.  More precisely, the manner in which these 
respondents make sense of their own giving, householding and SR investing is 
assumed to generalize beyond just SR investors and therefore offer an explanation for 
the puzzle of high giving and low SRI levels among all Americans.   
 
RESULTS 
Does Giving Crowd out SRI?   
 At the onset, I provided evidence that Americans are more willing to give their 
money away than to invest it ethically.  I now substantially narrow my population of 
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study by focusing on the case study of Mennonites.  To proceed with the 
denominational survey data at hand, I omit from my analysis 40 percent of Mennonite 
respondents that do not invest in a mutual fund to sidestep the issue of whether a 
respondent invests in any mutual fund.  Among mutual fund investors, 23 percent 
report that they invest in Praxis (see Table 4.1 for descriptive statistics of all variables 
to be included in upcoming model).  This proportion of SRI investors is substantially 
higher than the 3 percent estimate of all mutual funds stated at the onset of this article.  
I attribute this inflated proportion to the fact that Mennonites have their own SRI 
mutual fund, causing this particular population to be more likely to invest in SRIs.   
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Table 4.1: Weighted Descriptive Statistics (Proportions  
and Means) of Mutual Fund Investors from  
Mennonite Denomination (N = 1,223) 
Proportional giving: less than 1 percent         0.03
Proportional giving: 1 to 5 percent         0.16
Proportional giving: 5 to 9 percent         0.19
Proportional giving: 10 percent         0.32
Proportional giving: 11 to 20 percent         0.26
Proportional giving: more than 20 percent         0.04
Invests in Praxis         0.23
Female         0.52
Age        54
2005 income (in $1,000s)        73.898
2005 income (in $1,000s) squared   8,087.147
Home value (in $1,000s)      188.014
Home value (in $1,000s) squared 50,121.42
Voted for George W. Bush in 2004          0.53
Religion is most important thing in my life          0.43
Attends church less than monthly          0.05
Attends church monthly          0.14
Attends church weekly          0.74
Attends church more than weekly          0.07
Edu: High school graduate or below          0.26
Edu: Some college          0.27
Edu: College graduate          0.19
Edu: Some graduate school          0.28
 
Note: Proportions and means are calculated from original and 
imputed data. 
Source: 2006 Mennonite Church Membership Profile 
 
In order to answer the first research question of whether charitable giving 
crowds out or is associated with SRI, I predict each outcome separately, while 
controlling for standard demographic variables that may impact each outcome.  I 
predict the binary outcome of investing in Praxis with a Logistic regression model.  
Model 1 of Table 4.2 reveals that giving categories 10 percent and above are 
associated with an increased the odds of investing with Praxis.  Compared to those that 
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give less than 1 percent of their income, those that give 11 to 20 percent have an 
increased odds of investing by a factor of about 5 and those that give more than 20 by 
a factor of 7.  To interpret these coefficients, I calculate predicted probabilities while 
holding all other values at their respective variable’s mean.  Those that give less than 1 
percent of their income to charity have a predicted probability of 8 percent of 
investing with Praxis.  Those that give 11 to 20 percent of their income to charity have 
a predicted probability of 31 percent and those that give more than 20 percent have a 
predicted probability of 40 percent.   
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Table 4.2:  Estimated Odds Ratio of Praxis Investment and Giving  
Proportional giving: less than 1 percent (referent)
Proportional giving: 1 to 5 percent 1.61
Proportional giving: 5 to 9 percent 1.95
Proportional giving: 10 percent 2.85+
Proportional giving: 11 to 20 percent 4.89*
Proportional giving: more than 20 percent 7.33**
Invests in Praxis 2.11***
Female 0.9 0.9
Age 1.01 1.02***
2005 income (in $1,000s) 0.99+ 1.00
2005 income (in $1,000s) squared 1.00+ 1.00
Home value (in $1,000s) 1.00+ 1.00
Home value (in $1,000s) squared 1.00 1.00
Voted for George W. Bush in 2004 0.54*** 1.11
Religion is most important thing in my life 0.83 1.98***
Attends church less than monthly 0.24* 0.04***
Attends church monthly 0.36** 0.20***
Attends church weekly 0.57* 0.49**
Attends church more than weekly (referent)
Edu: High school graduate or below 0.57** 1.13
Edu: Some college 0.53** 1.05
Edu: College graduate 0.76 1.22
Edu: Some graduate school (referent)
N 1223 1223
 Odds Ratio 
of Investinga
  Odds Ratio 
of Givingb
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
 
+ p<.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two tailed) 
a
 Logistic Regression  
b
 Ordered Logistic Regression 
Source: 2006 Mennonite Church Membership Profile 
 
I predict the ordinal charitable giving outcome with an Ordered Logistic 
Regression model.8  Model 2 in Table 4.2 shows that being a Praxis investor increases 
the odds of proportional giving by a factor of 2.1. The predicted probability of non-
Praxis investors giving more than 10 percent  (that is, the sum of predicted 
probabilities for the top three proportional giving categories) is 59 percent, compared 
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to 76 percent for Praxis investors.  In sum, investing with Praxis is associated with 
charitable giving.  This associational evidence disconfirms the notion that individuals 
perceive one broad moral mental account and that charitable contributions crowd out 
SR investments.  Put another way, it suggests charitable contributions are segregated 
from SRI dollars in the minds of survey respondents.  This allows both giving and SRI 
to flourish in concert.   
Attending religious services increases the odds of both giving and investing in 
Praxis.   This highlights the similarities between the two outcomes.  However, 
attendance is the only factor in the featured models that has a similar directional 
impact on both MEB outcomes, suggesting there are different processes underlying 
each outcome.  Claiming religion is most important part of one’s life significantly 
induces the odds of giving while having no association with investing in Praxis.  
Higher levels of education induces the odds of investing in Praxis, yet is not related to 
giving.  Political conservativeness (measured by voting for George W. Bush in 2004) 
decreases the odds of investing in Praxis and is unassociated with giving.  These 
results create a muddled picture.  To help better understand the relationship between 
these two MEBs, I turn to analysis of qualitative data taken from Praxis investors in 
2010.    
 
Differentiation of Giving and SRI 
I now consider the similarities and differences between SRI and charitable 
giving from the perspective of social actors.  Twenty-seven (27) Praxis investors were 
asked and seemed to understand the following interview prompt, “Some think that 
contributing money to a religious mutual fund, such as Praxis, is similar to 
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contributing money to your church.  How do you react to that idea?”9 
 Francine is a middle aged woman who happens to be an employee off MMA.  
In response, she reasons, 
I don’t know that I see it as that different…  I like contributing to my 
church specifically because I feel that they've done a lot of good in the 
community.  Okay.  And I also want to support the spiritual part of it too.  
But I think at a certain point, all of the mission and service things our 
church is doing is very similar to what SRI is about.  You know, in terms 
of helping communities and helping people in communities….  All the 
kind of service and missions stuff is in some ways, to me very similar to 
SRI. 
 
Francine is one of the 7 percent (2 out of 27) of valid respondents that sees a similarity 
between giving and SRI and isolates community involvement as the commonality 
between the two.  In contrast, 93 percent (25 out of 27) say they do not see a similarity 
in response to the same prompt. This provides a resounding answer to the second 
research question.  When prompted to think about similarities between the two, 
respondents instead overwhelming articulated a difference between giving and Praxis 
investments.  Through analysis of responses, two themes of differentiation arose, 1) 
ownership of the money and 2) the expected return.   
Dustin, a college professor in his 40s, exemplifies both quite well. 
When I invest money with MMA Praxis, there's still some selfish desire… 
I don't expect a return on my investment from my church… I give that 
money in the offering and I don't have strings attached to that.  I mean it 
goes somewhere, and it's like whatever the church does with that, it does 
with that.  But my investments, oh my gosh, you know, there's some strings 
attached.  I mean, it all sounds well and good, but if they don't raise me 
some profit, then I would probably say, “Hmm, why am I doing this?”  So, 
I don’t know if I see it as exactly the same thing. 
 
Sixty (60) percent (15 out of 25) of the respondents that articulated a difference 
between giving and SRI mentioned the expected return of dollars from Praxis and/or 
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the absence of returns from charitable giving.  Similarly, 60 percent mentioned control 
or ownership as important.  In other words, many respondents feel they still had 
connections to their Praxis dollars, while in comparison, they give up control of their 
charitable donations.  As Dustin puts it above, “I give that money in the offering and I 
don’t have strings attached to that.”   
Responses to the interview prompt to compare giving and Praxis investing 
reveals a nearly unanimous perception of differentiation.  This evidence, coupled with 
the survey results presented above, suggests the church treasurer should not feel 
threatened by their congregants’ socially responsible investments.  It is also likely that 
similar processes operate in non-religious realm, meaning environmental non-profit 
organizations need not fret competition for dollars with environmental SRI funds.  
Ethical investments do not seem to crowd out charitable giving.   
 In sum, the interview data analyzed here provides a fuller portrait of why the 
two mental accounts are differentiated, significantly extending the mental 
accounting’s cognitive orientation.  The most oft repeated response points toward the 
relationship between the actor and his or her dollars.  Charitable dollars are 
relinquished while investments are not.  Investors expect returns and givers do not.  
This monetary differentiation of mental accounts disconfirms the notion that charitable 
giving crowds out SRI.  However, these perceived monetary differences fail to provide 
a satisfactory explanation to this article’s puzzle.  Why are Americans more willing to 
relinquish their dollars by giving them away, yet hesitant to “keep” their money and 
get more through ethical investing?  To better answer this question, I now focus on the 
moral components of MEB. 
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Morality 
To answer the third research question, how do actors perceive their moral 
involvement in various MEBs, I compare the moral reasons given for charitable giving, 
SR investing and householding.  Cultural sociologists have emphasized the importance 
of paying attention to justifications (or reasons) individuals provide for their behavior 
(Swidler 1986, Swidler 2001).  Indeed, given the multiplicity of factors that may be 
driving what appears to be moral economic behavior, it is all the more important to 
speak with the social actors and hear how they make sense of their behavior.  For the 
purpose of this research, I define a moral reason as an explanation that includes 1) an 
imperative quality that pertains to the “the right thing to do” and 2) is outward oriented 
(to one’s religious tradition or God, toward other social actors or the environment).10 
After identifying 211 moral reasons given for MEBs that meet these two criteria, I 
code them into categories that naturally arise from the content at hand.  I also strive to 
create categories that span charitable giving, householding and investing, to aid in 
comparability. 
At this juncture, it is important to acknowledge the religious context of this 
particular case study.  Many religious traditions provide well codified moral 
statements that instruct followers how they ought and ought not behave (Bader and 
Finke 2010).  American congregations are typically devoted to reminding followers of 
their moral commitments.  Since the socially responsible investors interviewed here 
are mostly from Mennonite or Christian churches,11 I prompted for moral reasons by 
asking how one’s religious faith impacts their giving, householding and Praxis 
investing.12  Most respondents readily understood the question and provided answers 
that revealed that their religious faith significantly calibrates their moral compass.  
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However, the findings here are meant to generalize beyond the religious context, and 
indeed, many of the moral categories discussed below are not unique to a religious 
context.    
 
Moral Reasons for Investing in Praxis 
Elvin gives the following moral reason for investing in Praxis, “I still have a 
strong pacifist streak.  So avoiding defense spending has some appeal to me.”  
Aligning with Mennonite pacifism, many respondents spoke positively of Praxis’ 
avoidance of military related stocks.  This moral reason reflects a concern for filtering 
out the bad or immoral and letting in the good or moral.  In the case of mutual fund 
investing, this translates into avoiding “sinful” companies and targeting the “better” 
ones for ownership.  In this way, respondents can remain pure.  Jason explains, “…I 
feel as though I'm not supporting anything that would violate my conscience... by 
being in Praxis.”  Sixty-two (62) percent of the moral reasons for investing in Praxis 
fall under this remaining pure category.13  This concern for remaining pure mirrors a 
deontological flavor of morality, where adhering to rules or performing one’s duty is 
most important.  
 Respondents also saw their Praxis investments as directly helping others, 
another significant category of moral reasons.  Ronald explains,  
…a central kerygma of our church doctrine is to find ways to make peace 
in the world. And since we have this… discretionary money that we can 
use, we want that to be used in a way that is going to promote peace in the 
world, and as well as good health and good futures for people that we don't 
even know about. And so we just feel our faith draws us into a position of 
using money for Praxis. 
 
Another commonly cited reason that falls under the helping others category is mutual 
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aid, where MMA (Praxis’ larger denominational organization) contributes money to 
needy individuals typically identified by local congregations.  Five respondents 
mentioned this benevolent activity as a moral reason to invest in Praxis.  In total, 27 
percent of moral reasons given for investing in Praxis fall under the helping others 
category.  Seven percent of the reasons are coded as allegiance to church organization 
exemplified by Laura explaining, “I think that the reason would be because it's a 
Mennonite organization and we're Mennonite and we feel like we should use our own 
denominational organizations.”  Only two respondents (or 3 percent of moral reasons) 
are coded as helping the environment (see Appendix 3 for all moral reasons for 
investing in Praxis).  
 
Moral Reasons for Charitable Giving 
Most interview prompts revolved around the respondent’s attitudes and 
experiences with Praxis.  However, many voluntarily spoke about their charitable 
giving in response to this particular question, “Does your religious faith impact the 
way you spend your money?”  Inviting respondents to think about how their religious 
faith and money were connected typically elicited more comfortable and lengthier 
responses (as opposed the questions about Praxis investments). 
Pat was initially apprehensive to take part in the phone interview, because she 
did not like to think about her financial investments.  However, she felt more 
comfortable talking about her charitable giving. 
When my father passed away… we received inheritance, and I took a good 
chunk of that and put it in an account to be used specifically for me to tithe 
and give out as I've felt the Lord leading me…. That has probably been one 
of the most joyful things I've been able to do…with money. [laughter]… 
I've given a… five hundred dollar gas card to a mother with four children, 
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just trying to get back on her feet. And there was also a young mother at 
church who has extreme pain and they aren't able to find the source of it at 
this point in time.  But we found out that doing massages has been helpful 
and insurance doesn't cover that.  So, I had provided her with money, 1,000 
dollars, to… get that kind of help. 
 
Jason, a computer technician for a non-profit organization explains, “I'm giving my 
money to my church to be used locally to… help my community.”  These are 
examples of moral reasons for charitable giving that fall under the previously 
mentioned helping others category.  Sixty-five (65) percent of the moral reasons for 
giving fall into this category.  Twenty (20) percent refer to the respondents feeling 
gratitude to God for their resources, which in turn motivates a moral imperative to 
give some of it away.  For instance, Ronald explains, “the stewardship position has 
made me think about making sure that I'm tithing, as a gratitude response to God.”  
Another 13 percent of the reasons allude to biblical directives to tithe or give to 
charity.  Bradley explained, “Jesus said share!  Give a tenth and give above the tenth.” 
Only one moral reason (3 percent) for charitable giving falls into the remaining pure 
category that was discussed above.  In this isolated example, the respondent explains 
he would never donate money to the National Rifle Association, stemming from a 
peace position (see Appendix 4 for all moral reasons for charitable giving). 
 
Moral Reasons for Householding  
While this article has mostly focused on giving and SR investing, the concept 
of household economy opens up a broader realm of economic behavior that I find 
particularly amenable to research on MEB.  Respondents are adept at reflecting upon 
how their religious faith impacts their household activities.  Discussions of this nature 
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were mostly prompted with the following: “Now I'd like you to think about everyday 
life and the things you do to take care of your household.  By that, I mean getting 
groceries, eating meals, taking care of the house and also the things you do in your 
free time for leisure. Would you say that your religious faith impacts these household 
activities?  If so, how?” 
Respondents give a wide range of household activities.  They include buying 
local goods, boycotts, egalitarian household division of labor, entertainment choices, 
food consumption, environmentally friendly home construction, hospitality, 
maintaining old products instead of buying new ones, patronizing Christian 
businesses, simplicity, time management, and careful consideration about what to 
spend money on.  Of this multiplicity of household activities, respondents most often 
linked their religious faith to simplicity (or frugality), which refers to an orientation 
toward reducing consumption.  Ivy, a part-time caregiver in her 60’s, explains, “This 
world is not our home… we are pilgrims here so… we try to keep… a modest… 
simplicity..., to live comfortably, but not… luxuriously.”   In another example, 
Brittany prays about whether or not to spend money for a vacation.    
Having provided some examples of householding activities that respondents 
relate to their religious lives, I now turn to the moral reasons offered for engaging in 
these various householding activities.  Tucker is a missionary in the Midwest, and 
explains how his religious faith impacts the way he spends his money.   
Well, I guess spending money on the things I believe in, the things that will 
impact the world with the gospel rather than just on being comfortable or 
being in interesting places.  I enjoy seeing interesting places and I like to 
see a good play or a good movie, or a good concert.  But I don't do a whole 
lot of that.  Not because it's not valuable, but it's not what my primary 
objective is. I don't spend a lot of money on those areas.  If I'm having 
coffee or eating out with people that I want to get to know, why then, that's 
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different.  I spend a little more money in that area. 
 
Here, Tucker can justify spending money on eating out with people whom he wants to 
get to know, but not on other things.  Reaching out to others (or helping others) is the 
most frequently cited moral reason for engaging in household economic activity, with 
36 percent of the householding moral reasons falling into this category.  Nineteen (19) 
percent of the reasons point to following the Bible, frequently following the example 
of Jesus’ lifestyle.  Warren, a college professor, claims, “Living simply, I think, is 
more of following…the example of Jesus and his disciples. You know, they were not 
the economic elite of their day. They were simple folk.”   
 Fifteen (15) percent refer to helping the earth or the environment as a moral 
reason.  Galen says, “We're trying to buy more locally grown products. You know, 
we're cutting down on transportation of food type of things.”  Thirteen (13) percent of 
the reasons fall into the remaining pure category.  For instance, one retiree strives to 
reduce his income so as to avoid paying taxes altogether and thereby not support the 
government’s military spending.  Others did not allow immoral entertainment media 
into their homes.  Eight (8) percent explain their householding in terms of freeing up 
resources to be used for other moral ends, which I call better use of resources.  Three 
(3) percent indicate the resources they have are a gift which impacts their 
householding (see Appendix 5 for a sample of moral reasons for householding). 
 
Comparing Moral Reasons 
 I now turn to the patterns that emerge by comparing the distribution of moral 
reasons across the three categories of MEB.  In particular, I zone in on the proportion 
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of responses that fall into the helping others and remaining pure categories.  Viewing 
the three MEBs side by side reveals that SRI is highly associated with remaining pure 
(62 percent of SRI moral reasons) but fewer SRI reasons referred to helping others (27 
percent).  In contrast, charitable giving and householding see higher proportions of 
helping others and lower proportions of remaining pure (see Figure 4.1).   
 
Figure 4.1.  Proportion of Moral Reasons by Type of Moral  
Economic Behavior (MEB) 
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Note: Chi Square = 126 (p< .001) for all moral reasons (N = 211).  For clarity’s sake,  
this figure only shows proportion of two categories of moral reasons,  
remaining pure and helping others. 
Source: 2010 Praxis Interviews 
 
These descriptive statistics demonstrate that, while different forms of morality 
can be attached to all MEBs, there are nonetheless distinguishable patterns.  The fact 
that SR investors have a harder time articulating how their investments actually help 
others provides one explanation for the hesitancy of more people to invest in SRIs.  
Inversely, despite the certain sacrifice of dollars that accompany charitable giving, 
there is a more natural social connection to other people who tangibly benefit from the 
contributions.  This social connection provides a sociological and moral explanation 
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for the relative willingness of people to give their money away.  
CONCLUSION 
 Upon considering the contrasting monetary implications of giving and SR 
investing, I posed the question, why are Americans more likely to give their money 
away than invest it ethically?  To help answer this question, I focus on mental 
accounting and morality.  It is acknowledged that this theoretical orientation and the 
subsequent research questions downplay convincing alternative explanations to this 
puzzle.  For instance, people are routinely faced with the opportunity to give, 
exemplified by a passing plate at weekly religious services or evening phone calls 
requesting contributions to charities.  In contrast, individuals are unlikely to be 
confronted with the moral implications of their investment decisions on such a routine 
basis.  Put another way, some may not even know about SRI options and this would 
obviously explain why they do not invest that way. The quantitative sample examined 
here partially deflects this issue because denominational respondents are especially 
likely to have heard of their own denomination’s SRI mutual fund.  But it is 
acknowledged that this research design does not perfectly control for the structural 
opportunity to invest in SRI.  Instead, I explore how mental accounting and the form 
of morality might provide additional explanatory leverage.   
Data are collected from American Mennonites, a small denomination that lays 
claim to its own SRI mutual fund.  This tractable site of research yields ample data for 
analysis of an otherwise relatively small and hidden population of SR investors.  
However, this also raises the issue generalizability.  What can Mennonites tell us 
about average Americans?  Mennonites tend to be pacifists that value simplicity and 
community.  However, these particularities are discussed in light of more abstract 
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concepts that are generalizable to all SR investors.  For instance, refusing to own 
military stock is one example of a broader form of morality I refer to as remaining 
pure.  All SRI funds select other kinds of stock they want to avoid, making this form 
of morality applicable to all ethical investors.  The importance placed on community 
(as practiced in mutual aid) is represented by the helping others form of morality, but 
there are many other examples as well that are more generalizable to all Americans.  
Lastly, simplicity is a kind of householding MEB that finds particular resonance 
among Mennonites, but I also catalogue other householding MEBs and intentionally 
analyze the moral forms associated with the broad householding category.  This too 
enhances generalizability to a larger population.   
A mental accounting orientation leads to two competing hypotheses. 
Depending on the breadth and nature of mental accounts, charitable giving could 
crowd out or track with SRI dollars.  This article demonstrates that giving and SR 
investing are correlated, thereby providing evidence that actors segregate their SRI 
dollars and giving dollars into separate mental accounts.  Qualitative evidence 
confirms this segregation.  Namely, when prompted to think about their potential 
similarities, 93 percent said they thought they were different and this difference was 
explained mostly in monetary terms.  Interview respondents explained that the giver 
loses control of money and expects nothing material in return, while the investor 
maintains control and expects more money back.  However, these important monetary 
differences between giving and SRI reemphasize this article’s puzzle.  In other words, 
if we only consider the monetary outcome (which was salient to interview 
respondents), we would expect higher levels of involvement in SRI because of its 
preferred economic outcome. 
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After establishing this segregation of moral mental accounts, I part ways with 
the thrust of most behavioral economics research.  It is not my intent to conclude that 
these segregated mental accounts are irrational and produce suboptimal economic 
outcomes.  Instead, I analyze the moral meaning actors derive from their MEB in 
attempt to better understand their economic behavior.  This methodological approach, 
quite familiar among sociologists, assumes actors are consciously making decisions 
and therefore able to articulate their own motivation.   
Therefore, I take a closer look at the moral reasons individuals provide for 
engaging in MEB.  The remaining pure form of morality is most commonly associated 
with SRI, no doubt because these funds are frequently defined and marketed mostly by 
their screening activity.  Recall, however, that Praxis is also heavily engaged in 
shareholder advocacy and community investment.  Respondents could draw upon 
these alternative activities as they think about the religious implications of their 
investments.  They instead prefer to draw from the deontological well of morality 
which focuses on the individual remaining pure from perceived profanations, such as 
the military related stocks.  This form of morality, however, is less associated with 
charitable giving and householding. 
 The helping others form of morality emphasizes social relations and resembles 
a consequentialist version of morality, wherein the implications of behavior are taken 
into account.  Actors more frequently articulate this helping others form of morality 
when discussing their giving and householding behavior and less so for SRI.  Zelizer 
(2011) suggests the concept of mental accounting is enriched through consideration of 
the social relations that provide meaning to money.  In this vein, I suggest the more 
tangible and relational nature of helping others, and its greater association with 
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charitable giving, provide a convincing explanation for why many give money away, 
but few invest ethically.  Actors can more readily see the direct repercussions of their 
charitable donations while they have more difficulty doing so through investing 
ethically in the financial market.   
This relational component of morality echoes Weber’s prescient view of 
modern rational capitalism.  Weber ([1915]1946) writes, “The more the world of the 
modern capitalist economy follows its own immanent laws, the less accessible it is to 
any imaginable relationship with a religious ethic of brotherliness.  The more rational, 
and thus impersonal, capitalism becomes, the more is this the case [italics mine]” (pg. 
331).  The impersonal nature of the financial market creates an awkward context for 
an ethic of brotherliness or a helping others form of morality to flourish.   
Just as behavioral economists are finding the importance of mental categories 
in determining monetary behavior, this article isolates morality as an equally 
important factor.  While I have concentrated on charitable giving and SRI as specific 
examples of moral economic behavior (MEB), morality can impact a much broader 
array of economic behavior.  For example, many household economic activities carry 
moral significance for social actors.  Future research should continue to examine the 
conditions under which morality is likely to be unleashed and the conditions under 
which it is not.  This research has shown that the form of morality (whether remaining 
pure or helping others) can make a difference.   
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ENDNOTES 
1
 At year end of 2009, there were 8,624 US mutual funds, totaling $11.1 trillion in 
assets (Investment Company Institute Factbook 2010). Social Investment Forum 
(2010) reports 250 SRI mutual funds totaling $316.1 billion.  The proportions SRI 
fund and SRI assets come to about 3 percent.  This may underestimate how many 
Americans mutual fund investors are investing in SRIs, if individuals tend to put 
smaller amounts in SRI funds.  On the other hand, a few wealthy Americans could 
invest large chunks of money in SRI mutual funds, which means three percent would 
be an overestimation.  By including assets held by large institutional investors and 
individuals alike, an estimated 12.2 percent of total assets under management is 
invested according to SRI criteria (Social Investment Forum 2010).  However, given 
this article’s focus on the social behavior of individuals, I focus on the proportion of 
mutual fund assets because it more closely approximates individual investor behavior.   
 
2
 About 44 percent of American households own a mutual fund, inside or outside 
employer-sponsored retirement plans.  Sixty-eight (68) percent of mutual fund owning 
households in the United States hold mutual funds inside employer-sponsored 
retirement plan accounts (Investment Company Institution 2010), which typically 
provide their employees with a finite array of mutual fund options.  This raises one 
possible explanation for the low levels of SRI involvement.  Perhaps few employers 
offer them as options in their benefit packages.  One way to address this possibility is 
to look at one fund family that is frequently available through such benefit plans.  
Many workers in the education field have the option of investing in TIAA-CREF’s 
mutual fund family and one of the many mutual funds available is an SRI fund.  
Viewing all TIAA-CREF mutual fund assets as of January 31, 2011 (Bloomberg 
Terminal), reveals Social Choice assets make up less than 1 percent of all assets in that 
fund family.  This confirms the low level of SRI involvement, even among those that 
have a viable option.      
 
3
 For the purposes of this article, the second “outward orientation” moral criterion is 
designed to preclude the potential moral position that one ought to look out for one’s 
own self  interest.     
 
4
 This estimate is produced from the Association of Statisticians of American 
Religious Bodies (ASARB) and retrieved from the ARDA (http://www.thearda.com/).  
It tallies the number of adherents from the following Mennonite family 
denominations: Mennonite Church USA, Mennonite Brethren Churches, Old Order 
Mennonite, Church of God in Christ (Mennonite), Conservative Mennonite 
Conference, Beachy Amish Mennonite Churches, Evangelical Mennonite Church, 
Eastern Pennsylvania Mennonite Church and Reformed Mennonite Church. 
 
5
 MMA has since changed its name to Everence. 
 
6
 The Mennonite Church Membership Profile (CMP) survey was conducted by Don 
Kraybill, Carl Desportes Bowman and Conrad Kanagy and the data are available for 
purchase from the Young Center for Anabaptist and Pietist Studies. All forthcoming 
data descriptions and analyses derive from data that is weighted to account for 
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differential congregational response rates.  This weighting adjustment ensures the 
correct balance of geographic and congregational representation that the initial 
sampling procedure was designed to accomplish.  The weights also account for the 
differential response rates of men and women.   
Income and home value categorical values were converted to continuous data 
by randomly selecting values within each appropriate category.  Missing values of 
independent variables were manually imputed by constructing regression models with 
existing data and predicting values.  Congregational indicator variables were cleaned 
from data, rendering multi-level modeling impossible.  In addition to dropping 
respondents that do not invest in any mutual fund, 147 respondents that report getting 
auto insurance from Mennonite Mutual Aid (MMA) are dropped because MMA did 
not offer car insurance at the time of the survey.   
 
7 An additional analysis (not shown here) reveals that financially literate respondents 
are more willing to participate in the phone interview.  This means the qualitative data 
stem from a slightly more financially literate sample than the original phone survey 
sample. 
 
8
 The ordered categories of the proportion of income given to religious and charitable 
causes are as follows: less than 1 percent, 1 to 5, 5 to 9, 10, 11-20, and more than 20 
percent.  Due to the uneven magnitude of these categories, I confirm the robustness of 
forthcoming Ordered Logistic regression results with a Logistic regression model 
which predicts the binary outcome of giving 10 percent or more and an ad hoc 
summary of a Multinomial Logistic Regression models (see Appendix 2).  In sum, the 
featured results are supported with these additional models. 
 
9
 Of the 41 interviews, I skipped this interview prompt with 12 respondents, usually 
because other questions took up more time than I had expected and I had to cut 
questions.  Two respondents were asked the question, but did not seem to understand 
it.  This leaves 27 respondents for analysis. 
 
10
 Here are some examples of reasons I am not considering moral.  For instance, 
investing in Praxis because one’s employer offers it does not count as a moral reason 
because it is not explained as an imperative action.  In other words, it is not explained 
as “the right thing to do.”  Likewise explaining, “I live simply because I was brought 
that way” does not count as a moral reason because it implies an ingrained habit and 
fails to explicate a moral imperative.  Investing with Praxis because one wants more 
liquid assets (in comparison to real estate) is not considered moral because the action 
is solely justified in terms of the benefit to ego and fail to meet the “outward 
orientation” criterion.   
 
11
 Out of the 499 Praxis investors surveyed in another portion of my research, one is 
“not religious” and four are not part of a religious group.  This information justified 
my assumption that most interview respondents would have some degree of religious 
experience.  One interviewee was uncomfortable with the term “religious faith,” but 
was more comfortable the term “spirituality.” 
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12
 Most moral reasons were gleaned from responses to the following four interview 
prompts (see  Appendix 1)…   
1. Can you tell me a little bit about why you began investing with Praxis?   
5. I’m wondering, does your religious faith impact the way you spend your 
money? If so, how?  
6. Now I'd like you to think about everyday life and the things you do to take of 
your household.  By that, I mean getting groceries, eating meals, taking care of the 
house and also the  things you do in your free time for leisure. Would you 
say that your religious faith impacts these household activities?  If so, how?  
7. Is there a connection between your religious faith and your decision to invest  
with Praxis?   
 
13 Toward the end of my interviews, I asked respondents to explicitly name the kinds 
of companies they would not feel comfortable investing in through their mutual fund 
(Q20 in Appendix 1).  Responses to this question are not included in my population of 
moral reasons and are therefore not coded as remaining pure.  I have excluded these 
responses from analysis because the prompt (given toward the end of interviews) too 
strongly elicits responses that would fall into the remaining pure category.  This 
means moral reasons analyzed in this article were voluntarily given.   
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Appendix 1. Interview Script for Praxis Mutual Fund Investors_______________ 
 
Motivation for investing with Praxis 
1. First question, can you tell me a little bit about why you began investing with Praxis?  
-(if answer is about investing in any kind of mutual fund) There are many mutual 
funds available for people to invest in.  Can you tell me why you are investing with 
Praxis- and not some other fund? 
 
2. Pretend for a moment that Praxis mutual funds did not exist.  If that were the case, do you 
think you would still be investing in the financial market; in stocks and bonds?   
-If so, how?  
 -If not, what might you do with your money that is now in Praxis? 
 
3. In general, when you do think about your Praxis investments, how does it make you feel?   
 -Prompt: Do you have negative thoughts or positive thoughts? 
 
4. Do you currently have a financial adviser that helps you with your mutual fund 
investments? 
 -Tell me about your relationship with that financial adviser.  
  -Is he or she associated with MMA? 
  -Do you feel like your adviser is pushing you toward more Praxis  
  investments? 
 
Religion and Economy 
5. I’m wondering, does your religious faith impact the way you spend your money? 
 -If so, how? 
 
6. Now I'd like you to think about everyday life and the things you do to take of your 
household.  By that, I mean getting groceries, eating meals, taking care of the house and also 
the things you do in your free time for leisure. Would you say that your religious faith impacts 
these household activities? 
 -If so, how? 
 
7. Is there a connection between your religious faith and your decision to invest with Praxis?   
 -Tell me more about that connection or lack of connection.  
 
8. Some think that contributing money to a religious mutual fund, such as Praxis, is similar to 
contributing money to your church.  How do you react to that idea? 
 
 
9. Do you attend church?  
-Do you hear about Praxis funds at your church?   
 -If so, tell me more about that. 
  
10. I’m thinking of the parable where Jesus says, you can’t serve both God and money.  Some 
would interpret this verse to mean there is a conflict between investing in the financial market 
and being a Christian.  Do you feel that conflict at all? 
 
11. In your opinion, is it acceptable for a Christian to be wealthy? 
 -Can you tell me what you are thinking about as you answer this question? 
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Investments and return performance 
12. What do you plan to use the money from your Praxis investment for?   
 
13. In general, how are you feeling about your financial future? 
 
14. How often do think about the return performance of your Praxis fund?   
 -When you do, what comes to your mind? 
 
15. If you were to learn that the return performance of your MMA Praxis fund was usually 
lower than conventional funds, how likely is it that you would sell some shares for that 
reason?   
 -Can you tell me what you are thinking about as you answer this question? 
 
16.  Have you or your financial adviser ever sold shares of a mutual fund in past because of 
low return performance? 
 -If so, was that from your Praxis fund, or some other kind of fund? 
 
17. Suppose your Praxis fund were to earn much higher returns than conventional funds.  
Would you feel comfortable attributing that high return performance to God’s intervention? 
 -Can you tell me what you are thinking about as you answer this question? 
 
18. The last couple of years were pretty bad for the financial market.  Did the financial crisis 
of 2008 and 2009 affect you personally?   
 
19.  Did the financial crisis change the way you think about the financial market? 
 -If so, how? 
 
Ethical component  
20. As you may know, a mutual fund, such as Praxis, owns stock in lots of different 
corporations.  I’m wondering, are there certain kinds of corporations that you don’t want your 
mutual fund to own stock in? 
-Are you engaging with these ethical issues in any other areas of your life?  If so,  
how? 
 
21. Were you aware that Praxis tries to change the behavior of some of the companies that it 
owns?   
 - Can you talk a little bit about how this is or is not important to you?   
 
22. In your opinion, is Praxis making a difference in society; are corporations listening? 
- Would you still invest in Praxis, even if it were not making a big difference society? 
 
23. Do you invest in non-ethical mutual funds or conventional mutual funds? 
 -Do you think that mutual fund may own corporations that you ethically disagree  
 with? 
-How can you reconcile that with your religious faith? 
 
Closing questions 
24. Just recently, MMA announced that it will be changing its name from MMA to Everence.  
Were you aware of this?    
 -In general, what is your reaction to this name change?  
 -Does the fact that they are taking “Mennonite” out of their name concern you? 
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25. Within the past 2 years or so, can you recall a time when you spoke with your friends or 
extended family about your Praxis investments? 
 -What kinds of things do you talk about? 
 
26. In my research, I’m only talking to people that invest in Praxis, but I’m curious about 
people who know about the funds and choose not to invest.  Has anyone told you why they 
would not invest in Praxis? 
 -What reason did they give? 
 
27.  I have a few demographic questions as we close.  Are you retired?  What do you (did you) 
do for a living?  How many children do you have? 
 
28. Are there any other questions you wished I would have asked?  Anything you want to let 
me know? 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 2. Ordered Logit, Logistic and Multinomial Regression Analyses of 
Proportional Giving  
Number of 
Statisically 
Significant 
Comparisonsd
Proportional giving: less than 1 percent (referent) - - - - - - 
Proportional giving: 1 to 5 percent - - - - - - 
Proportional giving: 5 to 9 percent - - - - - - 
Proportional giving: 10 percent - - - - - - 
Proportional giving: 11 to 20 percent - - - - - - 
Proportional giving: more than 20 percent - - - - - - 
Invests in Praxis 2.11*** 2.15*** 10
Female 0.9 1.09 2
Age 1.02*** 1.02*** 13
2005 income (in $1,000s) 1.00 0.99 1
2005 income (in $1,000s) squared 1.00 1.00 0
Home value (in $1,000s) 1.00 1.00 0
Home value (in $1,000s) squared 1.00 1.00 0
Voted for George W. Bush in 2004 1.11 1.31+ 1
Religion is most important thing in my life 1.98*** 1.94*** 10
Attends church less than monthly 0.04*** 0.05*** 13
Attends church monthly 0.20*** 0.12*** 11
Attends church weekly 0.49** 0.32** 8
Attends church more than weekly (referent)
Edu: High school graduate or below 1.13 1.35 0
Edu: Some college 1.05 1.26 0
Edu: College graduate 1.22 1.22 0
Edu: Some graduate school (referent)
N 1223
  Odds Ratio 
of Givingb
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
 Odds Ratio 
of Tithingc 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
1223 1223
 
+ p<.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 for two tailed test 
b
 Ordered Logistic Regression results, identical to Model 2 in Table 4.2. 
c Logistic Regression results, predicting whether or not respondent gives 10 percent or more to 
charity. 
d
 The number of statistically significant comparisons derives from a Multinomial Logit model 
which predicts the following outcome categories; less than 1 percent, 1-5, 5-9, 10, 11-20 and 
more than 20 percent.  This is the same outcome as the Ordered Logit model, but the 
Multinomial Logit model does not assume an order.  With six outcome categories, there are 15 
possible comparisons to analyze (less than 1 percent vs. 1 to 5, less than 1 percent vs. 6 to 9, 
…, 11 to 20 percent vs. more than 20).  To parsimoniously summarize these results, I sum the 
number of statistically significant (p < 0.05) coefficients, which report the effect of each 
independent variable on each outcome category relative to each other possible outcome 
category.  When more than half (about 8) comparisons coefficients are statistically significant, 
I consider the independent variable to have an important impact on giving.     
Source: 2006 Mennonite Church Membership Profile 
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Appendix 3.  Moral Reasons for Praxis Investing (n=73) 
Remaining Pure (n=45) Helping Others (n=20) Bible Directive (n=1) Allegiance to Church Org. (n=5) Help Environment (n=2)
Warren: to not be directly investing 
in things that I don't agree with… 
alcohol, tobacco, military.
Ronald: wanted to make sure that 
the money... was being used for 
peaceful purposes, to help other 
countries get on their feet
Julie: And, so we prayed 
about that, and it just 
seemed to feel like this 
one was the right one to 
go with. 
Laura: because it's a Mennonite 
organization and we're 
Mennonite… and we feel like we 
should use our own 
denominational organizations
Gille: anti-war stance and the 
environmental stance.  
Warren: You know, those kinds of 
… companies I wouldn't invest in I 
also would not work for.
Ronald: we felt that we were doing 
some good for the world by putting 
money into the fund
Dustin: I really pretty strongly 
consider our church institutions 
before I think about other things 
Gid:  they try to invest in 
companies that respect the 
environment
Ronald: ever since we've learned 
about SRIs, we've tried to put our 
money into places where we know 
it's not going, especially into 
military... emphasis.
Ronald: we feel like we're investing 
in good things, we're helping other 
countries... we're using the 
money… for peacemaking and 
good, constructive building
Dave: It's probably... loyalty... to 
denominational...products and 
institutions
Ronald:  our big bias is against the 
amount of money involved in the 
military.
Ronald: we want that to be used in 
a way that is going to promote 
peace in the world… as well as 
good health and good futures for 
people that we don't even know 
about 
Juanita: some things you just do 
because you are part of an 
organization.  And... I'm part of a 
church 
Leon: we don't like to see our 
money being used for military or 
for production of alcoholic products 
and tobacco and those kinds of 
things.
Ronald: for constructive world 
purposes. 
Jody: I attend a Mennonite church, 
and so the Praxis was through the 
Mennonite financial institution. It 
was a way of supporting…  what I 
would consider my financial 
institution.
Leon: it is invested in places that 
are productive
James: Praxis is involved 
with...assisting with congregational 
programs through MMA. 
Jason:  I feel as though I'm not 
supporting anything that would 
violate my conscience… by being 
in Praxis
Ken: it's more important for me 
that I invest in things where people 
are not being hurt by. 
James: trying to find investments 
that aren't supporting military 
involvement and... unethical drugs, 
and tobacco, and alcohol
Ken: hopefully my contributing to a 
Praxis fund is in some way 
helping…,in some virtuous way, 
the needs of this world
Laura: they invested in companies 
that were responsible companies 
and have our same values
Dustin:  our church gets grants 
from MMA... We've gotten grants 
for youth group, or help some other 
people... It doesn't seem like we 
should be willing to request those 
funds unless we're willing to invest 
with... Praxis
Laura: they are going to be 
investing in good companies that 
would closely align with our own 
values.
Dustin: practical ways to do 
peacemaking
Jayne: I would never...go online 
and think, "Oh, I'm gonna invest in 
RJ Reynolds...or I'm gonna invest 
in Playboy." 
Dustin: it seems highly hypocritical 
not to at least invest some of my 
investments with MMA if I'm gonna 
ask them to match things for 
people in my Sunday school class
Elmer: I was particularly pleased 
that they... steer clear of 
investments that support the 
military expenditures, and I'm 
concerned about justice issues 
and human rights.
Pat: they were doing their best to 
invest in things that were good for 
people and not detrimental to their 
health...I like when...I...can do 
something positive for somebody 
rather than harm
Galen: I like to invest in things that 
are not going for... military 
companies…, companies 
that...have questionable, you know, 
the way they treat people, their 
workers
Ivy:  to be involved in things that 
bring life rather than to destroy life
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Appendix 3 Continued.  Moral Reasons for Praxis Investing (n=73) 
Helping Others
Ken: I can't be saying it's most 
important for me to maximize my 
returns regardless of, you know, 
where those returns are coming 
from
Randy: Well, as far as the Praxis, I 
wouldn't want to support any... 
beer or cigarettes, companies like 
that
Rachel: MMA does a lot in aiding 
people in need
Dottie: they would be investing in 
place that we'd be more prone
Randy: I wouldn't want to support 
non-ethical companies
Francine: all of the mission and 
service things our church is doing 
is very similar to what SRI is about.  
You know, in terms of helping 
communities and helping people in 
communities. 
Dottie: we wouldn't have to worry 
so much about it going to places 
where we wouldn't want it to
Lamar: they do make investments 
in accordance with our faith values.  
We oppose participation in war 
activities and military activities.  In 
supporting... tobacco industries 
Juanita: if there is money left of 
what is invested, that is distributed 
back to the people that need it  
Brittney: the money that is being 
invested is invested in companies 
that do not promote abortion, or 
you know, those types of things 
that we do not go along with…
Lamar: their investments are in 
accordance with our traditional 
values
Marilyn:  they [MMA] are able to 
help persons of need… I know 
through our church there have 
been several people who have 
applied for grants for specific 
needs
Brittney: that the companies are in 
good standing and they're upright 
and they're not crooked
Elvin: I still have a strong pacifist 
streak.  So avoiding defense 
spending has some appeal to me
Marilyn: it's investing [in] other 
persons who need it
Dustin:  and not things that were 
used for destructive purposes. 
Frances: the investments... are not 
in things like alcohol, abortion 
related medical situations and ... 
companies that would take 
advantage of people unfairly.  Even 
in other countries, and certainly in 
our own.
Marilyn: we are supporting 
something that would be beneficial 
elsewhere, other than just us
Dustin: to invest that in things that 
were at least neutral or good
Drick: they are investing in funds 
that I can support faith wise
Frances: when the church 
contributes to help somebody out 
in the community... MMA will 
actually match that contribution 
Gille: anti-war stance and the 
environmental stance.  
Laurence:  would not invest in let's 
say tobacco, alcohol or companies 
associated with war 
Gille: I wanted to be sure that my 
money was not going to support 
the really bad stuff that some 
companies do, like war machinery
Alan: as far as we know, they don't 
invest with companies that deal 
with... alcohol and stuff with that.  
Wilber: trying to invest in 
companies that were more… 
ethical in their business practices.  
Glen: the money actually was 
being invested in stuff that didn't go 
against things that we believed in.  
Wilber: MMA's effort to invest in 
ethical companies
Chester: We understood that it had 
money invested... more carefully 
aligned with issues that were not 
negative to the Anabaptists faith… 
like alcohol and gambling 
Eloise:  the money is invested in 
mutual funds that we're not 
ashamed to invest in.  
Gid: they're probably not going to 
invest in arms merchant, and they 
try to invest in companies that 
respect the environment
Eloise: they're companies that I 
would personally choose to invest 
in, rather than... alcohol and that 
type of thing
Tucker: careful with their scrutiny 
of companies they invest in terms 
of social responsibility. 
Ivy: they're very careful that there's 
nothing that, as a Christian, we 
would not want to be involved in.
Marilyn:  it doesn't channel into…. 
organizations that I don't want to 
support.
Ivy: The money is being used in 
good areas
Marilyn: to support things that are 
pacifist.
Remaining Pure
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Ronald: not to use it for things that 
are involved in weaponry and 
donate to stuff like that. Like the 
NRA, I would never give a donation 
to them.
Warren: the part that's connected 
to tithing there are Bible verses 
that talk about sharing with those 
in need…. people have enough to 
eat.
Warren: the part that's connected 
to tithing there are Bible verses 
that talk about sharing with those 
in need…. people have enough to 
eat.
Ronald: the stewardship position 
has made me think about making 
sure that I'm tithing as a gratitude 
response to God
Jody:  I donate money to my 
church. I think of that being for the 
whole church
Chester: I feel biblically that there 
is a tremendous emphasis there, 
both by the example of Christ and 
also the guidelines and principles 
of the Bible.  There's a lot to be 
done in serving other people, the 
more you spend on yourself the 
less you spend on other people.  
So we try to keep our charity level 
is pretty high.  
Roy: I think there is in the sense 
that I would like to look at the 
money the Lord has given us as a 
gift. And if I can, I want to utilize 
that gift the best way I can. And 
whether it's helping the church 
grow by... giving an offering 
Roy: I feel, as a group, we have a 
responsibility to watch out for each 
other, where there are needs. And, 
um, we endeavor to use that 
money where we understand 
needs can be met by the use of it.
Ronald: we've focused on following 
the Gospel by aiming for 10% of 
our gross in what we contribute. 
Um, that's sort of our manner of 
saying, "This is our first fruits." 
Sheila: I think it's just the general 
teaching in terms of what we have 
has been given to us graciously, 
you know, by God... part of that is 
just the mindset to share with 
others and to give back, not only to 
the church but to other 
organizations that are helping 
people  
Roy: And whether it's helping the 
church grow by… giving an 
offering and helping people bring 
the word to other individuals, to 
me, it's pretty important.
Bradley: Jesus said share!  Give a 
tenth and give above the tenth! 
Marilyn: we want to have an 
attitude of gratitude, if you've heard 
that before.  So we are returning to 
God what he has gifted us to 
return.
Jason: I'm giving my money to my 
church to be used locally to help 
my community
Laurence: It says be generous, 
sermon on the Mount and Jesus’ 
words say
Jason: I don't view it as my money.  
I'm a steward of it, and so I have to 
think about what I do with it. So the 
examples... would be… giving, a 
lot of giving
James:   We are careful in tithing 
and giving and trying to be 
generous and helping in areas 
where it really is helpful.
Brittney: we give to our church, that 
money, that belongs to God, 
anyway, I mean, generally yeah, all 
of it belongs to God...
Laura: we're supportive to… our 
local church.  Our congregation is 
supportive to people's needs
Ivy: we feel very committed to 
tithing, not because church says 
we should, but that we feel that 
that is definitely the Lord's. 
Brittney: we give to our church… 
whether it goes to missions, or to 
our pastors salary, or the upkeep 
of the church.
Marilyn: We believe that God has 
given us money, not to, for our 
use, but he lends it to us so that 
we can help those that we need.  
Our money is not ours but is his 
His, actually from God.  The gifts 
that we have, the talents that we 
have to even earn our money are 
from God. 
Bradley: giving money is giving 
money to help others with no 
personal gain.
Pat: I've given... a five hundred 
dollar gas card to a mother with 
four children just trying to get back 
on her feet
Ivy: And we try to give well beyond 
the tithe…. that we want to share 
what we have.  
Sheila:  part of that is just the 
mindset to share with others and to 
give back.  Not only to the church 
but... to other organizations that 
are helping people. 
Francine:  I think my values 
coming out of my faith tell me to 
use my money generously with 
other people.
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Helping Others
Fracine:   I like contributing to my 
church specifically because I feel 
that they've done a lot of good in 
the community. 
Chester:  There's a lot to be done 
in serving other people, the more 
you spend on yourself the less you 
spend on other people.  So we try 
to keep our charity level pretty 
high.... Over the last couple of 
years, I'm semi-retired status, I'm 
no longer making income that I did.  
And therefore we have cut back, 
and even though we never took 
elaborate vacations, we are not 
taking near the vacations we did.  
All of that money is going to people 
in need.
Chester:  give away 10% of your 
money...  I think there is a balance 
there between taking care of 
yourself, saving, and taking care of 
others, charity.  
Juanita: I think since I have the 
money I should share it with those 
that don't have it
Juanita: If I happen to get some 
financial gains, then, like I say, that 
just means that I have more 
money to share with others.
Kurt: we try to make… donations to 
organizations that reflect concerns 
for the Earth and the Earth's 
people too.
Marilyn: I think it's being able to 
help, when we hear of a need of 
someone that either has problems 
financially that we know personally, 
or an organization that needs 
funds to keep their business or 
their organization going, we are 
very generous in giving.
Marilyn: I would consider us to be 
very good givers to persons of our 
denomination and persons that 
would need financial help.
Marilyn: the church is local and 
church is relationships and church 
is family to us 
Lamar: we have two sons, one son 
is full time, he and his wife are to 
full time with the Inter-Varsity 
Christian fellowship... we help 
support them out of our income...  
someday we might want to pull out 
money and make them more 
available to our sons to for what 
they are doing.  Or else our own 
church here in [city] 
Frances: our children… are 
involved in some sort of Christian 
work and so we are doing a lot of 
supporting on that end too
Laurence: It says be generous, 
sermon on the Mount and Jesus’ 
words say… so, if you're spending 
on yourself it makes it more 
difficult to meet the needs of 
others.
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Jayne:  [wouldn't buy pornography] Warren: We'll make a few 
purchases from sort of fair trade 
organizations for similar reasons. It 
comes out of a religious conviction 
about how people should be paid. 
Warren:  Living simply, I think, is 
more of following... the example of 
Jesus and His disciples. You know, 
they were not this economic elite of 
their day. They were simple folk.
Ronald: we've gone over the whole 
house to make it more green... 
Now we've cut down our fuel 
consumption considerably... as a 
way to not be such users of the 
Earth's resources. 
Elmer: we live simply so that we 
don't need to pay taxes when a 
higher percentage of taxes go to 
military
Ronald: one of the things that 
[wife's name] and I believe in 
together is the importance of 
Christian hospitality. And so we 
have adopted, or we've put 
together an evening meal invitation 
where we invite local [university] 
students over for supper. And that 
sometimes is three times a week
 Brittney: [prays before big 
purchases, like] whether  or not to 
spend money to go on a vacation
Laura: we try to keep our living 
simple, and we're not tightwads, 
but we are frugal. We have solar 
energy, and we garden and recycle 
and just preserving the earth and 
helping the earth to keep as clean 
as we can
Galen: Well, I think it's the 
conscious use of resource. Not not 
only money but... what's been 
given to you.  You make a 
conscious effort to not ...squander 
it, or... use it for good rather 
than…evil type of things.
Leon: one important aspect of 
stewardship handling for a wealthy 
person is how the will is written.  I 
think it should be a will that does 
not forget family, does not forget 
the children and the 
grandchildren..., should not leave 
them feeling neglected. At the 
same time, I think in the case of a 
huge estate, it's appropriate for a 
very significant percentage... to be 
willed to charities, to the Lord's 
work.
Leon: my wife has a green thumb 
and... last year... our porch... was 
pictured in the paper as one of 
[county's] prettiest porches.  And 
people talk to her about that when 
she circulates around town... They 
notice that, and she sees it as a 
witness.  Where it becomes a 
talking point and a way to share 
Christ... we try to keep things neat 
and clean around the place here, 
and that way we do it not only... 
ourselves, I think we do it for the 
Lord also.
Galen: we're trying to buy more 
locally-grown products…  We're 
cutting down on transportation of 
food type of things. 
Dottie: I just wouldn't waste my 
money on a lot of stuff like alcohol 
or, you know, smoking.
Leon: when it comes to eating in a 
restaurant you could eat more 
cheaply just out of the grocery 
store, but at the restaurant you're 
also making a contribution to 
somebody else's living… So I 
might justify myself that way, too
Leon: we do spend time in 
devotional time…that takes some, 
a little more time … most days.  
We think in terms of the Church, 
and we think in terms of the Lord, 
what does the Lord want of us?
Dustin: my daughter has decided 
to only eat meat once a day, and...I 
try to do the same thing.... 
particularly red meat, how much 
water it takes to produce red 
meat...some of those issues about 
what it does to the environment.  
Bradley: I don't go around to bars, I 
don't go to shows that I shouldn't 
go to... I choose my movies based 
on the ratings or what they're 
presenting, rather than just go 
because everybody's going to this 
movie.  
James: we do tend to spend 
money on travel and hosting 
people or things like that when it's 
related to church and missions 
ministries
Juanita: I think Jesus is our 
example and he sure lived a 
simple life, and so, I don't quite 
measure up there, but that is our 
example
Mimi:   Making choices about...how 
we treat the environment through 
things that we use... like limiting 
your garbage…using less plastic 
and stuff like that
Bradley: I look for organizations to 
purchase from that are showing 
proper business practices based 
on biblical interests...  at my 
church, we were looking for 
someone to do paving and one of 
the gentlemen we had in today, it 
was a Christian company, and 
listed as a Christian based 
company, so, that give's them an 
extra edge
Laura: we have solar energy, and 
we garden and recycle and just 
preserving the earth and helping 
the earth, to keep as clean as we 
can do for it, is some of the ways in 
which we personally contribute to 
that. Like, hoping that we will not 
put as much demand on the oil 
industry and things that would help 
to increase global warming or also 
into fights with other countries and 
wars and things like that.
Gille: Jesus taught that… the 
material things in life aren't what's 
important
Mimi: I think of spirituality as… 
caring for the earth.   We try and 
use less gasoline and ride our 
bikes and... turning your lights 
off… We do it just because it 
seems to be better for the larger 
world.  
Bradley: we go on cruises and we 
try to choose a cruise line that 
shows moral restraint. 
Ken: household chores you know, 
my wife and I ... it's kind of a joint 
effort, you know, hopefully.  We try 
to make it a team effort where, you 
know, I try to help with the dishes... 
and she helps me in my business 
where she can. 
Ivy:  this would be scripture again. 
Our treasures are in heaven, rather 
than on earth... Do not  build up 
your treasures here on earth, but in 
heaven.  And so we feel that by the 
way we spend our money...you 
know,  people are far more 
important than things.  
Glen: our house has three acres of 
what used to be hay field and 
we've tried to plant a lot of trees on 
it... fruit and nut trees, in 
particular…  We're trying 
to...reclaim the land and... improve 
it
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Leon: And I tend to be 
conservative in personal spending 
habits...  the material things that 
we have, money and whatever 
else, belongs to God. And how we 
use it, we're responsible to the 
Lord for that. It's not just a matter 
that I have it and so I can do as I 
jolly well please.
Ken: probably my resource can be 
of... better use if don't just go out 
and spend all I make on vehicles 
and whatever.
Galen: I try to... not spend a lot on 
frivolous things… [that are] here 
today and gone tomorrow
Jason:  this... probably sound like a 
sermon, but I don't view it as my 
money... I'm a steward of it... If I 
have a choice between a Chevy 
and a Cadillac, I'm gonna go with 
the Chevy… just being a good 
manager of money that isn't mine. 
We'll put it that way.
Sheila: we try to live a more 
simplistic lifestyle… and then we're 
able to give.. more
Pat: we don't feel like we need to 
have everything nice and new.  
And part of that... is being 
comfortable with myself because 
of knowing who I am in Christ. 
Pat: I try to live simply because.. I 
believe... I am steward of his 
money, it's not mine... \and so I 
believe that I need to be using that 
wisely. 
Glen: I'd love to go to Europe 
(laughter) but we've passed on 
that... I can't really...justify… 
spending that much money to...go 
to Europe, when there's a lot of 
other things out there that money 
could be spent on  
Tucker:  I make a point not to buy 
from Wal-Mart... I see them [Wal 
Mart] as a rather monopolistic 
enterprise... I've seen communities 
where the only store in town is Wal-
Mart and the only place to work is 
Wal-Mart... that means you've got 
a king... controlling everything.  I 
don't see that responsible Christian 
behavior is in the end to try to be 
the one in control.
Chester: we try to stay with more 
necessary and realistic things...the 
more you spend on yourself the 
less you spend on other people. 
Elvin: simplicity is the only thing 
that can move us to contentment... 
Out of my religious conviction, we 
need to be content with what we 
have... We've lived in the same 
house for 29 years.  A lot of our 
friends, as they’ve made more 
money they keep trading up to 
better house, a better house, 
usually more payment.  We've 
been very content to stay in this 
house.
Lamar: our simple lifestyle is a 
commitment to use our money for 
basic necessities.  We're not 
opposed to living comfortably.  But 
we try to avoid living extravagantly, 
because we think that Christians 
should be supportive of the church 
and the mission and evangelistic 
activities rather than using our 
monies for or a lot of worldly and 
extravagant living in this life. 
Frances: We try not to buy more 
things than we need because of 
not wanting to get too invested in 
the world [laughter]
 
 
